

Executive Summary

In June, 1968, a few days after the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and 2 months after the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King, President Lyndon B. Johnson established the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence -- with Johns Hopkins President Emeritus Milton S. Eisenhower as chairman and Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. as vice-chairman. On December 10, 1969, the Commission issued its final report, preceded by many volumes of staff task force reports.

The Commission was bipartisan. In terms of philosophy, the views of Commission members ran the gamut from Judge Higginbotham, Michigan Senator Philip Hart, Ambassador Patricia Roberts Harris and longshoreman-philosopher Eric Hoffer to Terrence Cardinal Cooke, Ohio Representative William McCulloch, Arizona Judge William McFarland and Nebraska Senator Roman Hruska. (Appendix 1 has biographical summaries of all Trustees and Milton Eisenhower's letter of transmission to the President, dated December 10, 1969.)

Lacking public action, the Commission predicted, in 1969, a "city of the future" in which the affluent would escape to gated communities and more distant suburbs. The suburbs would be connected by "sanitized corridors" to high rise office buildings protected by high technology in central business districts that would become deserted at night. The corridors would run over or bypass "ghetto slum" neighborhoods -- places of "terror and widespread crime."

Principal Findings

Based on the Preamble to the Constitution, the Commission's final report on December 10, 1969 was titled, *To Establish Justice, to Insure Domestic Tranquility*. Our principal finding is that, 30 years later, these goals have not been met.

How do we stand on justice today? Almost a quarter of all children 5 and under live in poverty. America is the most unequal country in the industrialized world in terms of income and wealth. The "digital divide" is accelerating the gulf between our haves and have nots. The average CEO makes 419 times as much as the average worker, and this ratio has greatly increased over the last 3 decades. The states spend more on prison building than on higher education, whereas the opposite was true at the time of the Commission. One in 3 young African-American men is in prison, on probation or on parole, up from 1 in 4 a decade ago. The rate of incarceration of African-American men today is 4 times higher than the rate of incarceration of Black men in pre-Mandela, apartheid South Africa. A primary reason is the racial bias in our sentencing laws. Filled disproportionately by minorities, our rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex is run by white men, and rural white communities send lobbyists to Washington to win grants for prisons to help in local economic development.

How do we stand on domestic tranquility today? There have been drops in violent crime, fear and unemployment since about 1993. That is welcome news -- though homicide increased by about 10% in New York City in 1999.

However the short-run decline in fear and violence since 1993 has led politicians and the media to a new and misplaced "triumphalism." To some extent, the new triumphalism represents a state of denial -- in which we exaggerate our recent successes against serious crime and ignore the implications of our high violence rates vis-a-vis other countries, not to mention our vast prison population. But there is also another problem. Although there have been significant reductions in violent crime since the early 1990s, the new triumphalism is misleading on the "why" of those declines. This interpretation is dangerous, in that it could lead us to adopt (or to continue) all the wrong anticrime policies while ignoring the things that could make an enduring difference.

The misleading triumphalism has 2 facets. First, it exaggerates the role of tough sentencing laws and tough "zero tolerance" policing in accounting for the welcome declines in crime in the last few years. Second, it *underestimates* the role of other, economic and human investment factors, like reduced unemployment, that may be more important. Put together, those twin fallacies constitute the core of a rigid policy ideology. In the words of historian Barbara Tuchman, "Rigidifying leads to increase of investment and the need to protect egos; policy founded on error multiplies, never retreats."¹

Most important, in spite of our present short run gains and in spite of a sevenfold increase in the prison population since the Violence Commission, fear and violent crime is for the most part *higher* today than in 1969, when a Commission task force report said "few things are more pervasive, more frightening, more real today than violent crime and the fear of being assaulted, mugged, robbed or raped."

Specifically, in a national poll in 1967, Americans were asked, "Is there any area right around here -- that is within a mile -- where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?" In 1967, 31% answered yes. In 1998, 41% answered yes. Similarly, the FBI Index of violent crime (murder, rape, robbery and assault combined) has increased from a big city offense rate per 100,000 of 860 in 1969 to 1218 in 1998. (Appendix 5). America's rates of violence remain *much higher* than most other industrialized nations, as in the 1960s. Today the rate of homicide death for a young man is 23 times higher in the U.S. than in England. In 1995, handguns were used to kill 2 people in New Zealand, 15 in Japan, 30 in Great Britain, 106 in Canada, 213 in Germany and 9,390 in the United States.

How Officials and The Media Underreport Criminality

One of the most distinctive things about the United States with respect to crime and punishment is that we not only have an unusually high level of serious violent crime -- but we maintain that high level of violent crime despite the fact that we *also* boast the highest level of incarceration of any country in the world but 1 (and when it comes to incarceration for ordinary street crimes, we probably even beat Russia).

This distinction points to a serious defect in the crime statistics used by our officials and reported by the media. What we call the "crime rate" measures the activity of those criminals who are still on the street. That kind of measure is useful in many ways. But as a measure of the deeper problem of criminality -- as an indicator of the tendency of our society to produce criminals -- it is obviously defective. Measuring crime this way is like measuring the extent of some physical illness in our society while systematically excluding from the count all those people who are so sick we've had to put them in the hospital. No one would think of doing that in the field of public health: We do it as a matter of course when it comes to the official crime statistics used by our leaders and the media.

If we were to measure our crime problem by our tendency to produce *criminality*, then we may be in a real sense losing the "war on crime" even as we have successfully hidden some of the losses behind prison walls -- and therefore appear superficially to be winning it.

That obviously gives us a very different sense of the health of our society and the effectiveness of our present policies. But looking at crime this way is only common sense. We feel intuitively that something is *especially* wrong if we have *both* very high rates of violent crime *and* very high incarceration rates, at the same time -- something that isn't captured in the conventional crime rate alone. Suppose 2 countries have the same official rate of violent crime, but 1 country has, proportionally, 5 times as many violent offenders behind bars. Do they really have the same violent crime problem?

This is much more than a statistical quibble. The fact is that this is the way we go about measuring most *other* social ills -- with the exception of criminality. In a reasonable culture we would not say we had won the war against disease just because we had moved a lot of sick people from their homes to hospital wards. And in a reasonable culture we would not say we have won the war against crime just because we have moved a lot of criminals from the community into prison cells.

What Works?

Yet, since the Violence Commission, we have learned a great deal about policy that doesn't work and that does work, based on scientific evaluation. Accordingly, our primary policy recommendation in this 30 year update is to stop doing what doesn't work and to replicate what does work -- but at a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem.

What doesn't work particularly well includes prison building, bootcamps, "zero tolerance" policing, the "war on drugs," supply side tax breaks for the rich, Enterprise Zones and the Job Training Partnership Act for high school dropouts.

What doesn't work often is sugar coated with false political rhetoric. For example, America won the Gulf War in the early 1990s with sufficient numbers of sufficiently paid staff and good equipment. Yet we are told that money for staff and equipment for inner city schools and for dynamic, private inner city, nonprofit organizations is not available. Instead, we often are told, inner city solutions largely should be based on "volunteerism,"

"self-sufficiency" and "empowerment." Sometimes, that is a double standard by officials who will not invest in human capital.

What doesn't work also can be immoral. For example, we believe it is immoral for the states to spend more on prison building than higher education, especially when almost a quarter of the youngest children live in poverty. There is a need for a national campaign to mobilize the clergy to regain the high moral ground.

What works, based on scientific evaluation? Leading examples include Head Start preschool, safe havens after school, the public School Development Plan of Professor James Comer at Yale University, full service community schools in which nonprofit organizations partner with individual inner-city schools, the Ford Foundation's Quantum Opportunities Program to keep inner-city youth in high school and "training first" (not "work first") job preparation for out-of-school youth modeled after the Argus Community in the South Bronx. *All of these successes reduce crime.* All also improve educational performance and develop youth in positive directions. Most also reduce drug involvement and improve employability. All have been successfully replicated.

Other examples of what works include YouthBuild USA, in which dropouts rehab housing; nonprofit community development corporations, modeled after Robert Kennedy's Mobilization for Youth, to generate inner city jobs; community-based banking to generate inner-city capital; problem-oriented, community-equity policing in which young minority officers mentor youth; diversion of nonviolent offenders from prison to treatment as begun by the State of Arizona; proven high quality drug treatment in the community closely integrated with local drug courts; the Delancey Street model in San Francisco for self-sufficiently reintegrating ex-offenders back into the community; and in-prison drug treatment like Delaware's Key Program.

Together, these existing successes simultaneously reduce crime and fear, improve education, increase employment and economically develop the community. Replicated to scale by knowledgeable leaders, *what we already know to work* can create a comprehensive, interdependent, national urban and criminal justice policy that simultaneously establishes justice and insures domestic tranquility. Such investment needs to be supported by a national economic policy that gives first priority to eliminating child poverty and creating full employment for all, including, especially, the hard-to-employ in the inner city and pockets of rural poverty.

A New Grassroots Federalism

Corporations should be asked to play as great a role as they are capable of in such a policy -- especially in terms of training and jobs. But the failure of supply side economics has made it painfully clear that only the federal government can raise the funds needed for a national policy that replicates what works to scale, eliminates child poverty and secures full employment for the hard-to-employ. At the same time, we need a new grassroots federalism in which the federal government then distributes most resources directly to local government, and especially to the private, nonprofit, inner-city organizations responsible for so much of what works.

Grassroots federalism replicated to scale should be financed through reductions in programs that don't work; fractional reductions in affirmative action for the rich, corporate welfare and the military budget; and use of a small part of the budget surplus. If, as part of its \$1.8T federal budget, the nation will not find the resources to replicate what works to scale during an unprecedented economic boom, it is uncertain whether America ever will solve its endemic problems, *even though we have the knowledge to do so.*

Changing the Will of Our Leaders

Public opinion polls tend to support the priorities set forth on these pages. For example, new public opinion findings by Albert and Susan Cantril show a majority of voters are against "government" in the abstract but for specific government investments, especially in education, training and jobs.

In spite of public opinion to the contrary, too much federal legislation in recent years has sought to expand programs that don't work and reduce programs that do work. Nor has there been any federal legislative attempt to replicate what works to a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem.

To change the will and action of political leaders, and, if necessary, to help bypass them through grassroots action and referendums, we need real campaign finance reform and a communicating what works movement that better informs voters that we do have the answers. One part of such a movement is training thousands of grassroots, nonprofit inner city leaders, advocates and clergy in "Television School," to learn how to combat the overemphasis by local television news on negative and violent stories and underemphasis on stories about what works. These local television news

priorities can cause many average citizens to believe no positive solutions exist. Another part is for new foundations based on information age fortunes to fund local community web sites through which grassroots leaders and clergy can organize advocacy against misleading mainstream media and for candidates pledged to what works.

Sentencing, Media and Firearms

A comprehensive national policy based on existing scientific evidence needs to reduce the disparity in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine, by reducing excessively long sentences for crack-related offenses; reduce the power of big media conglomerates so we can diminish entertainment and commercial violence on television; reinvigorate public television; create a national media literacy policy as a core component of the K-12 education curriculum; link firearms control to campaign finance reform; reinforce recent state and local successes in firearms control; encourage litigation against firearms manufacturers; create a national firearms licensing system; enact a federal ban on Saturday night specials; and regulate firearms as consumer products. There is considerable public opinion to support these recommendations -- including, for example, new political alliances between central city residents and more conservative "soccer mom" suburbanites in the wake of the recent wave of gun killings of children and youth in our schools, day care centers and places of worship.

A New Political Alliance

To turn our recommendations into policy, we need a new voting majority, a new political alliance. The alliance must bring together middle income Americans (who often need 2 or 3 jobs in the family to make ends meet) wage earners (who need to know that their CEOs earn on the average 419 times as much as they do) and the poor (who suffered in the 1980s and hardly improved in the 1990s). The alliance should be based on the common ground of education and re-education, training and re-training for the global marketplace. It also should be based on growing resentment by many Americans of an unfair economic deal -- in which the wealth of the super rich who are getting richer is not earned, but falls into place without effort as a result of our one dollar, one vote democracy.

In the late 1960s, after numbing assassinations and street riots, and with an understanding of how America's culture of violence produced crime rates far higher than other industrialized nations, the Violence Commission concluded that the greatness and durability of most civilizations has been determined not by external assault but by internal decay. Our civilization will be no exception.

The challenges within America require vision, not incrementalism and policy bites. Vision is needed from the grassroots to the White House. We need big solutions to big problems. That is what America always has been about. It is about dreaming and trying to fulfill those dreams, however long they may have been deferred.

In the words of historian James MacGregor Burns, "While centrists cautiously seek the middle way, leaders in science, technology, education, entertainment, finance and the media pursue their own transforming visions."² Isn't it time to establish justice and insure domestic tranquility through the transforming visions of grassroots movements and, perhaps, even of our leaders?

1. INTRODUCTION

In June, 1968, a few days after the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and 2 months after the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued an executive order authorizing the establishment of a National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence -- with Johns Hopkins President Emeritus Milton S. Eisenhower as chairman and Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. as vice-chairman. On December 10, 1969, the Commission issued its final report, preceded by many volumes of staff task force reports.

The Commission was bipartisan. In terms of philosophy, the views of Commission members ran the gamut from Judge Higginbotham, Michigan Senator Philip Hart, Ambassador Patricia Roberts Harris and longshoreman-philosopher Eric Hoffer to Terrence Cardinal Cooke, Ohio Representative William McCulloch, Arizona Judge William McFarland and Nebraska Senator Roman Hruska. **Appendix 1** has biographical summaries of the original Commissioners.

As President Emeritus of a great university, Milton Eisenhower believed in the power of knowledge and the logic of scientific evidence. When comprehensive findings were presented to him in a rigorous, systematic way, he was capable of changing previously held beliefs. That is how he came to accept and advocate for recommendations on licensing and reducing the availability of handguns in America. Milton Eisenhower received a great amount of hate mail because of that recommendation. A man of courage, he stood by his principles.

Assisted by a large professional staff, hundreds of leading experts and months of testimony, the Commission chose to look for fundamental, underlying issues. It searched for causes, not symptoms. "Violence is like a fever in the body politic: it is but the symptom of some more basic pathology which must be cured before the fever will disappear."¹

This bipartisan search for causes led to a priority on long run strategies, not short run tactics. Most strategically, the Commission identified lack of employment and educational opportunity in inner city neighborhoods -- set within a larger American culture of material success and a tradition of violence that the media transmitted particularly well. "To be a young, poor male; to be undereducated and without means of escape from an oppressive urban environment; to want what the society claims is available (but mostly to others); to see around oneself illegitimate and often violent methods being used to achieve material success; and to observe others using these means with impunity -- all this is to be burdened with an enormous set of influences that pull many toward crime and delinquency. To be also a Black, Mexican or Puerto Rican American and subject to discrimination adds considerably to the pull."²

Understood in these terms, violence in America, concluded the Commission, could be reduced by "nothing less than progress in reconstructing urban life... We must take more effective steps to realize the goal, first set in the Employment Act of 1946, of a useful job at a reasonable wage for all who are able to work. We must provide better educational opportunities for all our children."³

Unlike many Presidential panels, the Commission was forthright on money, time and budget priorities. "We recognize that to make our society essentially free of poverty and discrimination, and to make our sprawling urban areas fit to inhabit, will cost a great deal of money and will take a great length of time. We believe, however, that we can and should make a major decision now to reassess our national priorities by placing these objectives in the first rank of the nation's goals."⁴ The Commission recommended new investments of \$20B per year in 1968 dollars, an amount worth \$87B today. This, remember, was a *consensus* position by roughly equal numbers of conservative, moderate and progressive commissioners -- almost all white men.

Consistent with a long run "reordering of national priorities," the Commission recommended that new level of investment serve as "an initial goal"

and that federal funding "should continue to increase" until the goals of a new national urban and criminal justice policy were met.⁵

The Constitution framed the Commission's vision. "The Preamble of our Constitution does not speak merely of justice or merely of order; it embraces both. Two of the 6 purposes set forth in the Preamble are to 'Establish justice' and to 'insure domestic tranquility.' If we are to succeed in preventing and controlling violence, we must achieve both of these goals."⁶

This was a *moral* vision. The Violence Commission identified with the earlier Kerner Riot Commission's recommendation that there could be "no higher claim on the nation's conscience" than urban reconstruction.⁷

This 30 year update of the National Violence Commission, then, is a reminder to Americans of how things were not so long ago. It is a snap shot that compares then and now.

If in 5 years nothing has happened, I shall be the most disappointed man in America," said Milton Eisenhower in the *New York Times* in December of 1969.⁸ Yet the Commission's recommendations have not been much acted upon. One result is that America today has neither established justice nor insured domestic tranquility. That is the primary conclusion of this 30 year update.

How do we stand on justice today? Almost a quarter of all children 5 and under live in poverty. America is the most unequal country in the industrialized world in terms of income and wealth. The "digital divide" is accelerating the gulf between our haves and have nots. The average CEO makes 419 times as much as the average worker, and this ratio has greatly increased over the last 3 decades. The states spend more on prison building than on higher education, whereas the opposite was true at the time of the Commission. One in 3 young African-American men is in prison, on probation or on parole, up from one in 4 a decade ago. The rate of incarceration of African-American men today is 4 times higher than the rate of incarceration of Black men in pre-Mandela, apartheid South Africa. A primary reason is the racial bias in our drug sentencing laws. Filled disproportionately by minorities, our rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex is run by white men, and rural white communities seek grants for prisons to help in local economic development.⁹

How do we stand on domestic tranquility today? There have been drops in violent crime, fear and unemployment since about 1993. That is welcome news -- though homicide was up about 10% in New York City in 1999. More important, in spite of the sevenfold increase in the prison population since the Violence Commission, fear and rates of violent crime are, for the most, part *higher* today than in 1969, when the Commission expressed citizen "concern about high levels of violence in the United States." Specifically, in a national poll in 1967, Americans were asked, "Is there any area right around here -- that is within a mile -- where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?" In 1967, 31% answered yes. In 1998, 41% answered yes. Similarly, the FBI Index of violent crime (murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault combined) has increased from 1969 to 1998. (**Appendix 5**). And America's rates of violence remain *much higher* than most other industrialized nations, as in the 1960s. Today the rate of homicide death for a young man is 23 times higher in the U.S. than in England. In 1995, handguns were used to kill 2 people in New Zealand, 15 in Japan, 30 in Great Britain, 106 in Canada, 213 in Germany and 9,390 in the United States.¹⁰

Although the Violence Commission report examined collective and political violence, greater attention was directed to individual acts of violence, such as common crime in the street and violence in the home. In 1968, the Kerner Riot Commission had already released its report on collective violence. The present volume also limits itself to individual crime, but points to many common causes underlying individual and collective violence. The role of media and firearms in individual violence was a priority of the Violence Commission, and remains so here. Public shootings in schools, places of worship and day care centers have replaced the political assassinations that horrified the nation in the 1960s, but many of our recommendations on firearms control have continued relevance to political assassination. Domestic terrorism has emerged as a serious issue since the Commission. However, the subject would take another volume, and we have chosen not to address it here.

The present volume is a synthesis that represents the position of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation. It was edited and written by the Foundation's president, Lynn A. Curtis, who was staff co-director of the Crimes of Violence Task Force of the Violence Commission. This volume was approved by the Trustees of the Eisenhower Foundation, some of whom were staff directors or deputy directors on the original Commission.

The update draws on papers by a panel of experts, and we also add other conclusions and recommendations. A separate book will be published with the papers of the panel. **Appendix 2** has the tentative Table of Contents for that book. Many of the contributors were directors, co-directors or deputy

directors on the staff of the original Commission. Some wrote papers for staff task forces or testified before the Commission. Some are Trustees of the Foundation. Biographical summaries of all contributors to the forthcoming book are found in [Appendix 3](#).

[Appendix 4](#) has the Foreword to the forthcoming book. It is written by Fred Graham and Hugh Davis Graham. Fred Graham covered the original Commission for the *New York Times* in 1969. Hugh Davis Graham was staff co-director of the Commission's Task Force on Historical and Comparative Perspectives.

The professional staff of the Violence Commission published task force reports. The presidentially-appointed Commissioners drew on the staff reports, but published their own, final, Commission report.

Although many Commission professional staff and other experts have contributed to the present update, none of the original Commissioners have contributed. Most have passed away.

The sections that follow regain a perspective on American violence that has been lost over the last 30 years, in our view; ask whether the Commission's "City of the Future" has come to pass; assess media, firearms and violence; propose new policy for the new century; and articulate campaign finance reform, communications and other strategies leading to a new national political alliance.

Notes

1.National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, *To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. xix.

2.Ibid, p. xxi.

3.Ibid. p. xxii.

4.Ibid, pp. xxv.

5.Ibid, p. xxvii.

6.Ibid, p. xxii.

7.Ibid, p. xxiv.

8.John Herbers, "Violence Panel Bids U.S. Combat Causes of Unrest," *New York Times*, December 13, 1969, p. A1.

9.Citations for these trends are found in Sections 2 and 3.

10.Citations for these trends are found in Section 2. Also see the tables in Appendix 5. |

2. AMERICAN VIOLENCE SINCE THE VIOLENCE COMMISSION: REGAINING PERSPECTIVE¹

Surveying the state of violence in America at the end of the 1960s, the Violence Commission's Task Force on Individual Crimes of Violence found much to be alarmed about. For millions of Americans, they wrote, "few things are more pervasive, more frightening, more real today than violent crime and the fear of being assaulted, mugged, robbed, or raped." The fear of victimization had "touched us all in some way." Many were "fleeing" the cities to the presumed safety of the suburbs; others wouldn't venture onto city streets at night. "Unchecked criminal violence" was threatening to tear apart America's "fragile sense of community."²

Those were troubled, and troubling, words. But the Violence Commission's disturbing view was not lightly arrived at. Though it was well aware of the problems of existing crime statistics, the Commission concluded that serious crimes of violence had increased markedly in the late 1960s. Violent crime was hardly a new problem in America. But something had changed. Violence was more pervasive than ever before in our postwar history, and it was altering the quality of social life for vast numbers of Americans.

The New Triumphalism

Thirty years later, there is, at least in the official rhetoric among politicians and the mass media, a very different tone. Since the Violence Commission, all Presidents have, one way or another, declared "victory in the war against crime." Today, among some commentators at least, there is a sense that we *really*, and finally, have "turned the corner" on violent crime. Along with our low unemployment, vigorous economic growth, and booming stock market, America's perceived success against crime is offered as evidence that we are, at long last, doing things right. Those successes, moreover, often are attributed to the growing "toughness" of the criminal justice system -- especially the increasing willingness to sentence offenders to prison for long terms and the spread of aggressive policing strategies, like the "zero tolerance" model adopted in New York City. There is a new triumphalism about our ability to control crime through an unshackled criminal justice system. As the former Commissioner of the New York City police recently put it, "we have learned that we can manage our way out of the crime problem."

That view was strongly rejected by the Violence Commission, as well as other noted commissions that preceded it. In the late 1960s, it was widely believed that turning around America's violence problem in an enduring way would require significant investment and a frontal attack on the poverty and inequality that shamed the nation -- and that predictably bred violence. Today it is common to hear that sustained intervention is neither necessary nor desirable: we can deal with violent crime without addressing, for example, vast and shameful inequality in income, wealth, and opportunity; young child poverty that is almost 25%; deteriorating public schools; continuing high inner-city unemployment; and racism in drug sentencing laws. In this view, though it may have been true in the past that the criminal justice system wasn't doing much to reduce crime, that is only because we didn't *let* it: a squeamish society handcuffed the police and the courts. Now, we've tossed off our self-imposed shackles, and it is *working*.

A Longer View

But a longer view uncovers a much more disturbing picture. For while it is true that levels of violent crime have fallen significantly since the early part of the 1990s, it is also true that violent crime in big cities is generally *worse* today in America than it was when the Violence Commission drew

its devastating portrait of our ravaged cities. For example, for homicide, rape, aggravated assault and robbery -- the 4 FBI "violent Index crimes" combined -- the offense rate per 100,000 population in cities with 250,000 people or more was 860 in 1969 and 1218 in 1998. (See [Appendix 5](#).)

In addition, while perceptions of fear generally have fallen in recent years, over the longer run, from the late 1960s to the late 1990s, fear has risen. For example, in 1967, respondents in a national survey were asked, "Is there any area right around here -- that is, within a mile -- where you would be afraid to walk at night?" Thirty one percent answered "yes" in 1967. The same survey reported that 41 percent answered "yes" in 1998. ([Appendix 5](#).)

From this longer, and deeper, perspective, it is painfully clear that, when it comes to violence, we remain a society in deep trouble. How deep is masked by the extraordinary explosion of imprisonment since the time of the Violence Commission, which has shunted a good part of our crime (and drug) problem behind walls and, accordingly, out of most people's sight -- and in the process has created massive new social problems of its own. But even with the unprecedented investment in the penal system, American rates of serious violent crime are not only higher than they were 30 years ago, but far higher than those in comparable industrial nations around the world, again just as they were 30 years ago.

In the 30 years since the Violence Commission, in short, we have made little clear progress against violent crime, and we are now saddled with a swollen, racially biased, often self-defeating, and sometimes brutal correctional system which is looked at askance by people throughout the world. There have indeed been welcome successes against violence in the last several years. But there is a great danger of both exaggerating and misinterpreting those successes -- and, accordingly, of drawing the wrong lessons from them.

The good news, as we shall see later, is that we are at a point in our history when we actually have the wherewithal -- both the knowledge and the material resources -- to launch an honest and effective attack on the violent crime that still afflicts us, in ways that are both enduring and humane. But we will never get to that point if we keep trying to fool ourselves that we are there already.

The Recent Decline, Other Countries and Youth

From a more narrow perspective, violence has declined since about 1993. The decline is welcome. It translates into many thousands of lives saved and a better quality of life in many hard-hit communities. But it is crucial to put the decline into perspective, for it is often exaggerated -- and can obscure some fundamental truths about violence in America.

The first of them is that, despite the declines in violent crime since the early 1990s, we remain a far more violent place than the rest of the advanced industrial world. In 1969, the Violence Commission noted that while the U.S. was "not alone" among industrial societies in suffering incidents of violence, we were "constantly a leader." That, unfortunately, remains the case. That hard reality is obscured for a variety of reasons; partly because in our public discussion of policy we very rarely look anywhere else in the world for a reality check on our own condition, and partly because of some rather misleading claims that have been made about the level of crime in other industrial societies.

According to most conventional measures, when it comes to *less* serious forms of crime -- property crime and relatively minor violence -- the U.S. may have been surpassed in recent years by some other industrial countries that had suffered fewer of those offenses in the past. Even for these crimes, however, the evidence is less straightforward than many people believe. The extent of minor crimes is even harder to measure reliably than that of more serious ones, and problems of sampling and reporting are even greater. But more importantly, when it comes to the most serious violence -- homicide, gun assaults, forcible rape, armed robbery -- no one seriously denies that the U.S. remains a "leader" -- that we are in fact an anomaly, an "outlier," among the world's advanced industrial countries.

And that unfortunate global dominance forces us to put the recent declines in violence in the U.S. in proper perspective. For those differences, especially for the most serious of violent crimes, are extreme -- particularly, and most tragically, for the young. At its peak in the early 1990s, our homicide death rate among young men aged 15-24 was 36 per 100,000. By 1996 it had dropped to about 30 per 100,000; it has fallen still further since then, and is now probably closer to 25 per 100,000. That means that a lot of young men are alive who would be dead at the earlier rate. But that

rate is still higher than it was as recently as 1987. And more importantly, it is still extreme by the standards of every other industrial democracy.³

A drop from a rate of 36 to 25 deaths per 100,000 would mean that the relative risk of homicide death for our young men, versus those in England, has fallen from 33 to 1 to "only" 23 to 1. In 1996, 5,665 young American men aged 15-24 died of homicide. If the U.S. had had the English youth homicide death rate there would have been roughly 210 of them, and over 5,400 young men -- disproportionately young men of color -- would be alive today. An *African American girl* aged 1-4 in the United States, at last count, was 7 times as likely to die by homicide as a teenaged-to-young adult *man* in England. There is a limit to how much we can celebrate these realities.⁴

A look at the other nations which meet or exceed our youth homicide level is instructive -- and gives us some hints for policy. In recent years, all of the other societies with such high and rising rates of youth homicide have either been in the developing world or in some of the nations of the former Soviet bloc -- including Estonia, Russia, Venezuela, and Mexico. What most of these countries share, in addition to the extreme levels of youth violence, is very weak (and sometime collapsing) social safety nets, along with large and typically increasing gaps between haves and have-nots, frequently coupled (as in Mexico, with one of the most troubling recent records of violent crime of any nation in the world) with deliberate "austerity" policies imposed by national governments. A similar pattern appears, too, in the few advanced industrial nations that have suffered sharply rising levels of serious crime in recent years. In the United Kingdom, for example, rising property crime and some forms of violence have emerged simultaneously with deepening poverty, widening economic inequality, and the chipping away at long established standards of social protection for low-income people.

There is a lesson here. In many countries around the world, there has been, especially since the 1980s, an unreflective acceptance of the idea that simply "unleashing" the forces of the private market would bring not only prosperity but social well-being; that the end result of often harsh, Darwinian policies would, somehow, be societies that were not only richer but better and safer. That has not happened in Russia, Estonia, Mexico -- or the United States.

In addition, when it comes to homicide with *firearms*, America far outdistances other wealthy nations, most of which have far more restrictions on firearms. The firearms death rate in the United States today is 8 times greater than those of 25 other wealthy nations combined. In 1996, handguns were used to murder 2 people in New Zealand, 15 in Japan, 30 in Great Britain, 106 in Canada, 213 in Germany and 9,390 in the United States.⁵

The rate of violent death from assault in the United States is from 4 to 18 times as high as in other G7 nations. This disparity is largely a consequence of the widespread use of handguns in assaults and robberies. "You're just as likely to get punched in the mouth in a bar in Sydney [Australia] as in a bar in Los Angeles. But you're 20 times as likely to be killed in Los Angeles."⁶

The second hard reality is that, even measured against our own American standards, the recent declines in violent crime are by no means as reassuring as they are sometimes claimed to be. In the media, especially, the declines are typically presented as if they represented a sudden fall from a high plateau which we have occupied for a long time -- which appears quite spectacular -- when the reality is that they represent a falling-off from an extraordinary *peak* of violence, the high point of an epidemic that began in the mid-1980s and that was almost unprecedented in our recent history. (See Appendix 5.) Today we are at the tail end of that epidemic, which is much better than being in the middle -- but which also leaves us back at the very high levels of *endemic* violence we've been suffering for more than 30 years.

The best news in the past few years has been the significant drop in the homicide rate from its peak in the early 1990s. But it is important to keep in mind that the recent decline leaves our homicide rate just about where it was in 1968, despite the enormous increases in the prison population -- and despite the very significant medical improvements in our ability to keep people from dying if they are badly hurt in an assault. The picture is considerably more troubling, moreover, if we look at homicide trends among different age groups. For though homicide deaths have fallen at all ages from the 1990s peak, they remain much higher for the young than they were in the era of the Violence Commission. Among 14-17 year olds, the risk of death by homicide was almost half again as high in 1998 as in 1970, despite a sharp fall since 1993. For those aged 18-24, the situation is worse: their homicide death rate remained nearly twice as high in 1998 as it was in 1970. The long-term reductions in homicide have come entirely among people over 25. The similarity in the nation's overall homicide rate between the late 1990s and the late 1960s, in short, masks radically different trajectories for the young and the not-so-young: the plight of the young remains dramatically worse today than it was 30 years ago.

For crimes other than homicide, the numbers are, of course, far less reliable -- because they are not reported as accurately. But it is important to bear

in mind that *reported* rates for all other violent crimes are higher, and in some cases far higher, today than in the late 1960s -- after the explosion of "crime in the streets" had accelerated national concern and spurred the fearful responses the Violence Commission described. The reported robbery rate in 1998 was 26% higher than in 1968; reported rates of rape and aggravated assault more than twice as high. (Appendix 5.) And though some of that change -- especially for aggravated assault, where increased reporting of domestic assaults sharply raised official rates in the late 1980s -- clearly reflects differences in reporting rather than differences in the true crime rate, it is unlikely that all of it does.

Understanding Criminality

The failure to make real headway against our endemic levels of violent crime over the long run, however, is actually *understated* by the conventional way in which we measure crime. Most importantly, our usual measures of crime do not allow us to assess the meaning, for an understanding of crime rates in America, of the unprecedented increases in incarceration since the time of the Violence Commission. This issue is crucial in evaluating America's experience with violent crime in the past generation and the success of our present policies in reducing it. For in a very real sense, over the past 30 years we have simply *hidden* our crime problem in the United States, not beaten it.

The fact that we pay little attention to this fundamental reality is due both to the nature of the public response to crime and, also, to some of the conventions of how we measure crime. Because the public is most interested in getting criminals safely off the street, the public discussion about crime rarely counts the people behind bars as part of our crime problem. Instead they are usually counted as part of the *solution*, if they are counted at all. But as a result, the issue of what it means for our assessment of ourselves as a society -- as a civilization -- that we have such an extraordinary proportion of our population behind bars rarely comes up. But there is another reason: the way we typically *measure* crime tends to obscure the extent to which our society continues to produce it -- and to exaggerate our success against it.

The basic problem is simple. When we try to assess the severity of our crime problem, we usually fail to include that part of the problem that is represented by the people currently behind bars. We do this so naturally that it is completely unreflective, but on reflection this is actually a very odd way to go about measuring the extent of a social problem.

One of the most distinctive things about the United States with respect to crime and punishment, after all, is that we not only have an unusually high level of serious violent crime -- but we maintain that high level of violent crime despite the fact that we *also* boast the highest level of incarceration of any country in the world but 1 (and when it comes to incarceration for ordinary street crimes, we probably even beat Russia).

Common sense would tell us that this means that our real crime problem is even worse than our measured crime "rate" itself would indicate -- because the conventional rate leaves out all of the "criminality" represented by the masses of people behind bars. We are not talking here about the crimes offenders commit *while* they are behind bars -- though that is itself important in understanding our real crime rate. For example, most of us would shudder to think what would happen to our official rate of rape if we counted what goes on in jails and prisons.

But the more important conceptual problem is that we measure our crime rate without factoring in the reality that we've simply *shifted* some of the total "pool" of criminals in our society from one place to another. We haven't stopped *producing* them. We have just *moved* them. The problem, in short, is that we traditionally measure the "crime rate" rather than what we might call the "criminality rate." What we call the "crime rate" measures the activity of those criminals who are still on the street. That kind of measure is useful in many ways. But as an measure of the deeper problem of criminality -- as an indicator of the tendency of our society to produce criminals -- it is obviously defective. Measuring crime this way is like measuring the extent of some physical illness in our society while systematically excluding from the count all those people who are so sick we've had to put them in the hospital. No one would think of doing that in the field of public health: We do it as a matter of course when it comes to the official crime statistics used by our leaders and the media.

This isn't just an abstract or philosophical issue, because it significantly affects how we think about the problem of crime in our society and how we assess the meaning of the recent trends. And it is an issue that can be framed in terms of concrete numbers. There are several ways in which we might measure the "criminality rate," and in fact we have some bits and pieces of research that suggest how.

The basic strategy is straightforward. We need a measure of the amount of criminality represented by the offenders currently on the street *combined* with the amount of criminality represented by offenders currently incarcerated. The key is to arrive at a good estimate of the individual crime rates -- what some criminologists call "lambda" -- of offenders behind bars and *add* to it the rates of those on the outside.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we assume that the average number of reported robberies committed by incarcerated robbers is, say, 5 a year. There were about 135,000 inmates in state and federal prisons with robbery as their most serious charge in 1995. Other things being equal, then, those robbers, had they been on the street, would have been responsible for an additional $5 \times 135,000$, or 675,000, robberies--on top of the 580,000 actually reported in 1995. Factoring in the level of criminality in the incarcerated population to arrive at what we might call the "latent" robbery rate thus more than doubles the conventional rate.

And looking at crime this way gives us a very different picture of the *trends* in violence in recent years. By this (extremely rough) calculation, our "criminality index" for reported robbery in 1995 was about 1,250,000 -- that is, adding the 675 to the 580 thousand. Now let's go back to 1985, and do the same calculation. In that year imprisoned robbers accounted for an estimated $94,000 \times 5$ robberies, or 470,000, because there were fewer robbers in prison; add to that the 498,000 reported, and the total is 968,000. Thus the index increased by 287,000, or about 30%, between 1985 and 1995. Measured the conventional way, the number of robberies increased too in those years, but by only 16%. So the rate of increase in the robbery problem, by this measure, was twice the conventionally reported one.

Again, there are many technical issues involved in this kind of calculation, and we do not claim that these numbers are precise ones. But the general point is beyond serious doubt. If we measure our crime problem by our tendency to produce *criminality*, then we may be in a real sense losing the "war on crime" even as we have successfully hidden some of the losses behind prison walls -- and therefore appear superficially to be winning it.

That obviously gives us a very different sense of the health of our society and the effectiveness of our present social policies. But looking at crime this way is only common sense. We feel intuitively that something is *especially* wrong if we have *both* very high rates of violent crime *and* very high incarceration rates, at the same time -- something that isn't captured in the conventional crime rate alone. Suppose 2 countries have the same official rate of violent crimes, but 1 country has, proportionally, 5 times as many violent offenders behind bars. Do they really have the same violent crime problem?

This, again, is much more than a statistical quibble. The fact is that this is the way we go about measuring most *other* social ills -- with the exception of criminality. In a reasonable culture we would not say we had won the war against disease just because we had moved a lot of sick people from their homes to hospital wards. And in a reasonable culture we would not say we have won the war against crime just because we have moved a lot of criminals from the community into prison cells.

Denial

One problem with the new "triumphalism" about crime, then, is that to some extent it represents a state of denial -- in which we exaggerate our recent successes against serious crime and ignore the implications of our comparative standing vis-a-vis other countries, not to mention our vast prison population. But there is also another problem. Granting that there have been significant reductions in violent crime since the early 1990s, the new triumphalism is misleading on the "why" of those declines. This interpretation is dangerous, in that it could lead us to adopt (or to continue) all the wrong anticrime policies while ignoring the things that could make an enduring difference.

There are 2 facets to the new triumphalism. First, it exaggerates the role of certain criminal justice strategies in accounting for the welcome declines in crime in the last few years; second, it *underestimates* the role of other, economic and human investment factors which are probably more important. Put together, those twin fallacies constitute the core of a new ideology about crime control that could lead us to policy mistakes that, once made, are very difficult to correct.

The Exaggeration of Criminal Justice Effects.

Two things in particular, in some combination, have often been given the bulk of the credit for our recent declines in violent crime. One is tough sentencing laws which have dramatically boosted incarceration rates; the other is tough policing, especially the so-called "zero tolerance" approach adopted with the most media fanfare in New York City. The media have been full of stories about the supposed success of both of these strategies. But the reality is that ascribing too much effect to either our booming incarceration rates or our media-celebrated zero tolerance policing flies in the face of the evidence -- or more precisely, in the face of the lack of evidence.

The Impact of Incarceration. It is doubtless true that our mushrooming prison population has had some dampening effect on our rates of violent crime. That is what many years of serious criminological research on "incapacitation" would lead us to expect. Put *enough* offenders behind bars, and it would be strange indeed if there were *no* impact on crime -- at least on some kinds of crime. But that is very different from believing that incarceration is the *major* reason for the declines in serious violence in America -- or that we could drive our rates of violence even lower if we just did more of the same.

The idea that booming prison populations are the key reason for the declines in serious criminal violence runs up against a number of stubborn realities. One is that the magnitude of the declines varies enormously across different states, and it does *not* vary in any consistent fashion with those states' use of incarceration relative to their crime rates. Some of the slowest declines in violence (and in FBI-reported serious "Index" crime generally) have been in Southern states with very high and very rapidly rising incarceration rates; some of the fastest declines have been in the Northeast, which traditionally incarcerates relatively sparingly. Some of the most spectacular successes against youth violence have taken place in Boston, in a state with a traditionally low incarceration rate relative to its crime rate.⁷

Twenty years of research on incapacitation backs up that common-sense observation. That research tells us that if a state boosts its prison population dramatically, there will probably be moderate effects on some "high rate" crimes, notably burglary and perhaps 1 violent crime, robbery -- but astonishingly *small* effects on most other serious crimes of violence, including homicide, serious assault and forcible rape. Yet homicide has fallen as fast as robbery, and considerably *faster* than theft or burglary, since 1994. Can our sixfold increase in the prison population explain *some* of the decline in homicide? Probably. Can it explain *most* of it? No.⁸

As one of the most prestigious American studies of prison building to date, by a panel of the National Academy of Science, has concluded, the criminal justice response to crime is, at most, "running in place."²

One of the major goals for prison building has been to reduce drugs. Yet, "almost 70 years after the failure of Prohibition, the much-trumpeted 'War on drugs,' begun more than a decade ago, has itself hugely misfired. 'We have a failed social policy and it has to be re-evaluated,' says Barry R. McCaffrey, the 4-star general in charge of national drug control policy." General McCaffrey also has concluded that, "if measured solely in terms of price and purity, cocaine, heroin and marijuana prove to be more available [today] than they were a decade ago."¹⁰

Nor have boot camps been successful. Their failure has been documented well in studies by the University of Maryland that have been published by the United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.¹¹

The Cost of Incarceration. It is not just that incarceration has been exaggerated. It also has cost America a great deal -- in terms of dollars, budget tradeoffs (for example in education and housing), use of prisons as mental hospitals, racial bias in the criminal justice system and implications for women.

The cost of a single cell can run from about \$20,000 per year to about \$100,000 per year, based on the location in the country and the level of security. As the Reverend Jesse Jackson likes to say, it costs more to go to jail than to Yale.¹²

The Violence Commission did not foresee the sevenfold increase in the prison population, or a time when, in the richest nation on earth, the scale of prison spending would have significantly diminished the chances of a decent public education for a wide swath of the nation's children -- while violence remained, if anything, even more pervasive than at the end of the 1960s. Yet today, the states spend more on prison building than on higher education -- whereas 15 years ago, the opposite was true.¹³

In the 1980s, in many ways, prison building became our national housing policy for the poor. We more than quadrupled the number of prison cells, at

the same time we reduced appropriations for housing the poor at the federal level by over 80%.¹⁴

Because over 90% of the nation's psychiatric hospital beds have vanished since the 1950s, criminal justice facilities have, by default, become our new asylums. It is estimated that some 670,000 mentally ill individuals enter United States jails each year, nearly 8 times the total admitted annually to mental hospitals across the nation. Approximately 13% of those who enter the criminal justice system have severe mental illness, as compared to less than 2% of those in the general American population. Mentally ill individuals in the criminal justice system generally do not fare well. More than 95% of those who succeed in committing suicide while incarcerated are identified as having a treatable psychiatric illness. Jails and prisons are generally unequipped to provide mental health services.¹⁵

There are profound racial implications to prison building. In the early 1990s, 1 out of every 4 young African-American men in America was in prison, on probation or on parole at any one time, according to the Sentencing Project in Washington, DC. Yet today *1 out of every 3 young* African-American men is in prison, on probation or on parole, at any one time, in America. In big cities, the number is *1 out of every 2*.¹⁶ Similarly, we know from Professor Milton Friedman, the conservative economist, that the rate of incarceration of African-American men in America today is 4 times greater than the rate of incarceration of black men in pre-Mandela, apartheid South Africa.¹⁷ And today Hispanics are the fastest growing group of prisoners.¹⁸

One of the key reasons for this is the racial bias in our mandatory minimum sentences, especially when it comes to drugs. For example, sentences for crack cocaine, used disproportionately by minorities, are greater than sentences for powder cocaine used disproportionately by whites. As a result of these and related practices, America's prisons are disproportionately populated by minorities.¹⁹

In effect, the United States has developed a 2-track system for addressing substance abusers, with the tracks largely defined in racial terms. For minorities, a primary track leads to arrest, conviction and incarceration. For white Americans, especially those who are more affluent, there is often either no intervention or intervention through the health and treatment system. In one case, drug abuse is treated as a crime. In the other, it is treated as an illness.²⁰

Prison building also has become a kind of job generating, economic development policy for rural white Americans -- who now send lobbyists to Washington to fight for still more prisons, as part of an emerging prison-industrial complex.²¹

The human costs of prison have mounted in terms of gender, as well as race. In the past 10 years, the number of women in prison has multiplied almost 4-fold. The war on drugs has driven much of this dramatic increase: approximately 60% of incarcerated women today are serving sentences for drug convictions. In 1986, fewer than 15% were serving such sentences. Many of the most publicized cases of disproportionate sentencing occur among women who serve as "drug mules." Such women often have no prior criminal history but are arrested for carrying drugs for their boyfriends. They often receive the heaviest sentences because of naivete about the criminal justice system and the strength of the cases against them for drug possession.²²

Zero Tolerance Policing. As with prison building, the effects of some forms of policing have been exaggerated, and carry many human costs. The belief in the effectiveness of aggressive "zero tolerance" policing is widespread in the media and among elected officials, and it has sometimes been used as a justification for harsh and even brutal police tactics. It's sometimes argued that without aggressive policing violent crime would go back up again, in New York and elsewhere, and so we should be willing to tolerate practices we otherwise wouldn't -- for after all, if crime rises again, the worst victims will be precisely those minority communities that now are most aggrieved by "tough" police tactics.

In fact, in 1999, homicide in New York City increased by about 10%, and the New York Police blamed media coverage, which, said the Department, resulted in police being less assertive.²³

But no one has in fact ever shown that aggressive policing is responsible for declining rates of violent crime in our cities -- much less that aggressive policing is *necessary* in order to have reductions in crime. Again, the counter-evidence is stark, and obvious. Many cities across the country have enjoyed sharp drops in violence *without* resorting to the heavy-handed and heedless methods adopted by some urban police departments, like New York City. That includes a number of cities which have indeed done innovative things with their police, but in ways that have *improved* relationships among youth, police and the community. Boston, Columbia, South Carolina and San Diego are good examples. These also are cities in which the

police have done virtually *nothing* new, but which have also enjoyed striking drops in violent crime. San Francisco is an example. Another illustration is East St. Louis, Missouri. From 1991 to 1996, homicide declined more rapidly in East St. Louis than in New York City -- even though East St. Louis did not introduce zero tolerance. The sharp homicide drop in East St. Louis occurred at a time when the police were so deeply in debt that police layoffs were common. Many police cars did not have functioning radios, and many cars were idle because there was no money for gas.²⁴

This isn't to say that nothing the New York Police Department has done is relevant to its crime declines; some tactics, notably the strong emphasis on crime analysis and targeting resources on guns and drug gangs, have probably been a significant part of the story. But what is too often forgotten, especially in the media's treatment of these issues, is that we *utterly* lack evidence that rousting "squeegee men" or harassing homeless people -- or emptying weapons into innocent young immigrants -- has anything whatever to do with reducing serious violent crime. Can the police *help* to prevent crime? Yes, and more than we once thought. Is "zero tolerance" policing mainly responsible for the drop in the national homicide rate since 1992? No.

The Underestimation of the Economic Expansion.

The flip side of the exaggeration of the effect of harsh sentencing and aggressive policing is the *underestimation* of the impact of deeper, economic and human investment forces in producing the recent declines in violence. Once again, this inattention serves an ideological purpose: It helps to bolster the claim that, for example, lack of caring adults for youth development, lack of opportunity, continuing inner city youth unemployment in a supposedly "full employment" economy, child poverty, income inequality, vast disparities in inner city versus suburban public school investment, and racism in drug sentencing aren't important in explaining crime and incarceration. But the implication of these recent declines for intelligent national policy are very different if you believe, as we do, that much of the explanation may be the extraordinary economic boom the nation has enjoyed since about 1993.

It is important to bear in mind the magnitude of this burst of prosperity. As the *New York Times* put it in a recent editorial, these are "astounding" economic times. Sustained economic growth since 1993 has brought unprecedented rises in employment -- which, of course, have made the U.S. the wonder of most of the rest of the post-industrial world. To be sure, the rosiness of the American job picture relative to that of, say, Europe is routinely exaggerated. For example, in spite of official statistics, former Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall estimates the true rate of unemployment in the U.S. to be perhaps 15% -- when one includes the official government figures, persons who have stopped looking for work, and the unemployed equivalent of the great number of *underemployed* people in an America where, for example, more and more families have needed both parents working to keep up. According to the Center for Community Change in Washington, DC, the "jobs gap" is over 4 million nationally, with over 2 million in the inner city. And this estimate does *not* include our nearly 2 million incarcerated people.²⁵

Still, the job gains since the late 1980s have been significant. These economic gains have been concentrated among the better-off. But they have also significantly changed the economic condition and the economic prospects -- at least the short-term prospects -- of millions of low-income Americans. Unemployment rates have fallen sharply, even among the groups who have traditionally had the worst employment problems. The unemployment rate among African-American teenagers, for example, has fallen by close to 20% since 1992 -- paralleling the drops in reported robbery and homicide.

Beyond that, the boom has begun to pull at least some people into the labor force who until recently were too far out of it to even be counted as unemployed. It has also begun, more recently, to push up wages and hence family incomes for people underemployed in low-wage jobs, and, among African Americans in particular, to shift some people out of contingent work into more or less steady jobs.

From a variety of perspectives, we know that this matters. It matters first of all because it gives people, especially young people on the edges of the economy, a better stake in legitimate occupations as opposed to illegitimate ones. If you are a bright teenager who now has a realistic opportunity to go to work at Banana Republic, where before your only economic opportunity was selling drugs on the corner, Banana Republic can begin to look very appealing by comparison, given the dangers and uncertainties -- and moral quandaries -- of the street drug life. It matters also because it pulls some people -- especially young men -- out of settings in which they face a high risk of becoming either the perpetrators or the victims of violence, like bars and street corners, and into the workplace, where those risks are much lower. It matters, too, because it diminishes the risks of *intimate* violence behind closed doors, as steady work and better incomes reduce the pressures on families and couples and provide low-income women with

the means of self-support.²⁶

The economic boom as explanation has the virtue of actually fitting the trajectory of the real-world crime trends in the 1990s. It fits, for example, with the otherwise perplexing fact that homicide has fallen faster than some property crimes. If putting great numbers of people in prison were the main explanation for declining rates of crime, then we would expect large drops in property crimes and small ones in homicide, because, again, that is what many years of incapacitation research would predict. Instead, some of the biggest drops are in homicide, a crime notoriously resistant to incapacitation effects. On the other hand, in a booming economy with rising employment, we would predict *contradictory* effects on some property crimes -- because there is more to steal -- but falling homicide rates, for the reasons just described.

Lest we overemphasize the boom, we must also remind the reader that, in spite of economic expansion since 1993, the *only super power in the world still has about 1 out of every 4 children aged 5 and under living in poverty*, according to the National Center for Children and Poverty at Columbia University.²⁷ By comparison, the corresponding child poverty rate is about 15% in Canada, 12% in Japan, 7% in France, 4% in Belgium and 2% in Finland.²⁸ At the millennium, we have phenomenal prosperity and more jobs in the United States. Many of the poor are better off than in the 1980s. But, as the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reports, the extremely poor are worse off.²⁹

The Waning of the Crack Epidemic. Another crucial part of the explanation for the recent declines in violence is *related* to the economic boom -- the waning of the crack epidemic. Recent research -- by Alfred Blumstein, Richard Rosenfeld, Janet Lauritsen, and others -- confirms what more anecdotal evidence suggests: as the crack epidemic swamped the cities after the mid-1980s, bringing with it an enormous escalation in the gun trade, street violence shot upward to some of its highest levels in American history. It is in cities where the crack epidemic started later, moreover, that rates of serious violence often have remained most stubborn. The reasons for the waning of the crack epidemic, of course, are complex: it is certainly not unrelated to the growth of new and intensive law enforcement strategies, but it is also, in part, a reflection of the growth of realistic opportunities for legitimate work for people ready to abandon the trade in illicit drugs.³⁰

An Economic Downturn? Both of these factors -- the booming economy and the waning of the crack epidemic -- are very positive, and welcome, developments. But they also contain a warning: if indeed we have been rescued from our recent crime epidemic mainly by 2 trends, then, by the same token, we are likely to be in trouble if those beneficent trends should change.

And some change is highly probable. It is true that the current economic boom is unusually strong and long-lasting, and some even argue that the traditional business cycle may have become a thing of the past. That is possible, but it would be foolish to bet on it. And if, as many people expect, the inevitable downturn comes, is there really much doubt that violent crime will worsen? We suspect that, if and when that happens, we will relearn rather quickly that more underlying explanations of crime do indeed matter. What, realistically, will we expect if great numbers of those recently employed young men are thrown out of their new-found legitimate jobs and onto the street -- especially after we have steadily chipped away for years at what remains of our social safety net?

"Creative New Action"

Thirty years ago the Violence Commission's Task Force on Individual Crimes of Violence warned that if the then-current trends in violence were not "redirected by creative new action," we could expect "further social fragmentation of the urban environment, formation of excessively parochial communities, greater segregation of different racial groups and economic classes, imposition of presumptive definitions of criminality on the poor and on racial minorities, a possible resurgence of communal vigilantism and polarization of attitudes on a variety of issues."³¹

The Violence Commission was almost uncannily on target. We did not, in fact, invest in the kind of "creative new action" the Violence Commission had in mind -- at least not enough to forestall the results predicted, every one of which in fact came true during the next 3 decades.

What the Violence Commission clearly understood was that pervasive and deep-rooted violence in a highly fragmented and unequal society cannot be reliably contained by criminal justice policies -- even extreme ones. The experience of the past 30 years has proven the Commission right, indeed

more dramatically than anyone could then have expected.

"Creative new action," then, is just as indispensable today as it was in 1969. It is accordingly past time to press relentlessly to insure that this nation makes those preventive investments in human capital that can reduce violent crime in enduring and humane ways, rather than simply suppressing it, hiding it or denying it.

Notes

1. Unless cited otherwise, Chapter 2 is based on Elliott Currie, "American Violence Since the Commission: Regaining Perspective," chapter prepared for this 30 year update. The chapter will be published in its entirety in the separate book to be released in 2000. See Chapter 1.
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3. The homicide trends by age are from Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Homicide Rates by Age, 1970-1998*, at October, 1999.
4. U.S. homicide rates are from the Centers for Disease Control, *Final Report of National Mortality Statistics, 1996* (Rockville, MD, 1998). The English figures are from the World Health Organization, *World Health Statistics, 1996* (Geneva, Switzerland, 1998), various pages.
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6. E. J. Dionne, Jr., "America the Violent," *Washington Post*, September 21, 1999, p. A19
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**3. HAS THE COMMISSION'S "CITY OF THE FUTURE"
COME TO PASS?¹**

Lacking such public action, the Violence Commission predicted a "city of the future," with these features.²

- Central business districts in the heart of the city, surrounded by mixed areas of accelerating deterioration...will be largely deserted except for police patrols during the night-time hours.
- High-rise apartment buildings and residential compounds protected by private guards and security devices will be fortified cells for upper-middle and high-income populations living at prime locations in the city.
- Suburban neighborhoods, geographically far removed from the central city, will be protected mainly by economic homogeneity and by distance from population groups with the highest propensity to commit crimes.
- ...[O]wnership of guns will be almost universal in the suburbs, homes will be fortified by an array of devices from window grills to electronic surveillance equipment...extreme left-wing and right-wing groups will have tremendous armories of weapons which could be brought into play with or without any provocation.
- High-speed, patrolled expressways will be sanitized corridors connecting safe areas.
- Streets and residential neighborhoods in the central city will be unsafe in differing degrees, and the ghetto slum neighborhoods will be places of terror and widespread crime, perhaps entirely out of police control during night-time hours. Armed guards will protect all public facilities such as schools, libraries, and playgrounds in these areas.
- Between the unsafe, deteriorating central city on the one hand and the network of safe, prosperous areas and sanitized corridors on the other, there will be...intensifying hatred and deepening division. Violence will increase further, and the defensive response of the affluent will become still more elaborate.

Were the Commission's Predictions Accurate?

In some respects, the Commission's predictions were chillingly accurate. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Commission's worst fears about violence in metropolitan areas were borne out. The middle-class fled to the suburbs in an attempt to create distance from the urban poor. Most suburban homes have, or pretend to have, elaborate security systems, and many newer suburban developments are surrounded by walls and staffed around the clock by private security guards. Many children must pass through metal detectors as they enter school each morning. Ghettos and barrios expanded dramatically, increasing the social and economic isolation of the inner-city poor even as the African-American middle class was able to take advantage of a new openness in the American economy. In many cities ?Washington, DC, Detroit, Chicago, New York City, to name a few ?"ghetto slum neighborhoods [became] places of terror with widespread crime, perhaps entirely out of police control during nighttime hours."

This has not necessarily been a world-wide phenomenon. For example, the American withdrawal from shared spaces is, in the words of Sophie Body Gendrot at the Sorbonne, "not currently the case in France, where the middle classes have not deserted city centers and where public service jobs force interactions among diverse socioeconomic and ethnic populations."³

At the same time, a dramatic improvement in the economic opportunity structure brought about by the low American unemployment rates of the mid and late 1990s is, as we have suggested above, part of the explanation for reductions in violent crime rates in major cities. The Violence Commission emphasized the crucial role of a closed opportunity structure in perpetuating inner city poverty and generating crime. "Believing they have no stake in the system," the Commission argued, "ghetto young men see little to gain by playing according to society's rules...the step to violence is not great."⁴ The recent reductions in violent crime during a time of expanded opportunity are consistent with this explanation. In addition, links among poverty, inequality and violent crime are fairly well established.⁵

Considerable evidence, then, supports the Commission's attention to the effect on crime of the concentration of poverty, and to the need for real economic opportunity. "Safety in our cities," the Commission concluded, "requires nothing less than progress in reconstructing urban life."⁶

Other parts of the "city of the future" may seem, at least to some, hyperbolic or at least exaggerated. Armed bands of militants don't roam the streets, and not every suburban homeowner keeps an arsenal of weapons. Some central city areas and central business districts have, at least in recent years, experienced a Renaissance.

A number of other important developments were not anticipated by the Commission. It did not predict the racial bias in drug sentencing that would emerge in the criminal justice system. It did not anticipate the enormous inequality in income, wealth and wages that would occur. The Commission failed to predict that the spiral of decay would spill over from the central cities into the suburbs. And it overestimated the extent to which the middle-class would be successful at leaving behind the problems of the inner city.

Race, Prison and Budget Tradeoffs

In its analysis of concentrated "ghetto slums," the Commission saw the need for remedies that addressed both race and income inequality. In terms of race, there has been progress since the late 1960s on a number of fronts. For example, among African-Americans and Hispanics, the middle class has expanded, entrepreneurship has increased and there has been a dramatic rise in the number of locally elected officials.⁷

But there also have been many negatives in terms of race. For example, as Fred and Laura Harris have observed, American Indians (including, here, Alaska Natives-Indians, Aleuts, and Inuits) were not specifically dealt with in the 1969 report of the Violence Commission, which focused on big cities. Remediating that -- looking at them, now -- 30 years after the report, we find that these "first Americans" are first in a negative sense: the rate at which they suffer as victims of violence is higher than for any other racial or ethnic minority in America, twice the rate for the nation at large. The incidence of violent crime on Indian reservations and lands is *increasing* today, while declining elsewhere in the nation.⁸

Nor, as Dora Nevares-Muniz has pointed out, did the Violence Commission focus much on Hispanics. Yet today nearly 3 out of every 10 people living in poverty in America is Hispanic. In 2010, the Hispanic population will outnumber the African-American population.⁹ Whether or not that can result in a new vision of racial unity is still to be determined.

What we do know, from the work of Professor Gary Orfield and his colleagues at the Harvard School of Education, is that urban America is resegregating in its neighborhoods and schools. Over two thirds of all African-American and Hispanic students in urban areas attend predominantly segregated schools. Over two thirds of those cannot achieve minimally acceptable scores on standardized tests.¹⁰ These test scores reflect some of the effects of "ghetto slum" concentration that the Commission warned against.

But what perhaps would have disturbed the Commission the most is how prison building, racial discrimination in drug sentencing policy, expensive prison-industrial complex building, and consequent budget tradeoffs away from education and other investments in human capital have

complemented one another in a downward spiral over the last 30 years, as we discussed in Chapter 2.

Income, Wealth and Wage Inequality

At the same time, income, wealth and wage inequality has widened dramatically since the Violence Commission. This development would have been hard for the Commission to anticipate in 1969, after years of substantial decline in income inequality during the boom years of the post-World War II economy.

Specifically, here is what has happened:

•**Income inequality: The 1980s.** During the supply side economics that dominated the 1980s in America, the rich got richer and the poor got poorer, according to conservative author Kevin Phillips and many others. The working class also got poorer. The middle class stayed about the same, so it lost ground to the rich.¹¹

•**Income inequality: The 1990s.** In the 1990s, the large income gaps of the 1980s actually widened. The incomes of the best off Americans rose twice as fast as those of middle income Americans, according to the Congressional Budget Office. The gap between rich and working income Americans rose even more. Income differences between the haves and the have-nots are growing faster in America than in any industrialized democracy. In countries where reliable information exists, the United States is second only to Russia in having the smallest middle class and the highest poverty rates.¹²

•**Wealth inequality.** The increase in wealth inequality during the 1980s was virtually unprecedented. The only comparable period in America in the twentieth century was 1922-1929, before the Great Depression. During the 1980s, 99% of the wealth gained went to the top 20% of wealth holders in America -- and the top 10% gained 62% of that. The median wealth of nonwhite American citizens actually *fell* during the 1980s. The average level of wealth of an African-American family in America today is about one-tenth of an average white family. Wealth inequality is much worse in the United States than in countries traditionally thought of as "class ridden," like the United Kingdom.¹³

•**CEO-worker inequality.** In 1980, the average corporate CEO earned 42 times as much as the average worker. In 1998, the average corporate CEO earned 419 times as much as the average worker.¹⁴

The degree of inequality in income distribution has increased both overall and within racial groups. Income divisions are widening within the African-American community, mirroring society as a whole.¹⁵ As a consequence, issues that cut across racial lines, like the conditions of the working poor and the quality of public education, assume a greater importance now than when the Violence Commission completed its work.

Urban Decay in the Suburbs

The extent to which typically urban problems ?decay and violence ?have invaded the suburbs is another area in which the Commission's view of the City of the Future was incomplete. As the Commission predicted, cities have divided into an "unsafe deteriorating central city on the one hand" and "safe, prosperous areas and sanitized corridors on the other." What the Commission did not foresee was that the process would become so advanced that some high-flying suburbs of 1969 as well as the central city would be left behind. The spread of urban blight has not stopped at the boundary of the central city. Indeed, many older inner-ring suburbs are experiencing similar declines.¹⁶ The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has identified nearly 400 suburban jurisdictions with elevated poverty levels (above 20 percent) and declines in population between 1980 and 1996.¹⁷ In Minneapolis, 9 of 11 inner-suburban school districts had more than 20 percent of their children eligible for the free lunch program by 1994 and were gaining poor children faster than the central city.¹⁸

Unlike central cities, declining suburban jurisdictions usually have no central business district, convention center, or arena that can serve as an anchor and a source of tax revenues. When they decline, the fall can be precipitous. Glen Cove, Illinois, for example, was once "the exclusive province of wealthy industrialists and robber barons," but now has many problems traditionally associated with the urban core, such as homelessness, welfare dependence, and abandonment. Glen Cove Mayor Thomas Suozzi concedes, "It's true, we are a suburban town with city problems."¹⁹

Did the Middle Class Leave Behind the Problems of the Inner City?

The Commission correctly anticipated that affluent members of our society would use geographic distance and economic homogeneity to shield themselves from the crime and social disorganization of the inner city. What it did not anticipate was the strategy would be, at least in certain ways, unsuccessful. The Commission predicted that suburbanites would speed from one sanitized area to another on "high speed...expressways." But the car-centered culture of the suburbs has led to traffic congestion as bad or worse than is found in the central cities. More importantly, as economic inequality has increased over the past 30 years, and as that inequality has been codified in the geographic layout of our cities, the violence and alienation produced by such a society has not been contained within the boundaries of the central city. The new suburbs form and are then abandoned so rapidly that many lack any sense of community. People do not know their neighbors, don't participate in the civic life of their community, and don't know the parents of the children their children play with. There is a high degree of alienation and a low level of trust.

While the problems of such communities obviously pale in comparison to those faced by the residents of central city ghettos and barrios, there is a surprising similarity in the increase in social isolation both experience. Premier suburbs, such as Plano, Texas, experience heroin epidemics and strangely elevated rates of teen suicide. While necessarily speculative, it can be argued that the shallowness of human relations in cookie-cutter suburban communities may be one part of the explanation of the wave of school and workplace violence in recent years in "unexpected" places. A frequent refrain after such events as the "day trader" rampage in Atlanta or the school shooting in Littleton, Colorado is "how could this have happened here?" Suburbanites clearly believe that residence in a prosperous suburb should insulate them from violence, but this hope has proved unfounded in an American society with high mobility and rapid communication.

Metropolitan Development

The Commission's recommendations on neighborhood change and metropolitan development are just as relevant today as 30 years ago.

The key recommendation of the Commission here was on changes in metropolitan governance. "[T]he relative ineffectiveness of the efforts of urban government to respond to urban problems," the Commission concluded, "derives from the fragmented and obsolescent structure of urban government itself."²⁰ As David Rusk and Myron Orfield argue in recent books, "effective action on certain critical problems, such as law enforcement, housing and zoning, and revenue-raising requires governmental units coterminous with metropolitan areas."²¹ The Commission recommended vesting taxing and zoning power in a "higher tier of true metropolitan governments," while at the same time retaining a lower tier of government that would be more responsive to the needs of local constituency groups.

As the suburbs have grown and now make up a plurality of the voters in national elections, such proposals to fold suburban governments into metropolitan governments to benefit the central city seem politically infeasible. The horse is already out of the barn. However, Minnesota has had some success in forming revenue sharing alliances between central cities and inner ring suburbs.²² We recommend that the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as other federal agencies, replicate this model much more widely around the nation. In addition, given that the federal government has used fiscal incentives and disincentives to influence state actions on issues like speed limits and the legal drinking age, it also should use highway funds, HUD funds, other federal money and loan guarantees to encourage state governments to reduce the autonomy of local governments in zoning and housing issues.

Conclusion

The Commission's vision of the City of the Future, then, foresaw some important developments and missed others. It foresaw rampant suburbanization as a response to central city decline. But it did not foresee how unsuccessful and self-defeating the strategy would turn out to be. Crime and violent acts in the suburbs, such as the Littleton, Colorado, massacre, and the deterioration of the older "inner-ring" suburbs show that, in the long run, one can't simply abandon the nation's social problems. The Commission foresaw that a city based on the principle of flight to safety would only deepen social divisions.²³

[O]ur cities are being misshaped...by actions of more affluent citizens who desire safety for themselves, their families, and their investments. The safety they are getting is not the safety without fear that comes from ameliorating the causes of violent crime; rather it is the precarious safety obtained through individual efforts at self-defense.

Notes

1. Unless otherwise noted, Chapter 3 is based on Paul Jargowsky, "Has the Commission's City of the Future Come to Pass?" a chapter for this update. The chapter will be published in its entirety in the separate book to be released in 2000. See Chapter 1.
2. National Violence Commission, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
3. Sophie Body-Gendrot, "An Outsider's Understanding of American Violence: Tocqueville Revisited," chapter prepared for this 30 year update. The chapter will be published in its entirety in the separate book to be released in 2000. See Chapter 1.
4. National Violence Commission, op. cit., p. 36.
5. A recent contribution to this literature is Thomislav V. Kovandzic, et al., "The Structural Covariates of Urban Homicide: Reassessing the Impact of Income Inequality and Poverty in the post-Reagan Era," *Criminology* 36: 569-599. Also see Lauren J. Krivo and Ruth D. Peterson, "Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban Crime," *Social Forces* 75: 619-650. In addition, see Edward S. Shihadeh and Graham C. Ousey, "Metropolitan Expansion and Black Social Dislocation: The Link Between Suburbanization and Center-City Crime," *Social Forces* 75: 649-666.
6. National Violence Commission, op. cit., p. 48.
7. See Fred R. Harris and Lynn A. Curtis, eds., *Locked in the Poorhouse* (Lanham, New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
8. Fred R. Harris and Laura Harris, "Native Americans Youth, The Commission and the Present," chapter prepared for this 30 year update. The chapter will be published in its entirety in the separate book to be released in 2000. See Chapter 1.
9. Navares-Muniz, op. cit.
10. Gary Orfield, "Segregated Housing and School Desegregation," in Gary Orfield, Susan E. Eaton and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation, *Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown vs. Board of Education* (New York: New Press, 1996).
11. Kevin Phillips, *The Politics and Rich and Poor* (New York: Random House, 1990); Jason DeParle, "Richer Rich, Poorer Poor, and a Fatter Green Book," *New York Times*, May 26, 1991; Lynn A. Curtis, *Family, Employment and Reconstruction*. op. cit.; U.S. Census,

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12. Doug Henwood, "The Nation Indicators," *Nation*, March 29, 1999, p. 10; Alan Wolfe, "The New Politics of Inequality," *New York Times*, September 22, 1999, p. A27.

13. Keith Bradsher, "Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West," *New York Times*, April 17, 1995; Edward N. Wolff, *Top Heavy* (New York: The New Press, 1995); *New York Times* editorial "The Tide Is Not Lifting Everyone," *New York Times*, September 30, 1997; and Glenn C. Loury, "Unequalized," *New Republic*, April 6, 1998.

14. Alan Wolfe, op. cit.

15. Jargowsky, op. cit., 1999.

16. Myron Orfield. *Metropolitcs: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press: 1996).

17. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, *The State of Cities 1999: Third Annual Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1999).

18. Orfield, op. cit., p. 4.

19. Charlie LeDuff, "A Faded Suburb Seeks to Restore Its Gilded Glory," *New York Times*, February 10, 1999, p. A27.

20. National Violence Commission, op. cit., p. 50.

21. Orfield, op. cit.; David Rusk, *Inside Game: Winning Strategies for Saving Urban America* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

22. Orfield, op. cit.

23. National Violence Commission, op. cit., p. 43.

4. NATIONAL URBAN AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY

In the 30 years since the Violence Commission, then, America has not met the goals of establishing justice and insuring domestic tranquility, as set forth in the preamble of the Constitution.

How can we implement the Violence Commission's call for "creative new action" that generates "urban reconstruction"?

Part of the answer can be found in the public response in America after the 1992 violence in South Central Los Angeles associated with the verdict in the first Rodney King trial. A *New York Times*/CBS poll asked a national sample of Americans whether they would be willing to spend more on initiatives that worked in the inner city -- especially on education and employment, even if it meant increased taxes. A majority of those polled answered yes. The next question in the poll was, "What is the major obstacle against doing more?" A majority of those polled around the nation said "lack of knowledge."¹ Americans don't believe we know what works.

But that is not true. To a considerable extent since the Violence Commission, we have learned a great deal about what doesn't work and what does work, based on scientific studies and careful evaluations. It therefore would make sense to stop doing what doesn't work and start doing what does work, but at a "scale equal to the dimensions of the problem," to use the words of the Kerner Riot Commission that immediately preceded the Violence Commission.

In Chapter 4, we review what doesn't work and then what does work. Our criteria for judging "what works" are 1) whether a policy or program reduces or increases injustice and inequality in America and 2) whether a policy or program has proven effective based on scientific outcome evaluation.² As we already have suggested, it is not consistent with available scientific evidence to think that only criminal justice solutions reduce violence, reduce fear and insure domestic tranquility. Many criminal justice solutions don't achieve these goals at all, or not very well, based on existing knowledge. And there is scientific evidence that many human investment strategies provide multiple solutions -- for example, not only less crime but also more child development, more youth development, more progress in school, more employability, more job creation linked to economic development and more effective, community sensitive policing. These multiple solutions are consistent with the opportunity-focused recommendations of the Violence Commission.

What Doesn't Work?

We suggested in Chapter 3 that trickle down, supply side economics doesn't work -- except for the rich. Trickle down economics increases inequality and injustice. One part of supply side economics in the 1980s was the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). We know from evaluations commissioned by the United States Department of Labor that JTPA failed for high school dropouts, who are at high risk of crime. Greatly underfunded, JTPA is more a "work first" than a "training first" program. Another component of supply side economics is the notion of the Enterprise Zone -- something that we imported from England. Enterprise Zones are the notion that, for example, if you provide enough tax breaks, corporations will move to South Central Los Angeles, employ young African-American men who rioted in 1992 and provide job alternatives to crime. It didn't happen. The failure of the Enterprise Zones is well documented -- for example, by the Urban Institute in Washington, DC and by the United States General Accounting Office. The failure also is well recorded in conservative journals like the *Economist* and *Business Week*. (The newer notion of "Empowerment Zones" still is under evaluation.) Among other reasons given by corporations for why they would not move back and employ inner-city youth was the opinion that youth were not adequately trained.³ Hence, the need for "training first" programs for the hardest to

employ -- at a time when our national policy tends to be "work first."

Prison Building and Other Questionable Criminal Justice Policies

We suggested in Chapter 2 that prison building has greatly increased racial injustice in America, led to the development of a prison-industrial complex in which rural white communities lobby for big grants to disproportionately incarcerate poor minorities, been extremely expensive, taken budget dollars away from more just and cost-effective programs, had negative impacts on women, and had its crime-and drug-reducing impacts exaggerated by political leaders and the media.

Chapter 2 showed zero tolerance policing has created injustice and inequality by its insensitive treatment of minorities. And there is little scientific evaluation evidence that zero tolerance reduces violent crime.

Many other examples have been documented of criminal justice, youth, education and employment initiatives that have proven to fail.⁴

False Rhetoric

We also need to realize that, in the 1980s and 1990s, a false rhetoric was used to sugar coat such failed policies. Here we refer to phrases such as voluntarism, self sufficiency and empowerment. These can be helpful concepts at the street level -- if applied with wisdom and discretion. But our concern is with their abuse since the Violence Commission.

For example, a highly publicized 1997 national summit on voluntarism for crime, drug and other programs in poor communities was viewed with skepticism by many observers. The summit was held in Philadelphia. At the time of the summit, the *New York Times* interviewed residents in the impoverished Logan neighborhood of North Philadelphia. One resident thought that summit was a bit "naive" because "you need a certain expertise among the volunteers, and in communities like Logan, people don't have the expertise." The director of a non-profit community program in the neighborhood observed, "Volunteering is really good, but people need a program to volunteer for, and in order to do that, you have to have dollars." Pablo Eisenberg, former Executive Director of the Center for Community Change and now a Senior Fellow at the Georgetown University Public Policy Institute, concluded that "no matter whether you attract lots of volunteers, money is still the most important ingredient in reducing poverty and helping poor people. You need money even to organize volunteers." In an article on America's Promise, the national organization created at the Philadelphia summit to promote volunteerism, among other goals, *Youth Today* magazine asked whether the organization was "delivering for youth or fatally flawed." The executive director of one Midwest non-profit community group concluded that, after 2 years, the new creation was "long on talk and hoopla and short on doing." Although America's Promise promotes people working for free, as volunteers, the *New York Times* reported that the president and CEO of the group was being paid \$250,000 per year.⁵

Or take an international comparison to illustrate political buzzwords. In the early 1990s, America won the war in the Persian Gulf because of large numbers of well trained professional staff, large numbers of well trained support staff and a huge amount of expensive, high quality equipment. Yet, when it comes to investments in the inner city and the truly disadvantaged, including crime and drug prevention, we often are told that there is not enough money for adequate and adequately paid professional staff, adequate and adequately paid support staff, and good equipment -- like computers and facilities in public schools and at the headquarters of the inner-city, grassroots community-based non-profit organizations that are responsible for a great deal of what works. Instead, we are told that, for example, a grassroots community group ought to get initial grants from the public and private sectors. Then it ought to convert into "self sufficient" operations, in part with the help of (often poorly trained) volunteers. Volunteers should be combined with "partnerships" and "coalition building" among other financially competing and often penurious groups in the inner city. This, we are told, will lead to the "empowerment" of our neighborhoods and our schools, less injustice, less crime and more domestic tranquility. But it hasn't usually worked that way -- as anyone who has labored in the trenches knows. This is the rhetoric of those who have a double standard. They are not prepared, financially or morally, to invest to scale in our human capital -- in our children, youth, families and neighborhoods.

Immorality

We cannot ignore this moral dimension. We must keep in mind the Violence Commission's "higher claim on the nation's conscience." We suggest

that:

- It is immoral for the states to spend more on prison building than on higher education.
- It is immoral for white corporations to profit from incarcerating minorities sentenced with racially biased drug laws.
- It is immoral for the rate of incarceration of African American men in America today to be 4 times higher than the rate of incarceration of Black men in pre-Mandela, apartheid South Africa.
- It is immoral for the federal government to let the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.
- It is immoral for almost a quarter of America's youngest children to live in poverty.
- It is immoral for CEOs to earn 419 times as much as their factory workers.
- It is immoral, through lack of campaign finance reform, for America to create a one dollar one vote democracy, rather than retain a one person, one vote democracy.

We cannot give up the moral high ground if we are to establish justice and insure domestic tranquility. We need to mobilize the clergy of America to make this point.

What Works?

So much for examples of what doesn't work, for the political sugar coating that often encases them, and for their not uncommon lack of morality. It is more hopeful to talk about what works. We want to give just a few interrelated examples, based on scientific evaluation.⁶ The examples cover preschool, safe havens after school, public school reform, "training first" jobs programs, community development and banking, and problem-oriented, community-equity policing.

Preschool

One of the best examples of what works is preschool. According to the conservative CEOs on the Committee for Economic Development in New York, for every dollar invested in preschool, America gets almost \$5.00 of benefits in return -- over the lifetime of a child who receives preschool. Those benefits include less involvement in crime, less involvement in drugs, less involvement in teen pregnancy, more likelihood to complete school, and more likelihood to become economically independent. Preschool makes economic sense. Yet less than half of all eligible poor children are enrolled in Head Start -- because we are told we don't have the money for our children, especially the 1 in 4 of the youngest, who are living in poverty. At the same time, in many European countries, like France and Sweden, preschool is considered a basic human right.⁷

Some claim that, after a child leaves Head Start in America, the benefits decline. That point is subject to scientific debate. For example, a recent study by researchers in North Carolina found that poor African-American children who received high quality day care from infancy to age 5 outperformed their peers all the way into adulthood.⁸

However, if, in fact, benefits do decline, at least for some, after a child leaves Head Start, is that not what one might predict -- given present policy? If we only partially fund Head Start, decrease the amount of money available to Head Start programs for management and training (as has been the case in recent years), and throw a child back onto the mean streets at age 5 or 6 without any corresponding interventions, what can we expect?

Every competent professional who works with children and youth has learned that America needs a *continuum* of interventions from early childhood through adulthood.

Safe Havens After School

That is why, for children slightly older than preschoolers as well as for preteens, safe havens after school have worked. Evolving from the formative Carnegie Corporation report, *A Matter of Time*, in 1992, safe havens have become known as places where kids can go after school -- for help with

their homework, social support and discipline from adult role models.² During the week, youth get into the most trouble from 3:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. in the U.S.

Scientific comparison group evaluations by Columbia University and the Eisenhower Foundation have shown safe havens to be successful in reducing crime in public housing and other low income settings. Some indigenous, nonprofit, grassroots organization successes -- like the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston; Koban, Inc., in Columbia, South Carolina; and Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in San Juan, Puerto Rico -- combine paid civilian coaches, counselors and advocates with paid police mentors.¹⁰

There are many local nonprofit programs that claim success, but the ones just illustrated can show scientific proof of success based on control group or comparison group designs. Some of the evaluated successes are secular and some are part of the outreach of religious organizations. Just to focus on one group or another, or to identify groups based on political ideology, misses our primary criterion for identifying a model to be replicated: statistically significant pre-post evaluation outcomes using valid comparison or control groups. All the evaluated, indigenous youth development successes identified here also are centers of local moral influence.

Big Brothers-Big Sisters, the largest national mentoring program, has been shown to work. Big Brothers-Big Sisters adult mentors meet with selected youth for several hours, 2 to 4 times a month for at least a year. A scientific control group evaluation by Public/Private Ventures of 8 sites, where more than 60 percent of the participants were from minority groups and 40 percent were very poor, showed significant impacts. Youth with matches to mentors were much less likely to start using illegal drugs or alcohol, and this was particularly true among minority youth. School behavior improved as did relationships with families. Public/Private Ventures concluded that \$1,000 per year was needed per "volunteer" -- for recruitment, training and supervision by paid staff.¹¹ This recommendation complements findings by the Eisenhower Foundation that volunteerism cannot replace a solid and sufficiently large professional and support staff at the nonprofit organizations that are so successful implementing much of what works. Local nonprofit groups also need to possess, or secure, through technical assistance, skill in management, financial management, staff development, and board development, among other components of institutional capacity building.¹²

Public School Reform

The foregoing successes are carried out *after* school. There also are many good examples of reform that work *during* school hours. One is the School Development Plan of James P. Comer, the Maurice Falk Professor of Child Psychiatry at the Child Study Center of Yale University. Parents, teachers and principals take over the management of inner-city schools -- and additional investments in youth, like counseling and mental health services, are available. Scientific, comparison group evaluations have been positive -- for example, in terms of less crime, less drugs, and higher grades for youth in Comer Schools versus youth who are not.¹³ Similarly, "full service community schools," as articulated by Joy G. Dryfoos in *Safe Passage*, have begun to demonstrate their worth. Partnering with nonprofit organizations, such schools integrate the delivery of quality education with whatever health and social services are judged necessary by a specific community. An illustration is the El Puente Academy of Peace and Justice in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn.¹⁴ For high schoolers, a good example of success is the Ford Foundation's Quantum Opportunities program. Well-trained adult mentors work one-on-one with inner-city high school youth -- keeping them on track to good grades and high school completion, working out ways to earn money in the summer and providing venues for college education, if youth so choose. The original Brandeis University scientific control group evaluation showed that Quantum Opportunity students did much better than controls -- for example, in terms of less crime, less drugs, less teen pregnancy, better grades, more likelihood to complete high school and more likelihood to go on to college.¹⁵

These are all examples of *public* school reform. Private school vouchering schemes can create inequality. Persons who propose them like to say that the issue is choice. That is not so. There are plenty of scientifically proven inner-city public school successes for a school system to choose from -- like safe havens, the Comer School Development Plan, full service community schools and Quantum Opportunities. The real issue is accountability. Private schools funded through vouchers are not accountable to the taxpayers whose public sector money finances them.

For example, in Milwaukee, an African-American student who criticized her voucher school as racist was expelled. She sued on the grounds of free speech, but lost. The federal judge who wrote the opinion concluded that "restrictions on constitutional rights that would be protected at a public high school ...need not be honored at a private school."¹⁶

The issue in education also is money. The rich, who tend to support vouchers, often say the issue is *not* money. But what do the rich do? They send

their teenagers to Andover or Exeter -- spending \$20,000 a year on them. What we need is public financing of education that allows the annual level of investment per child in American inner cities to be the same as the annual level of investment per child in the suburbs.¹⁷

"Training First" Job Programs

When young people do drop out of high school, we know that there are alternatives to the failed Job Training and Partnership Act -- and to crime -- that can get them back on track. Often, these are "training first" initiatives. Good examples are the Argus Learning for Living Center in the South Bronx and the Strive initiative, which also was begun in New York City. These programs begin with "tough love" for inner-city dropouts, many of whom have drug problems. The priority is on changing attitudes. A high initial priority is on life skills training -- like how to manage money and how to resolve conflicts. Then there is education and remedial education. When participants are ready, they move on to job training -- focused on jobs for which there is a demand. In the case of Argus, some training is for jobs in drug counseling. In a replication of Argus, in the Anacostia neighborhood of Washington, D.C., training is for excellent paying jobs for African-Americans in repairing telecommunications equipment. The program thus seeks to reduce the "digital divide." After the training and job placement, there is follow-up to ensure retention. Retention is a crucial phase because there are often adjustments that need to be made once a person is in the workforce.¹⁸ Child care and transportation, for example, need to be in place. Sometimes help is needed with how to get along with fellow employees and with supervisors. Without this kind of "training first" strategy, it is difficult to believe that America's present "work first" welfare reform will succeed for those who are the hardest to employ, including persons with drug problems.

In scientific comparison group evaluations of Argus, and in replications of Argus, the Eisenhower Foundation found Argus trainees to be less involved in crime, more likely to be employed and likely to have higher earnings more than comparison group members.¹⁹

A related model of "training first" success is the public sector Job Corps. Job Corps takes seriously the need to provide a supportive, structured environment for the youth and welfare recipients it seeks to assist. Job Corps features classroom courses, which can lead to high school equivalency degrees, counseling, and hands-on job training for very high-risk youth. Hence, as in individual community-based, nonprofit programs, like Argus, Job Corps carefully links education and training first, placement and support services. Job Corps participants are high school drop outs, usually about 16 to 22 years old, and often at risk of drug abuse, delinquency and welfare dependency. The average family income of Job Corps participants is less than \$6,000 per year, 2 of 5 come from families on public assistance and more than 4 of 5 are high school dropouts. The typical participant is an 18-year-old minority high school dropout who reads at a seventh-grade level.²⁰

In the 1980s, evaluations sponsored by the U.S. General Accounting Office and others included a representative sample of participants from 61 program sites. Participants and comparison youth were matched on age, race, poverty status and educational level. During the first 6 months after the program, Job Corps participants were 5 times more likely to have earned a high school diploma or general educational diploma than comparison youth. In contrast to comparison youth, program youth experienced improved health, employment and earnings outcomes over a 4 year period after the program. The program also was associated with reduced criminal behavior. During the program, participants had arrest rates significantly lower than comparison youth, and in the 4 years after the program, participants had significantly fewer arrests for serious crimes than comparison youth. A 1991 evaluation by the Congressional Budget Office calculated that for each \$10,000 invested in the average participant in the mid-1980s, society received approximately \$15,000 in returns -- including approximately \$8,000 in "increased output of participants," and \$6,000 in "reductions in the cost of crime-related activities."²¹

There have been criticisms in the 1990s of too much violence and drug abuse in Job Corps Centers. Such problems must be taken seriously. But the success of Argus in a drug-free, alcohol-free and violence-free environment demonstrates that Job Corps can refine itself with Argus-type solutions. Another criticism of Job Corps in the 1990s was that the success rate -- of youth who move on to a job or full-time study-- was too low in some centers. Individual centers can vary. But the overall success rate in the 1980s was 75 percent. Given that Job Corps takes the most troubled youth and that the cost of Job Corps (about \$22,000 per year for the residential version) is lower than a year of prison in many places, a 75 percent success rate appears to us to be high.²²

Community Development and Banking

Many of the jobs for "training first" programs like Argus and Job Corps can be generated by community development corporations in the private,

non-profit sector. Community development corporations were the brainchild of Robert Kennedy's Mobilization for Youth in the late 1960s. Initially, there were 10 such community development corporations -- and now there are over 2,000, spearheaded by Ford Foundation leadership and investments. A good example is the New Community Corporation in the central ward of Newark -- founded in the ashes of the 1960s riot there by Monsignor William Linder, who has received a MacArthur Foundation Genius award. The New Community Corporation has generated thousands of economic development and associated services jobs in the Central Ward of Newark. One of its affiliates also owns the only Pathmark Supermarket in Central Ward. Income streams from this for-profit operation help finance the non-profit operations. Inequality is reduced.²³

The capital for community development corporations often can be secured via community-based banking. Here the model is the South Shore Bank in Chicago. Many banks do not bother with branches in the inner city. When they do, typically a bank will use the savings of inner-city residents to make investments outside of the neighborhood. South Shore does just the opposite. It uses the savings of the poor to reinvest in the inner-city neighborhoods where the poor live. Inequality is reduced -- and South Shore still makes a profit.²⁴

Problem-Oriented and Community-Equity Policing

Our last illustration of what works is community-based, problem-oriented policing. This essentially means getting officers out of their cruisers and into foot patrols. They work shoulder-to-shoulder with citizen groups to focus on specific problems and solve them with sensitive efficiency.

For example, in a scientific, comparison group evaluation by the Police Executive Research Forum of problem-oriented policing in Newport News, Virginia, the burglary rate in high crime public housing was reduced by 35 percent over a 2 year period. This was not done through making more arrests after crimes had occurred, but by improving maintenance of public housing properties, among other preventive strategies.²⁵

Another example is community-equity policing, as developed by the Eisenhower Foundation -- through 12 years of replications of neighborhood police ministrations that are housed in the same space as youth safe havens. (Neighborhood ministrations were pioneered by the police in Japan, and after-school safe havens have been popularized in America by the Carnegie Corporation, as discussed earlier.) Grants are made to non-profit grassroots youth development organizations, and police chiefs co-target 2 or 3 officers as local match. The officers are trained as mentors for youth. Officers on foot patrols are accompanied by citizens. In 4 initial replication cities -- San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago -- a quasi-experimental evaluation design showed serious crime to decline by at least 22 percent and by as much as 27 percent over a minimum of 3 years. Across the 4 cities, the decline in the 4 target neighborhoods where the police-community partnerships were replicated was significantly greater statistically than for either the surrounding precincts or their cities as a whole. In a fifth city, Baltimore, a quasi-experimental design over 18 months showed that program youth had less high risk behavior, less alcohol use, less drug use, less self-reported delinquency and better coping skills than comparison youth. The differences were statistically significant. In addition, racial and community relations with police have improved with such community equity policing.²⁶

Comprehensive Interdependence

Look at how these few examples of what works interrelate -- or can be made to interrelate through a wise national policy for the inner city and the truly disadvantaged. Problem-oriented, community-equity policing can help secure a neighborhood. The security can help encourage community-based banking. Community-based banking can provide capital for nonprofit community development corporations. Community development corporations can invest that capital in ways that generate good jobs for local residents. Inner-city youth who are out-of-school can qualify for those jobs if they have been in "training first" job training, like that at Argus, Strive and Job Corps. Similarly, inner-city youth can stay in high school if they have been involved in human capital investments like the Ford Foundation's Quantum Opportunities mentoring program. They can get that far if they have been in Comer schools, full services community schools and after-school safe havens. And they can get that far if they have been in preschool. So what we see, when we ask what works based on scientific studies and careful evaluations, is what Lisbeth Schorr at the Harvard University School of Public Health calls "multiple solutions to multiple problems."²⁷ Solutions that work are not single, narrow and categorical. They are creative, comprehensive and interdependent.

National Policy²⁸

Such comprehensive interdependence is at the core of the national policy we propose. Our policy concentrates on school, youth development and job reform. That is what scientific evaluations suggest is most important in reducing inequality, reducing injustice, reducing crime and drugs, and insuring domestic tranquility. Improved educational opportunity and jobs at reasonable wages were what the Violence Commission had in mind when it called for effective steps to realize the goal of the Employment Act of 1946, of a useful job for all who are able to work. (Chapter 1). Public opinion polls support school and job reform, as we later will show.

So framed, our policy means expanding Head Start preschool to all qualified inner-city young people. It means replicating to scale proven public education reforms -- like safe havens, Comer schools, full service (public) community schools and Quantum Opportunities. It means a new "training first" program for the hardest to employ -- including out-of-school youth and persons on welfare. In addition to their child development, youth development, education and employment goals, all of the proven models here also have been scientifically evaluated to reduce crime.

To generate jobs, we need a commitment by the federal government to full employment, especially for the hard to employ in the inner city and in pockets of rural poverty. As discussed in Chapter 2, in spite of media reports, the "jobs gap" is over 4 million jobs needed. As many of those jobs should be generated by the private sector as possible -- especially through a new national community-based banking program modeled after the South Shore Bank. But some of those jobs should be created by the public sector. A good many of those public jobs should be in the repair of decaying urban infrastructure -- that resulted from the public disinvestment of the 1980s. America is far behind almost all other industrialized democracies in investment in its public infrastructure. Here, an excellent model is YouthBuild USA, where founder Dorothy Stoneman, another MacArthur Genius award winner, trains high school dropouts to rehabilitate housing.²⁹ But we also need public service jobs, many of which can be used to reform welfare reform. There are hundreds of thousands of jobs needed for child care workers, assistants to teachers in inner-city schools, staff for non-profit grassroots community-based organizations and drivers to get people to the jobs.

Implemented comprehensively and to scale, these investments not only will reconstruct our cities but also will significantly reduce child poverty.

Federal Economic Policy³⁰

Federal economic policy needs to be supportive of the education and employment investments we have proposed. First priority should be on reducing child poverty by creating full employment.

The evidence of the last few years is that, if the jobs are created, poor people who can work will take them. The strong economy has pulled many people into the labor market who just a little while ago were said to be unemployable because they lacked skills and attitudes. For example, a recent study found that the increase in available jobs in 14 metropolitan areas had raised the workforce participation of young, less-educated African-American males from 52 to 64 percent.

To get people out of poverty, we need to make work pay. How? We should raise the minimum wage, support livable wage campaigns, increase the Earned Income Tax Credit, and remove restrictions in our labor laws that discourage workers from joining unions. To upgrade skills so people can earn still more, we need a world-class skills training program for all Americans, integrated into the "training first" reform of JTPA we already have recommended.

Supportive economic policy also should include a realistic view of the limits of economic growth; a fiscal policy that separates long-term investments from short term operating expenses; a monetary policy that gives first priority to full employment for the poor, working class and middle class; and a trade policy that raises labor and human rights standards.

The Limits of Economic Growth for the Truly Disadvantaged

Economic growth is an unquestioned cornerstone of the agenda of both major American political parties. But this growth hasn't gotten jobs for the structurally unemployed in the inner city. Our political rhetoric doesn't fit the economic reality of the inner city. The poor have not benefitted from trickle down policies. Nor has a rising tide lifted all boats. As David Kallick has advised, we need to measure economic improvement in terms of increased wages, reduced hours, improved working conditions and better integration of work and family life -- rather than rising stock prices, productivity rates and corporate profits. We should formulate policies that will achieve those goals.

A Fiscal Policy that Separates Long Term Investments From Short Term Operating Expenses

Jeff Faux observes that, as with businesses and households, "the correct measure of fiscal responsibility is a stable or falling ratio of debt to income, or in this nation's case, gross domestic product (GDP). As long as that rate is not rising (and it is not rising today), there is no economic reason not to expand public investments, especially at a time when they are so desperately needed in order to provide our children with the tools they will need to compete in the world." Faux recommends that the U.S. establish a capital budget that separates long term investments from the short term operating expenses of the federal government. We concur.

A Monetary Policy That Gives Priority To Full Employment

Monetary policy is controlled by the Federal Reserve (the Fed), which sets interest rates. In the words of Jeff Faux, today the Fed "protects the value of financial assets over the value of jobs by consistently overestimating the level of unemployment necessary to retain price stability. No one knows what the right level is, but we do know that the opinion of the financial punditry on this question has been consistently wrong." Faux argues that the Fed must be reformed -- to "live up to its mandate to pursue both high employment and price stability by probing much more forcefully the limits of the economy's capacity to produce without inflation."

We endorse these recommendations, as well as the conclusions of William Drayton:³¹

America's constraint is not too few workers. It is job creation, which the government depresses in many ways. The Fed typically raises rates and slows growth just when business starts pulling in "mothballed" workers.

As long as so many unemployed remain unseen and uninvited to the table, [The Fed's] logic will, sooner or later, indeed push us back to a 2% growth creep. However, that is not necessary. We could extend and, in fact, greatly strengthen the recent economic acceleration by giving everyone the choice to work.

Trade Policy That Raises Labor, Human Rights and Environmental Standards

Trade agreements are needed that raise labor, human rights and environmental standards around the world. Trade agreements should be opposed if they are good for large corporations but lower the living standards of the poor, working class and middle class. It is in the spirit of the Violence Commission to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement to guarantee the right to organize unions, the right to minimum health and safety standards and prohibitions of child and prison labor. Countries that do not enforce basic human rights should be denied access to U.S. markets.

Our priority is on jobs, linked to training, education, and supportive economic policy. But prison and sentencing policies also have been powerful in creating the job, income and racial breaches in America. Policy must, therefore, address interrelated criminal justice reform based on replicating what works.

Our criminal justice policy recommendations are as follows:³²

- Encourage problem-oriented and community-equity policing, and models like them, as more just, effective and proven than zero tolerance policing. In part, encourage this policy directly through existing appropriations from federal agencies like the United States Department of Justice, and through increased foundation funding of progressive nonprofit organizations like the Police Executive Research Forum

(PERF). Groups like PERF need to be funded to more widely communicate scientifically proven models to local police.

- Encourage better training of officers for policing models like those in Boston; Columbia, SC; and San Diego that are both more effective and more sensitive to the community. To begin early, the federal government should create a National Police Cadet Corps modeled along the lines of the Reserve Officer Training Corps. One goal should be to encourage more minorities to enter policing.³³
- Encourage as federal policy that local police departments and highway patrols avoid using pretextual stops (which often lead to racial profiling) as a law enforcement tool.³⁴
- Encourage as federal policy that we shift significantly away from prison building and toward cheaper, more effective treatment alternatives in the community, following the Arizona model (below).
- Invest in community courts, which move away from the assembly line justice that all too often characterizes urban courts, to provide serious assessment of defendants' needs, match defendants with appropriate services (including drug treatment), and emphasize community-service sentencing and other alternatives to the needless incarceration of nonviolent offenders.
- Provide greater support for treatment-oriented drug courts which allow drug offenders' charges to be dropped if they successfully complete a drug treatment plan. Drug courts in several cities have been evaluated as effective in bringing addicted offenders into treatment and avoiding the cycle of repeated incarceration.
- Replicate proven high-quality drug treatment programs in the community, closely integrated with local drug courts, to insure a continuum of comprehensive care for addicted offenders and their families. This must mean not simply providing treatment in the medical sense alone, but linking treatment with skill training, education, and needed support services, including transportation and child care. Successful community-based programs that work with families of addicted offenders, like La Bodega de la Familia in Manhattan, need to be replicated to enhance families' capacity for self-sufficiency and reduce relapse and recidivism.
- Develop sufficient intervention programs for youths in trouble -- along the lines, for example, of the Argus Community and the Multisystemic Therapy programs in South Carolina and Missouri -- to allow juvenile justice authorities the realistic possibility of referring youths to intensive services outside the formal juvenile justice system.
- Develop comprehensive, community-based centers to address the multiple needs of the low-income women who now, in the absence of effective intervention, are rapidly increasing as a proportion of prison populations -- with particular focus on building long-term economic self-sufficiency, freedom from domestic violence, substance abuse treatment, and family support.
- Expand in-prison drug treatment along the lines of successful models, such as Delaware's Key Program, which links intensive, residential treatment behind walls with serious vocational and literacy training, and community based aftercare.
- Invest in comprehensive strategies to reintegrate offenders into the community. Replicate much more widely the self-sufficient Delancey Street model in San Francisco, which already has been successful in several locations around the nation.³⁵
- Establish a policy at the federal and state levels that all new sentencing initiatives, including mandatory minimum sentences and "enhancements" of existing terms, be justified through a rigorous accounting of their predicted social, economic, and racial impact -- including credible estimates of the probable costs of housing and servicing new inmates, the realistic capacity to deliver services to them that could prevent further offending on release, and the "opportunity costs" of the proposed spending in terms of lost funds for meeting other pressing public needs. Condition all federal funding for state correctional agencies on the production of acceptable social impact statements.

- Establish a national-level Sentencing and Drug Treatment Commission to thoroughly review federal and state sentencing practices, the impact of recent sentencing trends on the fiscal health and public responsibilities of state and federal governments, the impact on serious crime, and the feasibility of a broad range of alternatives. The Commission should gather evidence on promising alternative strategies in the United States, as well as innovative approaches in other nations that have kept their levels of incarceration relatively low by American standards. *The Commission should propose a new policy to eliminate the disparity in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine, by reducing excessively long sentences for crack-related offenses.*

As these models are replicated, we need to respond to the failure of the "war on drugs," as acknowledged by its director (Chapter 2), by revising our budget priorities. America spends 30% of its anti-drug resources on treatment and prevention and 70% on law enforcement. In many European countries, the percentages are just the opposite -- 70% on prevention and treatment and 30% on law enforcement. In America, we need a ratio closer to that in Europe. One model for shifting budget priorities is the state of Arizona. Arizona held referendums in recent years on the high costs of prison building. Voters decided to begin to divert non-violent offenders from the prison system into treatment alternatives. Under this law, treatment programs are funded for anyone who is convicted of a crime and has a substance abuse problem. Those convicted for the first or second time for possession of drugs for personal use are required to be sent to a treatment program rather than to state prison. An evaluation commissioned by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona found recidivism rates for people so diverted to be low and concluded that a considerable amount of money had been saved for the taxpayers of Arizona.³⁶ If Arizona can begin to move in this direction, then, we believe, other states can do the same.

One estimate is that there are at least 700,000 persons not in prison who are addicted, need treatment and cannot get it. Part of this population consists of drug and alcohol abusers and addicts who leave prison each year. (It is estimated that there are 1.2M addicts and abusers in prison.) The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University estimates that, for each person "who successfully completes such treatment and becomes a taxpaying, law-abiding citizen, the annual economic benefit to society -- in terms of avoided incarceration and health care costs, salary earned, taxes paid and contribution to the economy -- is \$68,800, a tenfold return on investment in the first year. If a year of such comprehensive treatment turns around only 10 percent of those who receive it, it will pay for itself within the next year. Even with the difficult inmate population, success rates are likely to reach at least 15 percent of those who receive such treatment and training."³⁷

Conclusion

Shifting the budget priorities of the war on drugs, with an eye to the potential benefits articulated by the Columbia Center, raises the broader question of how much our proposed national urban, economic and criminal justice policy will cost. That is the subject of Chapter 5.

Notes

1. Peter Applebone, "From Riots of the '90s, A Report for a Nation with Will and Way for Healing," *New York Times*, May 8, 1992; Robin Toner, "Los Angeles Riots Are a Warning, Americans Fear," *New York Times*, June 14, 1992.

2. What do we mean by "scientific evaluation"? The National Research Council has concluded that the vast majority of programs for the truly disadvantaged and the inner city are not evaluated, or receive superficial evaluations that do not allow conclusions to be drawn on whether the program actually worked. By contrast, the Eisenhower Foundation's standards for scientific evaluation are as follows:

- **Scientific Research Design:** The program was evaluated using a "quasi-experimental" design with comparison groups or an even more rigorous design with random assignment of subjects to program and control groups. Pre-post (before and after) outcome measures were undertaken.
- **Targets Populations Most At Risk:** All or most of the persons receiving the interventions were truly disadvantaged in urban areas and were "at-risk" in terms of a combination of factors, including income, dependency, education, employment, earnings,

teen pregnancy, delinquency, crime and substance abuse.

- **A Focus on Core Problems:** The program addressed at least one of the problems or issues facing truly disadvantaged populations -- like poverty, inadequate education, unemployment, crime, drugs, teen pregnancy, dependency and substandard housing.
- **CSpecific, Measurable Outcomes:** The outcome findings were not equivocal, but clear cut -- with all or most of the key outcome variables showing improvements for the treatment groups that were statistically significant vis-a-vis control or comparison groups.
- **CImplementation, Modification, Replication:** The program was not an isolated, narrow academic experiment, but it started with, or built up to, broader scale implementation, possibly at multiple sites which later may have been replicated still further. The evaluation included considerable practical information on the day-to-day management of implementation and on how organizational and staff issues impacted on final outcomes.
- **CSpecification of Program Elements:** The program intervention was articulated in sufficient detail. The demographic, social and risk characteristics of the population served by the program were specified.

These standards for scientific evaluation are comparable to recent reviews of programs in the *American Journal of Preventive Medicine* and by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. However, the Eisenhower Foundation gives more emphasis than such reviews to initiatives, beyond academic research, that have adequate technical designs but that also have been operating for some time in the rough-and-tumble of real world street life, funding pressure, staff burnout, inadequate salaries and political machinations at the local and federal levels. Academic experiments are limited, in our experience, unless the ideas can be carried out and replicated on the streets.

The Foundation therefore has searched for common sense programs that foundations, legislators and public sector executives can fund and replicate.

We can illustrate these standards by comparing them to the standards used by others. For example, an excellent review by the American Psychological Association has a number of programs that are academic experiments. But the Eisenhower Foundation has concluded that there is insufficient replication of these experiments and insufficient

For the studies cited above in this footnote, see:

- information on how day-to-day management impacted on outcomes.
- American Youth Policy Forum. *Some Things Do Make A Difference for Youth*. (Washington, DC: American Youth Policy Forum, 1997).
- James C. Howell, ed., *Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders*. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1995).
- National Research Council, *Losing Generations: Adolescents in High-Risk Settings*, Panel on the High Risk Youth, Committee on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993).
- Kenneth Powell and Darnell F. Hawkins, eds, "Youth Violence Prevention: Descriptions and Baseline Data from 13 Evaluation Projects," *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*, Supplement to Volume 12, Number 5, September/October 1996.

- Richard H. Price, Emory L. Cowen, Raymond P. Lorion, and Julia Ramos-McKay, eds., *14 Ounces of Prevention: A Case Book for Practitioners*. (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1988).

3. Urban Institute, *Confronting the Nation's Urban Crisis: From Watts (1965) to South Central Los Angeles* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1992); William J. Cunningham, "Enterprise Zones," Testimony before the Committee on Select Revenue Measures, Committee on Ways and Means, United States House of Representatives, July 11, 1991; Tom Furlong, "Enterprise Zone in L.A. Fraught with Problems," *Los Angeles Times*, May 19, 1992; "Reinventing America," *Business Week*, January 19, 1993; "Not So EZ," *Economist*, January 28, 1989; and "Job Training Partnership Act: Youth Pilot Projects," *Federal Register*, April 13, 1994.

4. Joy G. Dryfoos, *Safe Passage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

5. Pam Belluck, "Urban Volunteers Strain to Reach Fragile Lives," *New York Times*, April 27, 1997, p. A1; James Bennett, "At Volunteerism Rally, Leaders Paint Walls and a Picture of Need," *New York Times*, April 27, 1997, p. A1; Bill Alexander, "On and Off the Wagon: America's Promise At Two," *Youth Today*, July/August, 1999; Reed Abelson, "Charity Led by General Powell Comes Under Heavy Fire, Accused of Inflating Results," *New York Times*, October 8, 1999.

6. See note 2 for this chapter on our definition of "scientific evaluation."

7. Lisbeth B. Schorr, "Helping Kids When It Counts," *Washington Post*, April 30, 1997; Committee for Economic Development, *Children in Need; Investment Strategies for the Educationally Disadvantaged* (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1987).

8. Jodi Wilgoren, "Toddling Off to Preschool," *New York Times*, October 31, 1999, p. wk4.

9. Carnegie Corporation, *A Matter of Time* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1992). Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring* (Washington, DC: Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 1998).

10. Ibid.

11. Cynthia L. Sipe, *Mentoring*. (Philadelphia: Public/Private Ventures, 1996).

12. See Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring*, op cit. Also see Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Capacity Building and Replication* (Washington, DC: Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 2000).

13. James P. Comer, *Waiting for a Miracle* (New York: Dutton, 1997).

14. Joy G. Dryfoos, *Safe Passage*, op. cit.; Robert D. Felner *et al.*, "The Impact of School Reform for the Middle Years," *Phi Delta Kappa*, March, 1997, 528-50.

15. Andrew Hahn, *Quantum Opportunities Program: A Brief on the QOP Pilot Program* (Waltham, Mass.: Center for Human Resources, Heller Graduate School, Brandeis University, 1995).

16. Barbara Miner. "Target: Public Education," *Nation*, November 30, 1998, p.4.

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19.Ibid.

20.Ibid.

;21.Ibid.

22.Ibid.

23.Ibid.

24.Michael Quint. "This Bank Can Turn a Profit and Follow a Social Agenda." *New York Times*, May 24, 1992.

25.Lynn A. Curtis and Fred R. Harris, *The Millennium Breach*, op. cit.

26.Michael Janofsky, "Police Chiefs Say Criticism Is Founded, and Vow to Regain the Public Trust," *New York Times*, April 10, 1999; Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring*, op. cit.

27.Lisbeth Schorr. *Within Our Reach: Breaking the Cycle of Disadvantage* (New York: Doubleday, 1988).

28.This policy is fully articulated in Fred R. Harris and Lynn A. Curtis, eds., *Locked in the Poorhouse*, op. cit.

29.Dorothy Stoneman, "Replicating YouthBuild," presentation at the National U.S. Senate Conference on *Locked in the Poorhouse*, Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, Washington, DC (forthcoming, 2000).

30.Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on Faux, op. cit.

31.William Drayton, "Don't Fear Putting More People to Work", *Los Angeles Times*, June 30, 1999.

32.Most of these recommendations are based on Elliott Currie, *Crime and Punishment in America*, op. cit.

33.Jerome H. Skolnick and Abigail Caplovitz, "Policing and Its Discontents", chapter prepared for this 30 year update. The chapter will be published in its entirety in the separate book to be released in 2000. See Chapter 1.

34.Ibid.

35.Mimi Silbert, "Delancey Street Foundation," in Frank Riesman and Alan Gratner, eds, *Self-Help Revolution*. (New York: Human Services Press, 1984).

36.Christopher Wren, "Arizona Finds Cost Savings In Treating Drug Offenders," *New York Times*, April 21, 1999, p. A16.

37.Joseph A. Califano, Jr. "Crime and Punishment -- and Treatment, Too," *Washington Post*, February 8, 1998, p. C7.

**5. FINANCING NATIONAL URBAN AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY,
AND CREATING POLITICAL WILL**

We estimate that the cost of beginning to replicate such a comprehensive and interdependent policy to scale is on the order of \$50B to \$60B per year.¹ This is a considerably lower funding level than the Violence Commission's proposed \$20B per year in 1968, which today would be valued at \$87B per year.

Table 1 is a cost summary of our main proposals. We believe that some of these costs can be borne by the private sector -- especially when it comes to jobs and training. However, given the failures of the private sector in supply-side economics, the Job Training Partnership Act and Enterprise Zones, we believe that it is inevitable that the public sector take the lead.

Grassroots Federalism

We recommend that, while the federal government should *raise* funds -- it should then *re-target* most of them to local government and especially to the private, non-profit, indigenous inner-city organizations that are responsible for so much of what works, based on the scientific evaluations presented here. Since the Violence Commission, we have learned a great deal about how to enhance the capacities of such organizations and how to replicate them. It is past time for a national commitment to steady, systematic replication. We consider this policy to be a kind of grassroots federalism.

TABLE 1

Summary of Federal Investments Proposed

Investment	Federal Cost Per Year (in billions)
Replication of Head Start Preschool for all Eligible Poor Children.	\$ 7
Replication of the Comer School Development, Carnegie <i>Turning Points</i> , Dryfoos Full Service Community School, and Related Successes in Urban Public School Systems.	\$ 15
Replication of After School Safe Haven Prevention Models, Quantum Opportunities Prevention Models and Related Youth Development Successes.	\$ 1
Reform of Job Training for the Hardest to Employ --Modeled After the Argus Community, Job Corps, Delancey Street and comprehensive drug treatment programs.	\$ 4.5
Creation of 1,000,000 Private Sector Jobs for the Inner City -- Through Better Targeting Existing Economic Development Grants on Poverty Reduction and Through Creation of a National Community Development Bank Modeled After the South Shore Bank.	\$ 1
Generation of 250,000 Public Construction and Rehabilitation Jobs for the Inner City That	\$ 5

are Targeted on Housing and Urban Infrastructure Development.	
Generation of 1,000,000 Public Service Jobs for the Inner City That are Targeted on Public Service Employment in Day Care, Transportation Services, Urban School Staff Support, and Nonprofit Community Organization Support.	\$ 20
Replication of Delancey Street. Replication of Successful Drug Treatment and Reintegration Programs. Replication of Community and Treatment-Oriented Drug Courts. Implementation of Sentencing and Drug Treatment Commission Recommendations.	\$ 2.5

TOTAL\$
56

Reduced Affirmative Action for the Rich and Corporate Welfare

How do we propose to finance such reform? Not through new taxes, though, as we have suggested, there is plenty of public opinion to suggest that Americans are willing to pay more taxes for school and job reform that works. Rather, at the federal level, we propose looking at the annual \$1.8T budget. We propose minor percentage changes in some budget line items. This can generate the \$50B to \$60B needed to begin replicating what works to scale.

Our first priority is on reducing by a fraction affirmative action for the rich and corporate welfare. The taxpayers of America spend somewhere between \$100 and \$200 billion per year on tax breaks and subsidies to the rich and to corporations. Table 2 has illustrations. For example, in the 1980s, tens of billions of dollars of tax breaks were given out to the rich and to corporations, by way of liberalized depreciation and capital gains allowances. At the same time, we spend tens upon tens of billions of dollars per year on subsidies to corporations. These are federal grants. We subsidize the nuclear power industry, the aviation industry, the media, big oil and gas, the mining industry, the timber industry, and agri-business. America subsidizes agri-business to the tune of over \$18 billion per year.²

Well paid lobbyists will argue that the rich need affirmative action and corporate welfare to assure a robust economy. Yet this claim is disputed by the econometric forecasts made by Richard McGahey, who prepared them while at the Center for Community Change. The Center has proposed 1 million new public service jobs, just as we have. McGahey analyzed the impact on the economy of these 1 million jobs if their total cost were financed by reducing corporate welfare by an equal amount. Using FAIRMODEL, a widely regarded econometric model based on 131 equations that is continually updated and re-estimated, McGahey compared the current econometric forecast produced by the model 5 years into the future to an alternative forecast with the public service job program financed by the corporate welfare cuts. Compared to the current forecast, the forecast with the proposed change "has a higher level of real and nominal economic growth, stable private sector employment, and a lower national unemployment rate. Real wage increases and inflation are virtually the same in the 2 scenarios."³

In other words, a shift in some resources from corporate subsidies to public service jobs does not hurt the economy. It can help the economy.

In addition to reducing corporate welfare, we should redirect some money now being spent on the military to our more serious domestic needs. Current federal plans call for military spending to be as much in the millennium, in real terms, as it was in 1975, in the midst of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union still existed and was heavily armed. Many well-qualified experts support military cuts, including William W. Kaufman, a defense analyst for several U.S. Defense Department secretaries. Kaufman concludes in a study for the Brookings Institution that the United States could reduce the defense budget to less than \$200B per year over the next 10 years without undermining its global security commitments or its position in arms control negotiations. The Center for Defense Information, founded by retired admirals and generals, has proposed a reduction in military personnel from 1.4 million to 1 million and an annual Pentagon budget of \$200B.⁴ One retired 3 star admiral, Jack Shannon, heads the military advisory committee of Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities. In the *New York Times*, Admiral Shannon has concluded:⁵

A 10-year program that included repairing every broken down public school in the United States (\$110B, or \$11B a year for 10 years), fully financing Head Start (\$8B a year), and reducing class sizes in kindergarten through third grade to 18 students nationwide (\$4B a year)

would cost \$23B a year. [That would reduce] the Pentagon's budget by only 15 percent...while still allowing us to remain the world's preeminent military power.

The Table 1 budget also should be financed by reducing programs that don't work particularly well -- like the war on drugs, prison building, boot camps, and JTPA for high-risk youth, and by allocating a fraction of any future budget surpluses.

TABLE 2

Examples of Current Welfare Subsidies and Tax Breaks

to Corporations and the Rich

Wealthfare Category and Illustration	Annual Cost to Taxpayers (In billions)
Taxes That Have Been Lowered on Capital Gains for the Rich	\$ 37B
Depreciation That Has Been Accelerated for the Rich	\$ 37B
Agribusiness Subsidies (Including Tobacco Subsidies)	\$ 18B
Tax Avoidance by Transnational Corporations	\$ 12B
Media Handouts, Like Free Corporate Use of The Airwaves	\$ 8B
Tax Loopholes Given to the Insurance Industry	\$ 7.2B
Business Meal and Entertainment Deductions As Part of Corporate Welfare	\$ 5.5B
Subsidies to the Nuclear Power Industry	\$ 7.1B
Subsidies to the Airline Industry	\$ 5.5B
Subsidies to the Mining Industry	\$ 3.5B
Tax Breaks to the Oil and Gas Industry	\$ 2.4B
Export Subsidies to Transnational Corporations	\$ 2B
TOTAL	\$145.2B

Source: Mark Zepezauer and Arthur Naiman, *Take the Rich Off Welfare* (Tucson: Odonian Press, 1996).

What Is The Problem?

If, then, we really know a great deal about what *doesn't* work, if we know a great deal about what *does* work, if we have learned a lot about how to replicate what works, and if, at least in a technical budget sense, we can identify budget line items that can finance what works to scale, what is the

problem?

The problem is lack of political will and lack of action by our leaders. For example, at the federal level, too much legislation has sought to expand funding for what *doesn't* work (like tax breaks for the rich and prison building for the poor) and to reduce funding for what *does* work (like preschool and safe havens). Nor has any federal legislative strategy been proposed to replicate what works to a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem.

But are not our leaders just carrying out the will of the people?

Public Support

The answer is no. Over the last decade, considerable support has been expressed by the public for the policy and budget priorities in this update.

For example, national surveys conducted from 1988 to 1994 by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago show that a substantial majority of Americans want to see more money spent on improving the nation's educational system and on reducing crime and drug addiction.⁶

In 1992, immediately after the Los Angeles riots, the *New York Times* and CBS News asked Americans in a nationwide poll: "Are we spending too much money, too little money, or about the right amount of money on the problems of the big cities, on improving the conditions of blacks, and on the poor?" Sixty percent of respondents said that too little was being spent on urban problems, 61 percent said that too little was being spent on improving the conditions of African Americans, and 64 percent said that too little was being spent on the problems of the poor. The pollsters also asked: "To reduce racial tension and prevent riots, would more jobs and job training help a lot, help a little, or not make any difference?" Seventy-eight percent of respondents said that more jobs and training would help a lot.⁷

In 1995, a national Harris poll for *Business Week* revealed that 72 percent of the respondents surveyed believed the federal government to have the responsibility for "a job for those willing to work." Seventy-five percent believed that the federal government should provide "child care for low income working mothers."⁸

Complementary findings come from a 1996 poll of voters sponsored by the Children's Partnership, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Coalition for America's Children, the National Association of Children's Hospitals, and the National Parent-Teacher Association. Seventy-six percent of the voters polled in that survey said that they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who supported increased funding for children's programs. Sixty-five percent favored proposals for children and families, even if this would mean slowing down deficit reduction. Sixty-four percent said that government should play a large role in solving problems facing children. Sixty-two percent said that they would oppose a balanced budget amendment if it required cuts in children's programs.⁹

In 1998, in the first national sampling of attitudes on surpluses after the federal fiscal year 1999 budget surplus was projected, a *USA Today/CNN/Gallup* Poll found that the largest group of respondents, 43 percent, called for using any extra money to invest in Social Security, Medicare and education. (Thirty percent backed paying down the debt, and 22 percent favored tax cuts.)¹⁰

In 1998, a referendum passed in California to add a 50 cent tax on cigarettes and to use the money for education and other investments in human capital. The referendum was successful in spite of \$30M spent by the tobacco companies to try to defeat it.¹¹

In 1999, the National Center for Children in Poverty at Columbia University identified segments of the voting public that can be targeted with success in campaigns to reduce young child poverty. For example, 1 of these voter groups consists of "natural givers" -- mostly women, baby boomers and persons who have higher income and education levels. Another voter target group that can be impacted, based on Columbia Center research, consists of "work ethic subscribers." They tend to be high school graduates with lower incomes. They have a strong moral imperative for reform, coupled with the belief that those who are helped should return the favor.¹²

What Is The Solution?

What are the means through which this public opinion can better be mobilized to change the will and action of leaders in the legislative and executive branches of government?

There are no easy answers to this question. But we offer 2 points of departure. The first is campaign finance reform. The second is a communicating what works movement.

Campaign Finance Reform

Without real political finance reform, only limited progress is possible. Today, the economic system in America runs the political system. We have a one dollar, one vote democracy -- not one person one vote. The stranglehold of big money on the American political system and the public agenda is illustrated by the following practices:¹³

- Lavish corporate subsidies to our 2 major political parties.
- The contribution of as much as \$1M to national campaigns by individual foreign interests.
- The virtual elimination of competition by congressional incumbents whose huge campaign war chests have ensured them a re-election rate of over 90 percent.
- Corporate sponsorship of the carefully scripted, plastic, made-for-television national conventions of the 2 major parties.
- Ongoing mobilization of special-interest money by members of Congress and shakedowns of rich people by elected officials dialing for dollars.
- The purchase of legislative and regulatory "relief" by lobbyists who represent the interests that get the politicians elected and re-elected.

In many ways, clean money campaign reform, as pioneered in the state of Maine and as advocated at the national level by Public Campaign, is the reform that makes all the other reforms possible. The model provided by Maine recently gained momentum when a federal district court upheld its constitutionality.¹⁴

Strictly limiting campaign contributions and providing a system of public financing for congressional campaigns, like that available for presidential campaigns, will not guarantee replication of what works to scale. Nor will shorter campaigns, as in England, combined with equal amounts of publicly financed television time for all candidates. But such reform will help level the political playing field. It might allow campaigns to be based more on issues than on money -- and to better take into account the interests of the poor, working income people and middle income people.

If we can, eventually, be successful with real campaign finance reform, then perhaps more people can be elected to Congress with backgrounds as community activists, teachers, nonprofit community development corporation directors, community-based bankers, youth development advocates, practitioners of prevention and treatment, public education reformers, persons who advocate for the elimination of racial biases in our sentencing system, and individuals who fight to reduce the prison-industrial complex.

To increase the chances for success, established progressive foundations and new foundations created from information technology fortunes need to better finance the work of nonprofit organizations fighting for campaign finance reform -- like Public Campaign.

Communicating What Works

To change the will and action of our leaders and, if necessary, to bypass them through grassroots action and referendums, we need reinvigorated

advocacy by national and local nonprofit organizations. The goal of the advocacy should be to better inform the public that we already know what works, and what doesn't -- so that our local and national policy can be to replicate what works to scale and stop doing what doesn't work.

We must organize to elect candidates who will pursue what works. But we also must create and finance a permanent national movement that communicates what works -- so that organizers in any locality can draw on it at any time. The what works message should be directed to national, state and local legislative and executive branch decision makers as well as to private sector decision makers.

A communicating what works movement can learn from the success of those who have advocated so effectively over recent decades for tax breaks for the rich, prison building for the poor and disinvestment from the inner city. Such advocacy has been well funded. For example, from 1992 to 1994, the richest conservative foundations in America made over \$220M in communications and media grants to conservative think tanks.¹⁵

The largest such tank in America has used its money to help develop a large staff of analysts and fellows. Many position papers, articles and books are produced. When such material is completed and approved, it is networked via a sophisticated communications office to every appropriate Member of Congress and every appropriate Congressional staff member. It is networked to newspaper editorial page editors, op-ed editors and columnists across the country, as well as to talk radio and talk television. The think tank has a television studio on its premises. There, its associates can practice their own seven-second sound bites.¹⁶

As Columbia University Professor Herbert Gans has written, such well-financed think tanks have been successful in promoting into public dialogue unsubstantiated concepts that nonetheless have influenced policy decisions controlled by legislators. An example is the term "superpredator," which was given to young African-American men in a book associated with one such think tank. Promoting racial stereotypes and fear of violence, that false notion has been linked to "3 strikes and you're out" type sentencing policy, racially biased drug sentencing, and the resulting prison building that profits a white male-controlled prison-industrial complex.¹⁷

Because of the considerable influx of money for media advocacy from conservative foundations in the 1980s and 1990s, there has been a proliferation of articulate conservative electronic media voices over the 2 decades that has not been matched by sufficient numbers of articulate media presenters advocating what works.

The media often reinforce what doesn't work and insufficiently cover what does work.

In the 30 years since the Violence Commission, much has changed in the media system. Back in 1969, there were 3 main networks -- NBC, ABC, CBS -- and none of them had other major media holdings. Today there are 7 main networks (including the quasi-non-commercial PBS) plus another 50 or so commercially viable cable channels. The original 3 networks all have been sold at least once. Excluding PBS, all of the main networks now are owned by massive transnational media conglomerates. The U.S. media system is dominated by 8 firms: Time Warner, Viacom (owner of CBS), General Electric (owner of NBC), Disney (owner of ABC), News Corporation, Sony, Seagram, and AT&T/Liberty Media. These 8 firms own all of the major Hollywood film studios, most of the television production studios, all or part of each of the 50 most lucrative cable television channels, a majority of the U.S. cable television systems, most of the major television stations in the 15 largest U.S. markets, and 4 of the 5 firms that sell nearly 90 percent of the music in the United States. They have large holdings in radio broadcasting, book publishing, magazine publishing, amusement parks and Internet websites.¹⁸

When we add to these 8 firms another 15 or so companies, we have a total of 2 dozen firms responsible for nearly the preponderance of our media system. In a nation of more than 260 million people, that is a very small number. And it is shrinking rapidly. In 1969, for example, about 100 or 150 companies were responsible for the same amount of media as these 2 dozen companies own today. This is enormous market power in a few hands. It gives these media giants tremendous leverage over audiences.¹⁹

There is unremitting pressure for profits. Most Americans prefer to get their news on local television. To maximize ratings and profits, local managers often will follow a policy of, "if it bleeds, it leads." Crime and violence on the 5 p.m., 6 p.m., 10 p.m., 11 p.m. local television news are thought to be the best way to maximize ratings, profits from commercials, and the television manager's job security.²⁰ For example, a recent study of television reporting in Philadelphia found that almost one-third of the stories on the local news were on crime and three-quarters of the crime stories were featured during the first segment of the news shows, before the first commercial.²¹ Similarly, a recent study of local news broadcasts on 26

stations in California found that violence was the single most frequent story featured. More than half of the stories on youth involved violence, and more than two-thirds of the stories on violence involved youth (even though Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics show that juveniles represent less than 20% of the arrests for violence.)²² As the California study illustrates, lead stories often target young minority males, who are demonized as offenders. "Welfare mothers" can be portrayed as inadequate parents.

Not only is violence perceived by station managers to hold viewer interest, but it also is cheap to produce. As former NBC News president Lawrence Grossman has observed, "the crime scene, marked off in yellow police tape, doesn't move; no matter when the reporter arrives there's always a picture to shoot, preferably live. No need to spend off-camera time digging, researching, or even thinking. Just get to the crime scene, get the wind blowing through your hair, and the rest will take care of itself."²³

George Gerbner, Bell Atlantic Professor of Telecommunications at Temple University, has observed that the result of the present violent and negative news programming can be the "mean world syndrome." That is, too often, the average, tax paying citizen concludes that the world is pretty mean and gloomy. In such a mean world, there are few policy answers -- except, of course, negative solutions, like prison building (which enhances the white prison-industrial complex and so helps make the rich richer and the poor poorer).²⁴ *The mean world syndrome helps explain why, after the South Central Los Angeles riots in 1992, a majority in the New York Times/CBS poll (above) said the major obstacle to doing more was "lack of knowledge."*

What to do to reverse the mean world syndrome? Patricia McGinnis, President of the Council for Excellence in Government, funded by the Ford Foundation, talks about the need for "spreading the word about what works most effectively in government."²⁵ To spread the word, we recommend a national communicating what works campaign. It should be led by national and local nonprofit organizations -- groups that are carrying out, replicating and advocating for the urban, education, employment, economic and criminal justice reforms set forth in this update.

As part of a communicating what works campaign, we recommend conventional as well as alternative media strategies.

Conventional Media Strategies. One model is the kind of Television School run by the Eisenhower Foundation and other groups for the executive directors of national and especially local nonprofit inner-city nonprofit organizations. Each Eisenhower Foundation Television School begins with strategic communications planning. A television camera then is brought in, operated by a wise, African-American cameraman off duty from NBC. Each nonprofit participant must first sit in front of the camera and, in a minute or 2, present the mission of his or her organization. Each then must undertake a friendly interview with a reporter. Next, each must undertake a hostile interview -- and finally be part of a press conference in which the trainers act as unpleasant reporters.

Each round of such training is videotaped, replayed and critiqued in front of all the other participants. It is hard and stressful work. But, not surprisingly, nonprofit organization personnel respond well and learn quickly. Few have thought of communications as part of their mission.

We need to greatly expand such training. If a thousand nonprofit organizations could receive Television School and strategic communications training and retraining each year and if communications directors could be hired back home for clusters of local nonprofit groups, there could be significant impact nationally. More media savvy nonprofit groups could be heard. They could put market pressure on local television stations that do not incorporate segments on what works and that continue "leads/bleeds" programming. They could teach private sector leaders what works and help elect public officials who campaign for what works.

There are local television stations that *have* made the changes recommend here, like KVUE in Austin, Texas.²⁶ These models need to be communicated, shared and replicated more widely around the nation.

Public service announcements on what works can be part of a conventional media strategy. However, since the Violence Commission we have seen little scientific evidence that public service announcements by many national nonprofit organizations have had much of an impact. Instead, we propose funding and evaluating of *local* nonprofit organizations -- to tailor local what works messages that are delivered by local youth. To employ the previously demonized as the message senders conveys a powerful message in and of itself. Here the model is the youth media enterprise of the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, which already has been evaluated as successful, as part of a more comprehensive strategy. The Collaborative's positive youth messages have been seen and heard locally in Boston and distributed nationally through Blockbuster Video. A limited

distribution, Hollywood-financed, socially-relevant motion picture has been made.²⁷

We recommend that nonviolent commercial advertisements for teenagers be included in a conventional media strategy. On television today, commercials are the primary vehicles for celebrating success, while news programs predominately are filled with images of failure.²⁸ Accordingly, we propose that corporate commercials be integrated with messages on what works. This can be a win-win strategy. Corporations can sell their product at the same time that basic what works messages are generated.

Alternative Communication Strategies. Yet we are realistic about the limitations of mainstream television, radio and newspaper media in communicating what works. That is why we recommend alternative venues -- including, for example, in-person town meetings, electronic pamphleteering and interlinked community web sites.

Town meetings have the advantage of direct communication without the filter of the media. They engage the audience -- and can help attract more citizens to join a local coalition that advocates for what works. Local and state legislative and executive branch officials can be invited, as can candidates running for office. Local nonprofit advocacy organizations can propose more of what works, less of what doesn't -- and then ask officials to go on record with responses.

Religious services and accompanying social functions are forms of town meetings. There is vast potential, we believe, for the clergy to communicate what works and the immorality of what doesn't work (Chapter 4). A well informed clergy can make powerful use from the pulpit of the policy successes and failures documented in this update.

As a supplement to in-person meetings, "low tech" pamphleteering can be useful to deliver messages to people in the community -- and, perhaps, to involve youth as the pamphlet distributors. When Bill Moyers resigned from commercial network television, he stated that corporate control had destroyed broadcast journalism and that one recourse was to "return to the days of the pamphleteer."²⁹ Low tech advocacy venues are well known to grassroots inner-city community organizations. However, many local inner-city nonprofit groups have lost their street organizing skills over the 30 years since the Violence Commission. We need to revitalize advocacy and street organizing by local nonprofit groups.

And, we need to integrate "high tech" pamphleteering with town hall meetings on what works. "Any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from a soapbox," Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens has written in the first Supreme Court decision that dealt with the First Amendment and the Internet. Through the technologies of on-line publishing, "the same individual can become a pamphleteer," he concluded.³⁰

Nationally, nonprofit organizations need to construct much more sophisticated web sites than at present. The sites should summarize what works, and doesn't work, based on scientific evaluation. The sites should tailor much of their information to local, grassroots inner city nonprofit groups. The groups, and especially the inner city youth they serve, should be taught how to access what works information and how to use it for advocacy.

Locally, a new generation of advocacy-based, community web sites is needed. The community web sites should be run by inner-city nonprofit groups and involve youth. The sites should link up nonprofit advocacy organizations with citizens who can help to communicate what works to local public and private leaders. The outcomes of town meetings can be summarized on such community web sites. Plans for upcoming town meetings can be communicated. Each community web site can serve as an ongoing town meeting -- continuing to debate reform, discuss budget priorities, organize against "leads/bleeds" television stations and generate new, proactive communication strategies. We already have evidence that many people want to convene with their geographic neighbors, both online and in person, and community-based web sites linked to town meetings would do just that. Partial existing models include community web sites in locations as diverse as San Francisco, California; Blacksburg, Virginia; and London, England. For example, in London, Microsoft supplied computers, Internet access and a way for persons in specific communities to communicate with one another online.³¹ Much more is possible, we believe, and it could reduce the "digital divide" between the haves and the have nots -- as well as advocate for what works.

If such an Internet advocacy strategy is developed for inner cities, it might be linked to the new Internet service being offered by the AFL-CIO to union members. The service will seek to diminish the "digital divide" by providing workers with Internet access and by functioning as an organizing tool.³²

Like Internet-based community networking, local cable programs with call-ins can help publicize a local what works advocacy campaign, provide ongoing information and attract more citizens to support the advocacy.

Funding a Communication Strategy

As with campaign finance reform, funding for a communicating what works movement needs to come from established foundations. The Ford Foundation's Excellence in Government funding is an example of what needs to be done. Some of the initiatives funded by the Soros Open Society Institute and the W. T. Grant Foundation are other examples. Perhaps the new foundations being generated by information technology fortunes can play a role. For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has heavily financed computers in inner-city schools, and its recent commitment of \$1B in scholarships for aspiring minority students in poor neighborhoods was the largest education grant in American history.³³ The AOL Foundation has a promising new grant initiative that seeks "innovative ideas for tapping the power of the online medium to empower disadvantaged populations and communities."³⁴ We call on the new information age foundations and more established progressive foundations to convene a national conference on communicating what works, media training and Internet advocacy.

It is projected that Hispanics will outnumber African-Americans by 2010. As part of communicating what works, we recommend that leading progressive and new information technology-generated foundations fund a national dialogue among Hispanic, African-American, Native-American and Asian-American nonprofit organizations to promote common solutions around what works. William Julius Wilson at Harvard's Kennedy School argues, wisely we believe, that a vision of interracial unity is more important now than ever.³⁵

Conclusion

In sum, through campaign finance reform and a communicating what works movement, we can increase the likelihood of a political system with more players who will appropriate enough funds to replicate what works. And we can create a better environment for the new political alliance and voting majority suggested in Chapter 8. Outside of the public sector, we can generate more action by grassroots nonprofit leaders.

Notes

1. This total has several components, as discussed in more detail in Fred R. Harris and Lynn A. Curtis, eds., *Locked in the Poorhouse*, op.cit.

\$7 billion per year is the estimated cost for expanding the existing Head Start preschool program to all eligible poor children.

\$15 billion per year for replication of successful public inner-city school reform initiatives is based on estimates by Joy Dryfoos that roughly 15,000 schools in the United States serve disadvantaged urban youth, children and teenagers; that the average number of students per school is about 1,000; and that the average cost per student to implement reforms that work is about \$1,000.

\$1 billion per year is a conservative estimate for funding, technically assisting and evaluating safe haven-type and Quantum Opportunities-type replications for a fraction of the children, youth, and teenagers who would benefit from them.

\$4.5 billion per year for job training reform modeled after the Argus Community would allow training each year for a fraction of the 2,000,000-plus inner-city unemployed who need it.

\$1 billion per year for a National Community Development Bank is expected to generate a fraction of the 1,000,000 new private jobs that is our goal for the inner city. \$5 billion per year for 250,000 public sector construction and urban repair jobs each year is based on estimates in United States Conference of Mayors, *Ready to Go: New Lists of Transportation and Community Development Projects* (Washington, DC: United States Conference of Mayors, 1993). \$20 billion per year for 1,000,000 public service jobs is based on a minimum wage that averages to \$20,000 per year, with benefits and administrative expenses. This is somewhat higher than the average assumed in Richard

McGahey, *Estimating the Economic Impact of a Public Jobs Program* (Washington, DC: Center for Community Change, 1997).

\$2.5 billion per year is based primarily on estimates for expanding Delancey Street and other proven ex-offender, drug treatment, remedial education and job training programs for a fraction of those who need it, as calculated in Joseph A. Califano, Jr., "Crime and Punishment -- And Treatment, Too," *Washington Post*, February 8, 1998.

2. See Fred R. Harris and Lynn A. Curtis, eds., *Locked in the Poorhouse*, op. cit., Mark Zepezauer and Arthur Naiman. *Take the Rich Off Welfare* (Tucson, Arizona: Odonian Press, 1996).

3. Richard McGahey, *Estimating the Economic Impact of a Public Jobs Program* (Washington, DC: Center for Community Change, 1997).

4. *New York Times* Editorial, "150B a Year: Where to Find It," *New York Times*, March 8, 1990; *New York Times* editorial, "Star Wars in the Twilight Zone," *New York Times*, June 14, 1992; *New York Times* editorial, "Who Needs Four Air Forces?" *New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1992; Jeffrey R. Smith, "Two Missiles Unnecessary, Ex Chiefs Say," *Washington Post*, Feb. 3, 1990; and Patrick E. Tyler, "Halving Defense Budget in a Decade Suggested," *Washington Post*, Nov. 21, 1989.

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6. ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA AND VIOLENCE¹

When the Violence Commission made its recommendations, we knew much less than now about what works, so communicating it better had not yet evolved as an issue. But the Commission was able to point to research at the time on violence in television entertainment.

The Commission believed it reasonable to conclude that "a constant diet of violent behavior on television has an adverse effect on human character and attitudes." The Commission did "not suggest that television is a principle cause of violence in society. We do suggest that it is a contributing factor."

The Violence Commission urged parents to carefully supervise their children's television viewing. It recommended that the President provide more adequate financing to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting "so that it may develop the kind of educational, cultural, and dramatic programming not presently provided in sufficient measure by commercial broadcasting."² To the television industry, the Commission recommended that:³

- The broadcasting of children's cartoons containing serious, non-comic violence should be abandoned.
- The amount of time devoted to the broadcast of crime, western and action-adventure programs containing violent episodes should be reduced.
- More effective efforts should be made to alter the basic context in which violence is presented in television dramas.
- The industry should be more responsive to the best evidence provided by social scientists, psychologists, and communications researchers.

These recommendations have been ignored at the same time that we have experienced the wave of media consolidation, concentration and conglomeration discussed in Chapter 5.

By 1998 Americans were consuming, on average, 11 hours and 40 minutes of media every day. Nowhere has the increase been more dramatic than with children. By the late 1990s, the average 7 year old was watching 1,400 hours of television and 20,000 television commercials per year. Children were becoming a formidable market in their own right. Children aged 4-12 spent \$24 billion in 1997, 3 times the figure a decade earlier. Accordingly, commercial television aimed at children was arguably the fastest growing segment of the industry in the 1990s. Today each of the 4 largest media companies owns a film studio, a network and 1 of the 24 hour per day commercial cable television channels aimed at children. When one combines this media experience with the growing commercialization of education, it becomes clear that America's youth are being subjected to a commercial barrage that radically transcends anything any earlier generation has experienced. Nobody can foresee exactly what the implications of the commercial indoctrination will be. The range of predictions is from mildly harmful to disastrous. The only certain thing is that the firms that profit from these developments rarely factor any such concerns into their planning.

The preference for violent fare in children's television programming has not abated. If anything, research shows that it has even increased in the 1990s. By 1997, the use of violence in television ads aimed at children had increased, as well. The same pattern is true for prime time fare. A 1998 study by scholars at the University of California at Santa Barbara concluded that violence was common to 60 percent of television programs, and that the amount had increased each year over the 3 year course of the research.

There is no mystery surrounding these developments. Although the same companies own more and more of our media, there are vastly more

channels competing for attention. In this environment, broadcasters and advertisers are desperate to grab viewers' attention, and they know they only have a very short hold on a prospective viewer before a flick of the remote. There is little time to develop new genres, complex characters or plot lines. There is tremendous pressure to imitate what was successful in the recent past. When in doubt, there are 2 sure-fire attention getting devices: violence and sex. Not surprisingly, in addition to the rise in violence, there has been a huge climb in the amount of sexual innuendo in prime time television fare.

Broadcasters defend this programming by claiming that they are "giving the people what they want," but this is disingenuous. In fact, broadcasters give Americans what we want, as long as profits can be maximized. First and foremost, broadcasters have focused on giving advertisers what they want. In our television as in politics, we have one-dollar, one-vote. Entertainment programming is bathed in commercial imperatives that stridently shape the nature of the content. Yet many, perhaps most, surveys of television viewers reveal a deep and profound dissatisfaction with the quality of television programming.

Since the Violence Commission in 1969, there have been dozens of studies on the effects of violent television programming upon people, especially children. The evidence directly connects the amount of violent programming consumed with violent behavior. "The evidence is overwhelming," an official of the American Psychological Association stated in 1999. "To argue against it is like arguing against gravity." Some scholars say that, while there is a clear link, there is still not sufficient evidence to conclude that violent programming causes violent behavior. But many reputable scholars argue exactly that point. In the 1990s separate studies of television violence were conducted by the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the National Institute of Mental Health, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and the American Psychological Association. Each of them concluded that "television violence contributes to real-world violence," in the words of Dale Kunkel of UCLA.

As L. Rowell Huesmann of the University of Michigan, one of the most respected researchers on the subject, informed a Senate hearing in 1999: "Not every child who watches a lot of violence or plays a lot of violent games will grow up to be violent. Other forces must converge, as they did recently in Colorado. But just as every cigarette increases the chance that someday you will get lung cancer, every exposure to violence increases the chances that some day a child will behave more violently than they would otherwise."

We believe that Professor Huesmann's point is well taken. Television entertainment and commercial violence is not solely responsible for violent behavior, as the Violence Commission concluded. Commercial television's defenders are absolutely correct on that point. And they are correct to state that this means we should move toward the kind of human investment policy articulated in Chapter 4. But commercial television's defenders are wrong to say that television is just an innocent bystander. Television does indeed accentuate some trends and downplay others within the broader culture. In this case it is accentuating some very negative trends.

It is fully within the public's province to address media and, especially, television reform. Television is conducted by private firms that pay not 1 cent to the government for monopoly rights to channels on the scarce, highly lucrative, and publicly owned electromagnetic spectrum. *This gift of spectrum is one of the nation's best examples of corporate welfare.* It has generated scores of massive private fortunes. In theory, commercial broadcasters have been required to undertake some broadcasting in the "public interest" to justify their receiving a broadcast license. "Public interest" was and is supposed to mean that broadcasters pursue some programming that they would not pursue if their purpose was simply to maximize profits. The track record for U.S. commercial broadcasters shows, however, that they have easily avoided anything more than token public interest programming. By 1999 the very notion that commercial broadcasters undertake anything that is not about maximizing shareholder return is unrealistic.

This lack of public interest programming is due mostly to the immense power of the broadcasting lobby in Washington, D.C. The National Association of Broadcasters has its way with regulators and politicians. The broadcasters not only have lots of money, but they also control valuable airtime. That makes them very uncomfortable enemies for any politician seeking re-election. Debate over broadcasting and media is effectively handcuffed by corporate lobbying power. *Hence, reform of the media is connected to campaign finance reform.*

It has been that way for some 60 plus years. Not surprisingly, the Violence Commission's call for industry self-regulation was the equivalent of the "Hail Mary" pass, and it has enjoyed no success whatsoever. Given the commercial pressures on broadcasters to generate violent entertainment fare,

it is naive to expect them to act otherwise in our economic system. The rewards are too great, the punishments too severe.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the broadcast system must be restructured so that it is rational *not* to produce violent fare -- and rational to produce quality fare. Because the explanation for the rampant amount of violent fare on television is that it is very profitable, the solution is to lessen the importance of commercial factors in television.

How do we do that? Our recommendations are to:

- Frame media entertainment reform, "leads/bleeds" television news reform, handgun control and campaign finance reform as part of the same issue -- how monied interests and the economic system control our political system, children and family lives.
- Elect leaders who will use the bully pulpit. "Not long ago, the tobacco companies seemed invincible. But then the American people elected a president who was willing to take them on, especially on the issue of marketing to kids, and eventually the industry was forced to reform. The same could happen in the entertainment world."⁴
- Make critical media literacy a core component of the education curriculum in K-12 schooling. Young people should be educated on how and why the system works the way it does. The Surgeon General should make media literacy a public health priority and wage a campaign against media violence comparable to the campaign against smoking.
- Recharge public television. Finance the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) with a per capita budget comparable to the best systems in the world. Mandate PBS to serve the entire population, not just that part of the population that can give money at pledge time and hassle politicians to keep the PBS budget intact. Eliminate corporate underwriting and "enhanced underwriting." Foster community web sites. Establish non-commercial community and low-power television and radio stations in local communities to complement the national system.
- Make it a condition of a broadcast license that there be no advertising targeted to children under 12. This is the practice in Sweden and may possibly become the practice across the European Union in the next 5 years. It will be a major political issue in Europe for the next decade. Instead, each station should be required to devote 10-20 hours per week to children's programming, under the guidance of educators and artists, with a budget automatically fixed as a percentage of the station's revenue.
- Secure private funding for new campaigns by national nonprofit organizations to accelerate educating the public on media reform in America, including the potential breakup of big media companies. Build on the lessons of new media reform movements in Canada, Sweden, France, Australia, New Zealand and India.⁴ Through the Internet and town hall meetings, begin public dialogue on whether big media should pay for the current free use of the air electromagnetic spectrum, which amounts to billions of dollars in yearly taxpayer subsidies -- almost enough to fully fund Head Start. (See [Chapter 5](#).)

Such reform will come slowly. But it should be pursued within the same long run, grassroots advocacy and democratizing framework as campaign finance reform, communicating what works and, as we shall next see, firearms control.

Notes

1. Unless noted otherwise, this chapter is based on: McChesney, 1999 (a) op. cit.; McChesney, 1999 (b), op. cit.; and personal communication from Robert W. McChesney, October 29, 1999 (c).

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7. FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE¹

The Violence Commission concluded that firearms generally facilitate, rather than cause, violence. But it did observe that there were then an estimated 90 million firearms in the United States, which it described as a "domestic arms buildup." It recommended the "restrictive licensing of the handgun," designed to greatly reduce the number of handguns in the United States.²

Where We Are Now³

There are now almost 200 million firearms in this country. They are no longer mostly designed for hunting and target-shooting. Today, most are high-powered, rapid-firing, easily-concealed weapons that have no other logical function than to kill humans. The impact of a flood of such weapons into an urban society is profound. Any confused teenager feeling disparaged by fellow students can blow a number of them away. A worker who has problems on the job can put an end to it with a massacre at the office. A litigant who feels wronged by the justice system can set it right by shooting up the courthouse. Most people resolve things in a more reasonable way -- but in a nation of 230 million people and 200 million firearms, the law of averages is producing a growing number of massacres.²

Public shootings in schools, places of worship and day care centers have replaced the political assassinations that held the nation's attention throughout the 1960s. Guns and violence are increasingly associated with children and youth, a connection that was not part of the 1960s as described in the Firearms and Violence chapter in the Violence Commission's final report. While much on this subject has changed, a great deal also remains unchanged. Firearm death rates today are strikingly similar to those of 1969, and African-Americans continue to suffer disproportionately high rates of firearm death.

As we begin the twenty-first century, perhaps the most powerful image of guns in America is the mass shooting. Embedded within that image is a new level of fear for the safety of our children, and a growing sense that we have a limited ability to protect our children from the behavior of a disturbed individual whose threat is made lethal by a gun. While mass shootings in places like Columbine High School have only recently become a familiar headline, the threat guns pose to the lives of our youth is one that predates the recent string of public massacres. In the 3 decades since the publication of the original Violence Commission report, guns have claimed the lives of American youth at rates that far exceed the level of that era.

If ever there was a metaphor for a failure of democracy, this may be it. Whether it is due to the political muscle of the gun lobby, the fear of the average citizen of the intruder in the night or public apathy, the American political system has spectacularly failed to produce a solution.³

However, the increasing rates of youth gun violence, in particular, have brought new partners to the effort of understanding and preventing firearm violence. In the last decades of this century, gun violence and its prevention have come to be viewed as much as public health issues as criminal justice issues. Public health professionals have brought new perspectives to the discussion of firearm violence, expanding the language of the debate and offering new approaches to the prevention of deaths and injuries that result from guns.

The involvement of our children as both victims and violent offenders raises the stakes surrounding America's relationship with guns. In 1969, the Violence Commission called for both federal and state legislation. In 1999, the need remains the same, but the states have become more innovative forums than the federal government. Whereas, in the 1960s, legislation focused on systemic approaches to limiting access to guns by high risk individuals, today's policies increasingly concern strategies to alter the design of guns as a means of reducing gun death and injury. In recent years,

litigation also has been recognized as a tool for prevention, as lawsuits raising questions about the liability and legal responsibility of firearms manufacturers grow. Litigation is increasingly being used by public entities and private victims alike in their search for justice amidst the suffering associated with lives lost, and the costs of gun-related injuries.

Guns in America

The number of guns has increased at a faster rate than the population has grown.⁴ Recent polling data suggest that approximately 38% of the nation's 103 million households contain at least 1 gun.⁵ While the percentage of gun-owning households has declined, the number of guns within those households has increased.

The characteristics of the guns Americans are buying also have changed. Throughout the 1960s, handguns comprised an increasing percentage of total gun sales, a trend that continues today.⁶ In contrast to long-guns, which primarily are used for sport, handguns generally are purchased for protection. The gradual shift in the market share of handguns has implications for firearms violence, which more often involves handguns. In 1997, 80% of gun homicides were committed with handguns.⁷

The growth of the protection market for guns is reflected in changing design characteristics of guns. Beginning in the early 1970s, an increasing number of easy-to-conceal pistols was being manufactured by the domestic Saturday night special industry that took root on the heels of the 1968 import ban of these guns. The palm-sized, low quality, inexpensive pistols are among the most frequent recovered by police and confiscated from youth.⁸ In addition to their appeal to criminals and youth, Saturday night specials and the companies responsible for their manufacture also drew the attention of the gun violence prevention movement, which criticized the industry for producing guns associated with a disproportionately high risk of injury and death.

The development of a domestic Saturday night special industry, and the subsequent emphasis on concealability among the traditional gun manufacturers, are part of the larger growth of semi-automatic pistols within the handgun market. In 1987 production of semi-automatic pistols outnumbered that of revolvers, reflecting a shift toward the increasingly popular pistols that would continue through the 1990s.⁹ Many of these pistols hold a larger number of bullets than revolvers, permitting longer chains of uninterrupted firing. Over the last 30 years, handguns have evolved into more efficient killing machines as the designs grew more compact and the ammunition capacity and caliber of the bullets increased.

Increases in semi-automatic pistol production have been accompanied by a new wave of advertisements designed to sway consumers toward the new handgun options. Fear of crime and the need to arm oneself against criminal threats are prominent themes in advertisements for semi-automatic pistols.¹⁰

Epidemiology of Firearm Death and Injury¹¹

Since the original Violence Commission report, an estimated 1 million people have been killed by gunfire in the United States.

People of all ages, races, and both genders are represented in these numbers. However, the burden associated with gun deaths and injuries falls disproportionately on certain subgroups within the population. In 1997, young adults aged 20-24 were killed by gunfire at a rate of 26 per 100,000—the highest rate among the age groups and more than double the total population rate of 12 per 100,000. Gun death rates among African-Americans that year were 2 and one-half times the rate for whites. In 1997 men were almost 6 times more likely to die by gunfire than women.

The most alarming trend over the past 30 years is the sharp increase in gun deaths among adolescent and young adult males. The high rates of 1993 marked the peak of this gun homicide trend. In the years that followed 1993, gun homicide rates began a slow decline, in part, we believe, because of the economic expansion (**Chapter 2**).

Nor does the recent decline in gun homicide rates in America change the nation's standing vis-a-vis other countries. The firearms death rate in the United States today is 8 times greater than those of 25 other wealthy nations combined.¹²

Recent Trends in Firearm Legislation¹³

In 1969 the Violence Commission criticized the absence of an effective national firearms policy, describing the laws of that day as reactionary and piecemeal. Today's federal firearms policies may be described similarly. Promises of tougher firearms laws appear almost on cue in the flurry of activity following the public shootings that have become all too routine in this country. Given America's one dollar, one vote democracy and our failure to control monied interests through campaign finance reform, Congress has been unwilling to toughen the federal rules that govern the manufacture and distribution of firearms in this country. In response, however, the states and localities have emerged as the new centers of activity for the regulation of guns.

State Legislatures

A few state legislatures have approved innovative gun violence prevention policies which include attention to the manufacture and distribution of guns, as well as their use.

Prohibitions on the manufacture of guns deemed high risk, such as Saturday night specials and assault weapons, have been approved by legislatures in several states. In addition, the manufacture and design of guns is central to state policy proposals to mandate personalized guns. Personalized gun legislation would require that guns be designed so that only authorized users can fire them. While personalized gun bills have been introduced in several states legislatures, such a mandate has yet to be elevated to the status of a law.

Several states have undertaken the sizeable task of regulating gun sales between 2 non-licensed gun dealers by mandating background checks of purchasers in these otherwise unregulated transactions. These secondary, or private, sales have long been viewed as a leading source of guns for criminals and youth, and are estimated to comprise 40% of all gun sales in this country.

Within the broad category of laws regulating gun use are laws which govern legal concealed gun carrying. During the last 5 years, many states have reexamined their policies on the legal carrying of firearms. Individuals may legally carry guns in public if they are in compliance with state and local laws. With few exceptions, a permit is required to legally carry a concealed weapon. The recent debate surrounding these laws concerns whether permits will be issued based on relatively strict criteria, requiring applicants to provide a reason for needing to carry a weapon in public, versus relatively lax criteria which essentially grant a permit to any individual who applies and is legally eligible to purchase and possess a handgun. Here, a promising model was a 1999 Missouri referendum. A proposal was defeated that would have allowed citizens to obtain permits to carry concealed guns. The gun lobby heavily outspent its opponents, but lost. Victory was achieved by a new alliance -- including both urban African-Americans and more conservative, suburban white "country club moms," "waitress moms" and "soccer moms."¹⁴

Perhaps the best example of state progress is California. In 1999, California passed several restrictions:¹⁵

- **Assault weapons:** Banned high-capacity magazines and "copycat" assault weapons designed to skirt restrictions on certain firearms. (The ban is tougher than federal law.)
- **Multiple purchases:** Limited the number of handguns an individual can purchase to 1 a month.
- **Gun shows:** Required certification of gun show promoters and prohibited minors from attending gun shows unless accompanied by an adult.
- **Gun locks:** Required all guns sold, transferred or manufactured in California to be equipped with a trigger lock or other safety device.
- **"Saturday night specials":** Restricted manufacture, importation and sale of cheap guns that don't meet basic safety standards.

As in Missouri, the gun lobby heavily outspent its opponents on these issues, but lost. As in Missouri, proponents of the California measures that

passed included a coalition of more progressive urban dwellers and more conservative suburban dwellers -- in part responding to recent school shootings. Because it is large and diverse -- and not necessarily as progressive as many people think -- California may be a partial model for the rest of the nation. Maryland may be emerging as another partial model.

Local Initiatives

Gun policy initiatives have not been limited to the state level. The growing community level activism around guns and gun policy has resulted in local level initiatives in several states. Among the states, California localities would likely rank among the most active. Communities have successfully enacted gun policies in response to local needs by using zoning laws to keep firearms dealers who operate from their home (known as "kitchen table dealers") out of their neighborhoods, and by using the local legislative process to ban certain types of guns such as Saturday night specials and assault weapons.

Litigation

Among the most radical and potentially the most influential changes in advocacy for gun violence prevention in the past 30 years is the use of litigation as a tool for reforming the gun industry.

Current litigation is an extension of a new way of looking at guns in general. For most of the latter half of the twentieth century, the focus of gun policy was on regulating the individuals who might criminally use a gun. By proscribing the purchase and possession of a handgun by a felon, and by enhancing the punishment of someone who used a gun in a crime, it was hoped that the incidence of gunfire would be reduced. But while lawmakers attempted to regulate who might use a gun, we essentially ignored those supplying the guns. We, as a society, focused on the person pulling the trigger and not the person making the trigger.

By the 1980s, however, the field of injury prevention began to look at gun-related injuries as a public health problem. When researchers considered the combined total of gun-related homicides, suicides, and accidental deaths, it was then understood that guns were the second leading cause of injury deaths in the United States, surpassed only by motor vehicle-related deaths.¹⁶ For some segments of the population, such as young African-American males, death by gunfire was the number 1 cause of death. It has been suggested that the solution to this public health emergency required focusing not only on the behaviors of individuals, but on the involved product as well.¹⁷ Historically, public health had found success in dealing with infectious diseases by controlling the vectors of the diseases, such as mosquitoes and rats. The vehicles of many homicides and suicides were guns, and the control of guns, it was argued, would be necessary to reduce the incidence of gun-related deaths.

For example, in 1999, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed a class action suit against the gun industry. Rather than seek monetary damages, the NAACP has asked for an injunction against the gun industry's distribution and marketing practices that allow guns to wind up in the wrong hands. The suit argues that illegal trafficking of guns, made possible by failure to control distribution, disproportionately affects minority communities. Nationally, African-American males aged 15 to 24 are 3 times as likely to be killed by gunfire than white males of the same age group.¹⁸

Litigation is a proven strategy for compelling the safer design of injury-creating products.¹⁹ Jurors, unlike legislators, do not seek re-election, and therefore may be more willing to take tough positions against a company that makes a dangerous product, even if the company or the product's users contribute significantly to election campaigns.

The most compelling gun cases that are now percolating their way through the courts are those that focus on the design and distribution practices of gun makers. With regard to design, plaintiffs are alleging that the incidence of gun-related deaths would be lower if the gun manufacturers used existing technologies to create a safer product. Loaded chamber indicators and magazine disconnect devices are 2 examples of technologies that have existed for about a century, but are still not found on most handguns. Magazine safety devices also can save lives.

created that will prevent the advertisement of guns on television, prevent the advertisement of guns in a jurisdiction if it is illegal to sell those guns in that jurisdiction, and prevent the depiction of children in gun advertisements.

Notes

1. Unless noted otherwise, this chapter is based on Shannon Frattaroli and Stephen P. Teret, "Firearms and Violence," chapter prepared for this 30 year update. The chapter will be published in its entirety in the separate book to be released in 2000. See Chapter 1.
2. Fred Graham and Hugh Davis Graham, Foreword, chapter prepared for this 30 year update. The full chapter is found here as Appendix 4 and will be republished in the separate book to be released in 2000.
3. This section is based on Frattaroli and Teret, *op. cit.*, and Graham and Graham *op. cit.*
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8. A NEW POLITICAL ALLIANCE

Ultimately, through campaign finance reform, a communicating what works movement, and related grassroots advocacy, we need to create a new voting majority, a new political alliance in America. The alliance must bring together middle income Americans (who often need 2 or 3 jobs in the family to make ends meet), wage earners (who need to be reminded that their CEOs earn on the average 419 times as much as they do), and the poor (who suffered in the 1980s and hardly improved in the 1990s).

What are the common grounds for such a new political alliance? One common ground is resentment over an unfair economic deal. We know from Sophie Body-Gendrot at the Sorbonne that large majorities already exist in 5 European countries and in Japan that want public policies to reduce economic inequalities. And now we have at least some evidence that middle and working income Americans appear to be resentful of CEOs with excessive salaries and stock options, according to surveys by Alan Wolfe at Boston College. Such rewards to CEOs are perceived by many middle and working income people interviewed by Wolfe as disconnected from the efforts that go into securing them. Like "welfare mothers," the wealthy rewardees are perceived by many as not earning their money. This, suggests Wolfe, makes the rich politically vulnerable -- especially given the enormous income, wage and wealth gaps that have opened in the 1980s and widened in the 1990s.² Middle income and wage earner families, including those with both parents working, may respond to messages like "reduce affirmative action for the rich" and "get corporations off welfare."

Resentment over an unfair economic deal is not the only common ground that middle and working income people share with the poor. They all share, as well, a vulnerability to the technological global marketplace. As Jeff Faux has observed, middle income people, wage earners and the poor all need education and re-education, job training and re-training, to compete.³ Can we secure a voting majority around government-facilitated education and training? The answer may be yes, based on new national surveys of voters by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press⁴ and especially by Albert H. Cantril and Susan Davis Cantril.⁵ For example, the Cantril surveys show voter disagreement philosophically on the role of government in the abstract. But the Cantril surveys also identify majorities in terms of voter support for specific, pragmatic government investments. Such investments include increased spending on Head Start, teacher subsidies, college student aid and job training. *The Cantril findings fit well into our frame of program-selective urban and criminal justice investments based on more of what works and less of what doesn't, along with our recommendation of an economic investments based on the elimination of child poverty and the creation of full employment, especially for the hard to employ.*

It will be easier to secure a voting majority around these issues of education and jobs than around issues like media entertainment violence and handgun violence. But here, too, there are some promising trends -- like the new anti-handgun alliances between central city voters and more conservative, suburban, soccer mom voters. As one unifying theme, campaign finance reform embraces *all* of these issues.

In the late 1960s, after numbing assassinations and street riots, and with an understanding of how America's culture of violence produced rates far higher than other industrialized nations, the National Violence Commission concluded that the greatness and durability of most civilizations has been finally determined not by external assault but by internal decay.⁶ Our civilization will be no exception.

The challenges within America require vision, not incrementalism and policy bites. Vision is needed from the grassroots to the White House. We need big solutions to big problems. That is what America always has been about. It is about dreaming and trying to fulfill those dreams, however long they may have been deferred.

In the words of historian James MacGregor Burns, "While centrists cautiously seek the middle way, leaders in science, technology, education, entertainment, finance and the media pursue their own transforming visions."⁷ Isn't it time to establish justice and insure domestic tranquility through

the transforming visions of grassroots movements and, perhaps, even of our political leaders

Notes

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4. Sean Wilentz, "For Voters, the 60's Never Died," *New York Times*, November 16, 1999, p. A 31.

5. Albert H. Cantril and Susan Davis Cantril, *Reading Mixed Signals: Ambivalence in American Public Opinion About Government* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); David Broder, "Voters of

6. National Violence Commission, op. cit., p. xxxii.

7. Burns, op. cit.

CHAPTER NOTES

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- 1.Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992).
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1.Introduction

- 1.National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, *To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. xix.
- 2.Ibid, p. xxi.
- 3.Ibid. p. xxii.
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- 9.Citations for these trends are found in Sections 2 and 3.
- 10.Citations for these trends are found in Section 2. Also see the tables in Appendix 5.

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5. Bob Herbert, "Addicted to Violence," *New York Times*, April 22, 1999, p. A31; Josh Sugarman, "Aiming Too Low," *Washington Post*, August 2, 1999, p. A19.
6. E. J. Dionne, Jr., "America the Violent," *Washington Post*, September 21, 1999, p. A19
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8. For a general discussion of recent research on the effects of incapacitation, see Elliott Currie, *Crime and Punishment in America* (New York, Metropolitan Books, 1998), Chapter 2.
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31. Mulvihill and Tumin with Curtis, *op. cit.*, p. xxvii.

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4. National Urban and Criminal Justice Policy

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June 14, 1992.

2. What do we mean by "scientific evaluation"? The National Research Council has concluded that the vast majority of programs for the truly disadvantaged and the inner city are not evaluated, or receive superficial evaluations that do not allow conclusions to be drawn on whether the program actually worked. By contrast, the Eisenhower Foundation's standards for scientific evaluation are as follows:

CScientific Research Design: The program was evaluated using a "quasi-experimental" design with comparison groups or an even more rigorous design with random assignment of subjects to program and control groups. Pre-post (before and after) outcome measures were undertaken.

CTargets Populations Most At Risk: All or most of the persons receiving the interventions were truly disadvantaged in urban areas and were "at-risk" in terms of a combination of factors, including income, dependency, education, employment, earnings, teen pregnancy, delinquency, crime and substance abuse.

CA Focus on Core Problems: The program addressed at least one of the problems or issues facing truly disadvantaged populations -- like poverty, inadequate education, unemployment, crime, drugs, teen pregnancy, dependency and substandard housing.

CSpecific, Measurable Outcomes: The outcome findings were not equivocal, but clear cut -- with all or most of the key outcome variables showing improvements for the treatment groups that were statistically significant vis-a-vis control or comparison groups.

CImplementation, Modification, Replication: The program was not an isolated, narrow academic experiment, but it started with, or built up to, broader scale implementation, possibly at multiple sites which later may have been replicated still further. The evaluation included considerable practical information on the day-to-day management of implementation and on how organizational and staff issues impacted on final outcomes.

CSpecification of Program Elements: The program intervention was articulated in sufficient detail. The demographic, social and risk characteristics of the population served by the program were specified.

These standards for scientific evaluation are comparable to recent reviews of programs in the *American Journal of Preventive Medicine* and by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. However, the Eisenhower Foundation gives more emphasis than such reviews to initiatives, beyond academic research, that have adequate technical designs but that also have been operating for some time in the rough-and-tumble of real world street life, funding pressure, staff burnout, inadequate salaries and political machinations at the local and federal levels. Academic experiments are limited, in our experience, unless the ideas can be carried out and replicated on the streets.

The Foundation therefore has searched for common sense programs that foundations,

legislators and public sector executives can fund and replicate.

We can illustrate these standards by comparing them to the standards used by others. For example, an excellent review by the American Psychological Association has a number of programs that are academic experiments. But the Eisenhower Foundation has concluded that there is insufficient replication of these experiments and insufficient information on how day-to-day management impacted on outcomes.

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5.Financing National Urban and Criminal Justice Policy -- and Creating Political Will

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\$7 billion per year is the estimated cost for expanding the existing Head Start preschool program to all eligible poor children.

\$15 billion per year for replication of successful public inner-city school reform initiatives is based on estimates by Joy Dryfoos that roughly 15,000 schools in the United States serve disadvantaged urban youth, children and teenagers; that the average number of students per school is about 1,000; and that the average

cost per student to implement reforms that work is about \$1,000.

\$1 billion per year is a conservative estimate for funding, technically assisting and evaluating safe haven-type and Quantum Opportunities-type replications for a fraction of the children, youth, and teenagers who would benefit from them.

\$4.5 billion per year for job training reform modeled after the Argus Community would allow training each year for a fraction of the 2,000,000-plus inner-city unemployed who need it.

\$1 billion per year for a National Community Development Bank is expected to generate a fraction of the 1,000,000 new private jobs that is our goal for the inner city. \$5 billion per year for 250,000 public sector construction and urban repair jobs each year is based on estimates in United States Conference of Mayors, *Ready to Go: New Lists of Transportation and Community Development Projects* (Washington, DC: United States Conference of Mayors, 1993). \$20 billion per year for 1,000,000 public service jobs is based on a minimum wage that averages to \$20,000 per year, with benefits and administrative expenses. This is somewhat higher than the average assumed in Richard McGahey, *Estimating the Economic Impact of a Public Jobs Program* (Washington, DC: Center for Community Change, 1997).

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Appendix 1
Biographical Summaries of the Original Members of the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

726 Jackson Pl., N.W.

Washington, DC 20506

December 10, 1969

Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith the Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

This Commission was created by President Johnson in an Executive Order dated June 6, 1968. Nearly a year later you asked us to continue our work and so extended the Commission's life for an additional six months. We are grateful for the support and encouragement that two Presidents and their staffs have given us.

Our Report is based on penetrating research by two hundred leading scholars and on eighteen months of hearings, conferences and some sixty days of arduous working sessions by members of the Commission.

The Commission's findings and recommendations are presented to you in a single volume. The detailed data and findings of the scholars who helped us are set forth in more than fifteen volumes of printed reports. These reports provide a solid base for further study and research.

We believe our Report will be of value to you, to the Congress, and to the American people. It sheds much light on the complex forces that tend to increase the level of violence in our rapidly changing society.

It suggests what the federal government, the state governments, and private associations and individuals can do to reduce the incidence of violence.

With one or two notable exceptions, our findings and recommendations have been unanimously agreed to by the thirteen members of this Commission. This is remarkable, for we are a diverse group of citizens; black and white, male and female, young and old, and Republican and Democratic -- from the fields of education, law religion, politics, psychology, history, labor and philosophy and from every region of the United States.

I wish to emphasize that the solution to the problem of violence in our society will require manifold actions by individuals, by families, by many private organizations, as well as by every level of government. Hence, the public educational value of our report is surely as important as its use in formulating legislation.

Respectfully yours,

Milton S. Eisenhower

Chairman

**THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE**

Biographical Summaries of the Commissioners,

as They Appeared In the Report

Submitted To the President on December 10, 1969

Milton S. Eisenhower, Chairman

President Emeritus of Johns Hopkins University; former President, Pennsylvania State University and Kansas State University; former Special Ambassador and Presidential Representative for Latin American Affairs.

A. Leon Higginbotham, Vice Chairman

U.S. District Court Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania; former Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission; former Member, President's Committee to Fulfill These Rights (White House Conference on Civil Rights); Member, Commission on Reform of U.S. Criminal Law.

Hale Boggs

Majority Whip, House of Representatives; U.S. Representative from 2nd Congressional District, Louisiana; former Member, Warren Commission.

Terence Cardinal Cooke

Archbishop of New York; Military Vicar to the Armed Forces of the United States; Member, Presidential Task Force on International Development.

Philip A. Hart

U.S. Senator from Michigan; Member, Judiciary and Commerce Committees; Chairman, Judiciary Anti-Trust and Monopoly Subcommittee; Chairman, Commerce Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources and Environment; Member, Democratic Policy Committee.

Eric Hoffer

Longshoreman; migratory worker; author; philosopher.

Roman Lee Hruska

U.S. Senator from Nebraska; former U.S. Representative from Nebraska; former Member, Board of Regents, University of Omaha.

Patricia Roberts Harris

Attorney at Law; former Dean and Professor, School of Law, Howard University; former U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg.

Leon Jaworski

Attorney at Law; former Special Assistant U.S. Attorney General; former Special Assistant Attorney General of Texas; author; Member, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice; Army Chief of War Crimes Trials, World War II.

Albert E. Jenner, Jr.

Attorney at Law; former Special Assistant Attorney General of Illinois; Senior Counsel. Warren Commission; author; President, National Conference Commission on Uniform State Laws; Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers.

William McCulloch

U.S. Representative from 4th Congressional District, Ohio; former Speaker, Ohio House of Representatives; former Member, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

Ernest William McFarland

Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; former Governor of Arizona; former U.S. Senator from Arizona and Senate Majority Leader.

W. Walter Menninger, M.D.

Staff Psychiatrist, Menninger Foundation; Member, National Advisory Health Council; Consultant, Federal Bureau of Prisons; Senior Psychiatric Consultant, Peace Corps.

Appendix 2

Table of Contents of the Forthcoming Book

To Establish Justice, to Insure Domestic Tranquility

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Dedicated to A. Leon Higginbotham and Marvin E. Wolfgang

Foreword

Fred R. Graham, Chief Anchor and Managing Director, Court Television, New York

Hugh Davis Graham, Holland N. McTyeire, Professor of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville

Introduction and Executive Summary

Lynn A. Curtis, President and CEO, Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, Washington, DC

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1. The Extent and Character of Violent Crime in America

Vera Y. Huang, Research Specialist, Center for the Study of Youth Policy, School of Social Work, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Neil Alan Weiner, Senior Research Associate, Center for the Study of Youth Policy, School of Social Work, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Rosalinda Rendon, Research Coordinator, Center for the Study of Youth Policy, School of Social Work, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

2. American Violence Since the Violence Commission: Regaining Perspective

Elliott Currie, Professor, University of California, Berkeley

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Sophie Body-Gendrot, Professor of Political Science and American Studies, The Sorbonne, Paris

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4. Has the Commission's "City of the Future" Come To Pass?

Paul A. Jargowsky, Associate Professor of Political Economy, School of Social Sciences, University of Texas, Dallas

5. Violence in the African-American Community

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Dora Nevares-Muniz, Professor of Law and Criminology, Inter-American University Law School, San Juan

7. Native Americans, Youth, the Commission and the Present

Fred R. Harris, Professor of Political Science, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque

Laura Harris, Executive Vice President, Americans for Indian Opportunity, Albuquerque

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Joy G. Dryfoos, Independent Researcher and Consultant, Hastings on Hudson, NY

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Jeff Faux, President, Economic Policy Institute, Washington, DC

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Jerome H. Skolnick, Adjunct Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Research in Crime and Justice, New York University School of Law, New York

Abigail Caplovitz, Leslie Glass Fellow, New York University School of Law, New York

11. Prison

JoAnne Page, President, The Fortune Society, New York

12. Firearms Policy

Shannon Frattaroli, Kellogg Community Health Scholar, Center for Gun Policy and Research, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore

Stephen P. Teret, Director, Center for Gun Policy and Research, Professor, School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore

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George Gerbner, Bell Atlantic Professor of Telecommunications, Temple University, Philadelphia

Robert W. McChesney, Research Associate Professor, Institute of Communications Research, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

14. Communicating What Works: Leveling the Media Playing Field

Leila McDowell, Co-Founder, McKinney and McDowell Associates, Washington, DC

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15. National Policy, Resources and Political Will

Lynn A. Curtis, President and CEO, Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, Washington, DC

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Appendix 3

Biographical Summaries of the Panel of Contributors to the Forthcoming Book

Sophie Body-Gendrot is Professor of Political Science and American Studies at the Sorbonne and at the Institute of Political Science in Paris. Her research focuses on comparative public policy, urban disorders, ethnic and racial issues and citizen participation. Among her books are *Ville et Violence*, *The Social Control of Cities* and *The Urban Moment*, edited with R. Beauregard. In 1998, with N. Le Guennec, she wrote a task force report on Urban Violence for the French Home Secretary.

Abigail Caplovitz is a Leslie Glass Fellow at the School of Law, New York University. She has been a Summer Scholar and Student Fellow at the Institute for Judicial Administration at New York University.

James P. Comer is Maurice Falk Professor of Child Psychiatry at the Yale University Child Study Center. Dr. Comer has been a researcher, consultant and advisor to programs serving children nationwide and internationally. He is the author of *Waiting for A Miracle* and *Maggie's American Dream*, and co-author of *Raising Black Children*. He has won numerous awards, most recently the 1996 Heinz Award for Service to Humanity. Dr. Comer was a contributor to the Task Force on Individual Acts of Violence on the National Violence Commission.

Elliott Currie is Professor in the Legal Studies Program at the University of California, Berkeley and is affiliated with its Center for the Study of Law and Society. He is the author of many books, including *Crime and Punishment in America* and *Reckoning: Drugs, the Cities and the Future*. Dr. Currie was Assistant Director of the Task Force on Demonstrations, Protests and Group Violence on the National Violence Commission.

Lynn A. Curtis is President of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation in Washington, DC. He was Executive Director of President Carter's interagency Urban and Regional Policy Group; served as Urban Policy Adviser to the U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; is the author, co-author or editor of 9 books; and was Co-Director of the Crimes of Violence Task Force of the National Violence Commission.

Joy G. Dryfoos is an independent researcher and consultant supported by the Carnegie Corporation. She lives in Hastings-on-Hudson, NY. She has written extensively about adolescent behavior and programs and policies that work in families, schools and communities. Her books include *Safe Passage: Making It Through Adolescence in A Risky Society*; *Full Service Schools: A Revolution in Health and Social Services for Children, Youth and Families*; and *Adolescents-at-Risk: Prevalence and Prevention*.

Jeff Faux is President of the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), in Washington, DC. EPI is recognized internationally for its economic research and public education work. It analyzes economic trends from the perspective of people who work for a living. It was founded by Mr. Faux and several prominent economists in 1986. His latest book is *The Party's Not Over: A New Vision for the Democrats*.

Shannon Frattaroli is a Kellogg Community Health Scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, where she is affiliated with the Center for Gun Policy and Research. Her work with the Center includes such topics as gun policy implementation, the epidemiology of gun injuries and deaths, and the development and evaluation of policies to restrict access to guns by people proscribed from purchasing guns.

George Gerbner is the Bell Atlantic Professor of Telecommunications at Temple University in Philadelphia. Before being awarded the Bell Atlantic Chair, Dr. Gerbner was Professor and Dean of the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, from 1964 through 1989. He was executive editor of the quarterly *Journal of Communication* and chair of the editorial board of the International Encyclopedia of Communication. He founded the Cultural Environment Movement.

Fred Graham is the Chief Anchor and Managing Editor of Court TV in New York City. He was previously Supreme Court Correspondent for the New York Times and Law Correspondent for CBS News. He is the author of *The Self-Inflicted Wound*, a book about the criminal law decisions of the Warren Court, and *The Alias Program*, about the Justice Department's witness protection program.

Hugh Davis Graham is Holland N. McTyeire Professor of History and Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University. He was Co-Director of the Task Force on Historical and Comparative Perspectives of the National Violence Commission and co-editor of its 1969 report, *Violence in America*. He is author of *The Civil Rights Era* and *Civil Rights and the Presidency*.

Fred R. Harris is a former member of the U.S. Senate from Oklahoma and now Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico. He is Co-Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation and was co-editor of *Locked in the Poorhouse: Cities, Race and Poverty in the United States*. Professor Harris has authored 15 nonfiction books and is working on his second novel.

Laura Harris is an enrolled citizen of the Comanche Nation and Executive Vice President of Americans for Indian Opportunity. She is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Center for Policy Alternatives and was a consultant to President Clinton's Initiative on Race.

Vera Huang is a research specialist at the Center for the Study of Youth Policy at the School of Social Work, University of Pennsylvania. She has been working on projects on violence, juvenile justice, the death penalty and child welfare. Her work has concentrated on survey design, survey analyses, database management and other applied social science research.

Paul A. Jargowsky is Associate Professor of Political Economy, School of Social Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas. His book *Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios and the American City*, is a comprehensive examination of poverty at the neighborhood level in U.S. metropolitan areas between 1970 and 1990. It received the Urban Affairs Association's Prize for the "Best Book on Urban Affairs Published in 1997 or 1998" and was chosen by *Choice Magazine* as "One of the Outstanding Academic Books of 1997."

Robert W. McChesney is Research Associate Professor in the Institute of Communications Research and the Graduate School of Library and Information Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Dr. McChesney is the author or editor of *Rich Media, Poor Democracy; Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy: The Battle for the Control of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935*; and, with Edward S. Herman, *The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism*.

Leila McDowell is co-founder of McKinney and McDowell Associates in Washington, DC, a media company with clients that have included the NAACP, National Institutes of Health, National Organization for Women, National Rainbow Coalition and TransAfrica. She has been a television and radio reporter, anchor and producer in New York City and other locations.

Dora Nevares-Muniz is Professor of Law and Criminology at Inter-American University Law School, San Juan. She is the author of 5 books published in Puerto Rico, and coauthored with Marvin Wolfgang *Juvenile Delinquency in Puerto Rico: The 1970 Birth Cohort Study*, published in 1988. In the late 1980's she directed the revision of the Puerto Rico Penal Code.

JoAnne Page has been the Executive Director of the Fortune Society in New York City since 1989. Ms. Page graduated from Yale Law School in 1980 and has been employed as a criminal defense attorney with the Legal Aid Society in New York City and as Director of Court programs at the Court Employment Project. She was a member of the National Criminal Justice Commission and currently serves as the Chair of the Executive Committee of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation. Ms. Page frequently is interviewed on national television about criminal justice issues and has appeared in such diverse settings as CNN, Court TV and Geraldo.

Rosalinda Rendon is Research Coordinator at the Center for the Study of Youth Policy, School of Social Work, University of Pennsylvania. She has been active in the social service field since 1980. She has supervised the operations of a shelter for abused woman and illegal immigrants and, more recently, has been involved in research and technical assistance projects at the University of Michigan and the University of Pennsylvania.

Jerome H. Skolnick is currently Adjunct Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Research in Crime and Justice at the School of Law, New York University. He retired in 1995 as Professor of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, where he

taught for more than 30 years. For 10 years, he was Director of the University of California's Center for the Study of Law and Society. He is the author of numerous books and edited books. Dr. Skolnick was Director of the Task Force on Demonstrations, Protests and Group Violence on the National Violence.

Stephen P. Teret is Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy Research. He is a pioneer in gun violence prevention policy, a prominent national expert, and the proponent of many innovative recommendations to reduce needless injuries and death. He is Professor of Health and Public Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health and holds joint appointments in Pediatrics and Emergency Medicine at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. He also is co-director of the Johns Hopkins joint degree program in Law and Public Health and Adjunct Professor of Health Law at the Georgetown University Law Center.

Neil Alan Weiner is Senior Research Associate at the Center for the Study of Youth Policy, School of Social Work, University of Pennsylvania. He was Senior Research Associate on the National Academy of Science's Panel on Understanding and Preventing Violence and a Visiting Fellow at the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. His ongoing research interests include individual violent criminal careers, situations in which violence occurs and escalates, historical patterns in violent crime, and evaluation of juvenile justice and child welfare programs.

Joseph F. West is a doctoral student at the Harvard School of Public Health in the Department of Health and Social Behavior. In 1999, he won the Albert Schweitzer "Reverence for Life Award" and the Harvard Dwight D. Eisenhower Scholarship.

Appendix 4

Foreword to the Forthcoming Book

FOREWORD

by Fred Graham and Hugh Davis Graham

Violence in America is a subject that lends itself to cliches. "As American as apple pie." "Burn baby, burn!" "Make my day."

Many of the cliches that have helped to form the public image of violence in this country were coined thirty years ago, during a spasm of rioting, assassinations and public lawlessness unlike any period before or since. But cliches can obscure reality, and many of the images of violence inherited from the Sixties are no longer valid. In some ways, they exaggerate the extent of the problem and its impact on American life--we are not a nation racked with urban riots and campus uprisings any more. But in others, the old images deflect attention from the problems of today--the rate of violent street-crime offenses is actually higher now than it was then, and silent plagues of violence such as spousal abuse and brutality against children pass almost unnoticed by our official statistics. We are both less, and more violent than we used to be--and the solutions, to the extent there are any, are surely different than thirty years ago.

Yet some aspects of American violence are depressingly consistent, suggesting that little headway is being made in achieving solutions--much of the violence of thirty years ago was attributed to the corrosive influence of guns, race and the entertainment media, and those same three concerns confound our society today.

So with regard to this nation's unique scourge of violence, it would be well to have a periodic review of where we have been, where we are, and where we may be headed. In fact, such a review happens.

When President Lyndon Johnson appointed the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (the Violence Commission) in the summer of 1968, the nation was in a state of shock. The year had begun, in late January, with the Tet offensive in Vietnam, and the succeeding months brought sledge-hammer blows -- Johnson's withdrawal from the presidential race, the assassination of Martin Luther King in Memphis, the wave of urban rioting by African-Americans in Washington, Baltimore, and other cities, the rioting at Columbia University, the assassination of Robert Kennedy in California, and the chaos at the Democratic national convention in Chicago. The decade of the 1960s, born in the hope of youthful idealism, equal rights reform, and a national drive to eliminate poverty, seemed to be spinning out of control.

Johnson appointed the Violence Commission in the wake of the King and Kennedy assassinations. He created a new commission partly because the Kerner Commission, appointed in 1967 following the riot in Detroit, had released a report early in 1968 that angered the president. The Kerner Report largely dismissed the achievements of the Great Society programs enacted under Johnson's leadership, and instead criticized the Vietnam war and emphasized the failures of national social policy in combating white racism and eliminating ghetto poverty. In its most famous passage, the Kerner Report described America as heading toward "two societies, one black, one white, separate and unequal." The Kerner Report had concentrated, not surprisingly, on the nation's racial crisis. The Violence Commission had a broader agenda of social pathology to address, and took a longer, historical view of their development. In addition to racial rioting in the cities, the Violence Commission agenda included political assassination, violent crime, and the role of the mass media in violence.

What has happened in the thirty years since? What have been the trends, and what lessons do they teach? The report that follows asks these questions, offers some answers and policy recommendations, and poses some questions of its own. As participants in the original Violence

Commission study, we have watched with relief as many of the violent impulses of the 1960s faded, especially the group violence and political assassinations surrounding the issues of race and war. And, like most Americans, we have monitored the persistent pulse of violent crime with anxiety, mixing relief at falling crime rates in the 1990s with unease at its still murderous toll and our soaring rates of imprisonment. We address these trends since the 1960s in that order -- group and political violence first, then crime.

Collective Violence Recedes Following the 1960s

When we look back today on the work of the Violence Commission we are struck by how rapidly circumstances changed in the wake of the commission's 1969 final report. This occurred not because the commission's policy recommendations were acted upon and helped resolve the crisis. The Violence Commission, even more than the Kerner Commission, addressed complex and deeply rooted problems of social conflict -- race riots, campus unrest, political assassination, poverty, antiwar turmoil, rising crime. These were problems that federal government policy, even if responsive to the recommendations of blue-ribbon panels, was unlikely soon to meliorate. When commission chairman Milton Eisenhower submitted the final report in December 1969, Richard Nixon was in the White House. The Nixon administration, seeking to "lower our voices," trimmed rather than expanded the social programs of the Johnson administration, and pursued policies in Vietnam that prolonged the war for another half-dozen years.

Despite this familiar pattern -- polite inattention by government to blue-ribbon panel recommendations -- most of the major forms of violence that had characterized the 1960s and prompted the presidential commissions, quickly subsided. The race riots, annually torching the cities in the "long hot summers" of 1965 through 1968, abruptly ceased. The riots were spontaneous outbursts of accumulated resentment by African-Americans against police, slumlords, merchants, decayed schools and community services. But burning and looting one's neighborhood was self-destructive, and communities rarely rioted twice. Moreover, it is a mark of how rapid and effective was the civil rights revolution of the 1960s in toppling the Jim Crow South, that the long hot summers of urban violence torched few southern cities. Southern blacks were quick to exploit the payoff in jobs, education, and political power produced by the breakthrough civil rights reforms of 1964 and 1965, and were not inclined to riot.

The ambush that killed Martin Luther King in 1968 also brought to a close the contagion of political assassination that counted among its victims in the 1960s John and Robert Kennedy, King, Malcolm X, and Medgar Evers. The campus violence at Kent State and Jackson State universities in 1970, following Nixon's invasion of Cambodia, represented the last of the campus eruptions that began at Berkeley in 1964. The antiwar movement lost much of its driving force when Congress at the end of 1969 approved President Nixon's proposal to draft 19-year-old males by lottery. Drafting under this new system of low induction rates ended entirely in 1973, when the country shifted to an all-volunteer armed forces.

Radical political violence similarly faded during Nixon's first term. Some forms of radical violence, for example the revolutionary gestures of Students for a Democratic Society and the Weatherman, faded in self-destructive anarchy. Other violent groups, such as the Black Panthers and the Symbionese Liberation Army, were suppressed by police. All these groups, though small, were expert in manipulating the media and won attention far exceeding their numbers. By 1973, however, when American Indian Movement leaders staged a two-month confrontation with federal authorities at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, the violent insurgencies of the 1960s had largely run their course.

New Forces for Change Following the 1960s

Looking back at the 1960s from the end of the century, we can see three new lines of development, trends that were not clearly discernible at the time but that since have powerfully reshaped America. One was chiefly political, one economic, and the third, social. Together these post-1960s forces shaped a national environment that produced unmatched peace and prosperity for most Americans. Yet they also led to a widening gap between the rich and the poor. They failed to change the festering cores of the inner cities, and produced governments unwilling or unable to develop effective interventions beyond maintaining social control through the criminal justice system.

The first change, the political one, was a partisan realignment ushered in by the election of 1968. Nixon's victory brought a new era of divided partisan government to America, and accelerated a conservative movement that would send Ronald Reagan to the White House in 1980. The hallmarks of divided government would be polarized political parties, increasing conflict between the elected branches of the federal government (including impeachment), legislative gridlock, and budget brinkmanship. And, for a generation following Nixon's victory in 1968, split government brought Republican control of the presidency and appointments to the federal courts.

The hallmarks of the conservative trend in national politics was growing opposition to large, centralized programs of social intervention run by federal agencies and paid for by taxpayers. Even President Jimmy Carter, the one-term exception to the quarter-century era of Republican presidential dominance, worked for deregulation and fiscal restraint. Democrat Bill Clinton, first elected, like Nixon, in a three-way presidential contest, presided in 1992-94 over a White House-Congress switch in party control. But the dynamics of split government did not change; hostilities between the president and Congress continued (including, again, impeachment), as did opposition to Big Government programs in Washington. Such a political atmosphere was, and today remains, inhospitable to large programs of social intervention of the kind recommended by the Kerner and Violence commissions in the 1960s.

The second post-1960s change was economic, and came in two phases. The 1960s had capped the great, postwar boom that saw American industrial production and the U.S. dollar dominate the world. Then in the 1970s the economy deteriorated. It was plagued by inflation, stagnant production, soaring energy costs, and high unemployment. Modernized economies such as Germany and Japan and low-wage developing nations provided stiffening global competition for American manufacturing and trade. By 1983, however, the American economy rebounded, leaned down by deregulation, corporate down-sizing and out-sourcing, and lubricated by President Reagan's tax cuts and defense buildup. The surge of economic growth that followed in the 1980s and 1990s broke all the old records.

Helping drive the economic boom was the third change, the revival of mass immigration to America. The country's earlier era of mass immigration ended with World War I and the restriction laws of the 1920s, which kept numbers small for half a century. Then Congress passed the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, a little-noticed reform that ended the national origins quota system of the 1920s. The 1965 law was passed on the strength of pledges by its sponsors that it would remove the racial and national origins quotas, but would not significantly change the number or origin of immigrants, then numbering around 300,000 a year. But the change brought unintended consequences. The family reunification preferences in the law, combined with population pressures and economic privation in the underdeveloped world, led to a tidal wave of immigration. Between 1970 and 1995 more than 25 million immigrants came to America, three-fourths of them from Latin America and Asia.

The post-1960s immigrants, like their pre-1920 counterparts, helped fuel the engines of the economic boom of the 1980s and 1990s. Their abundance drove wages down, gratifying the employers and Wall Street investors who lobbied successfully to keep immigration levels high. Like immigrants before them, they worked hard, complained little, and provided stiff competition for native-born workers. Mass immigration thus produced conflicting outcomes, boosting the growth economy, yet at the same time displacing many native-born workers, especially unskilled blacks. Recent studies have documented this competition, where employers preferred Asian and Hispanic over African-American workers, and network recruiting in high-immigrant areas displaced black workers from jobs in hotel and office building cleaning, landscape service, restaurants, light manufacturing, and construction. "Immigrants tend to compete for jobs at the bottom of the wage ladder," writes Jeff Faux in Chapter 9, where they are "strongly motivated by hardship to elbow the native poor out of job opportunities."

The Isolation of the Underclass

Fortunately, full employment during most of the 1980s and 1990s eased pressures between the competing minorities. But two outbreaks of collective violence during those otherwise riot-free decades revealed deep-seated problems that prosperity and full employment tended to mask. One was the Liberty City-Miami riot of 1980, in which 14 persons were killed and more than 300 were arrested. The riot broke out when African-Americans in the Liberty City slum protested a "not guilty" verdict in the trial of four Miami police officers accused of beating a black businessman to death. The 1985 update of the Violence Commission report observed that the riot was an exception but carried a warning. Set against a background of post-Castro Cuban immigration and economic success in Miami, and of black resentment in depressed Liberty City worsened by the nationwide inflation and high unemployment of 1980, the riot was the precursor of another telltale exception: the 1992 riot in Los Angeles.

The Liberty City-Miami and Los Angeles riots were separated by a decade of rising prosperity. Then recession returned in 1991-92. This worsened the downturn in California's economy caused by defense industry layoffs following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and heightened tension between racial and ethnic groups. The 1992 riot in South Central Los Angeles was sparked on April 29 by the acquittal by an all-white jury of charges against four white Los Angeles policemen charged with beating a black suspect, Rodney King. A video segment showing the officers beating King was widely seen on national television. The black-versus-white theme reinforced the initial interpretation of the riot by civil rights groups as Watts II. The label partly fit -- Los Angeles blacks violently protesting decayed neighborhoods and police violence, just as they had in 1965.

But the 1992 riot had a larger, more contemporary meaning. It was far more destructive than the 1965 riot, leaving more than 50 dead, 2,300 injured, and causing more than \$1 billion in property damage. Most merchants victimized by looting and arson were Asian and Latino -- black attacks on Korean merchants was a persistent pattern. More than half of those arrested were Hispanics, 40 percent of them with criminal records. Black-Latino tensions in Los Angeles had been rising, with disputes centering on claims by Hispanic political leaders that blacks, benefitting from affirmative action programs in the 1970s and 1980s, were overrepresented in government jobs. The Los Angeles riot in 1992 was, then, also an immigration riot, featuring cultural and economic competition between racial and ethnic groups.

Like the Liberty City-Miami riot of 1980, the Los Angeles riot of 1992 was a cathartic outburst, but one soon eased into the recesses of public memory by the return of good times. But both riots sent a message, like a firebell in the night, an alarm signifying a deep abscess in the tissues of an expansive, prosperous nation. The Liberty City riot, warned the Violence Commission update of 1985, signified "the transformation of the Miami black community into an underclass . . . a large proportion of the city's blacks had been relegated to an underclass of unemployables with little hope of escaping the dependency wrought by their structural irrelevance." Today, even conservative social critics concede that the underclass -- chiefly urban, black, and low-income -- has been largely untouched by the rising tide of economic prosperity or the ameliorative efforts of government programs. Charles Murray, author of Losing Ground , concluded in a recent study that despite the prosperity that followed Ronald Reagan's elevation to the White House, the underclass remains cut off from mainstream America, "living a life in which . . . productive work, family, [and] community . . . exist in fragmented and corrupted forms."

The Polarizing Income and Wealth

Sociologists disagree on the size and structure of the underclass and the appropriateness of the term. But few economists disagree that the rising tide of economic prosperity in the 1980s and 1990s has been accompanied by a growing class gap in income and wealth. As Paul Jargowsky observes in his chapter in this book, the Violence Commission report of 1969 was "stunningly accurate" in predicting the fragmentation of the American city, but underestimated the extent to which the fault lines in society would shift from racial issues in the direction of social class conflict. Class divisions widened in the African-American community, as the black middle class tripled after 1960 while the black underclass stagnated. The income gap separating the top and bottom fifths of the American population, a gap modestly narrowed during 1930-1970 by the redistributionist spending and tax policies of the Roosevelt administration and its successors, widened again thereafter, especially following the "supply side" tax and fiscal policies of the Reagan presidency. By the 1990s, the top fifth of the population typically received half of the annual income while the bottom fifth received less than 5 percent.

As Eisenhower Foundation president Lynn Curtis points out in his introduction to this report, the average corporate CEO in 1980 earned 42 times as much as the average factory worker. In 1998, the average CEO earned 419 times as much as the average worker. Prosperity and full employment ease the sting of class resentment caused by such startling disparities, much as good times ease the tension between racial and ethnic groups competing for jobs and advancement in our cities. But when the economy falters, as it had when the Liberty City and Los Angeles riots erupted, will we have learned and benefitted from any lessons of the past? And even while the good-time economy continues to roll, are we content with the record of crime and our response in the criminal justice system since the crime wave of the 1960s alarmed the American people?

Crime, Politics and Race

It is a measure of the corrosive impact of violence in the United States that one of the buoyant events of the 1990s was that violent crime rates went down.

Things weren't expected to happen that way. Crime rates as reported by the FBI had shot up in the turbulent 1960s, had zig-zagged around until an alarming rise in teen-age homicides in the mid-1980s triggered another rise in violent crime rates, and many experts predicted that the situation would get worse in the century's final decade. They warned that a bulge of young people in the population would begin to reach their most crime-prone ages in the early 1990s, touching off a further disturbing spurt in violence and crime.

Instead, crime rates declined. Beginning early in the 1990s, crime rates began to drift downward--across the nation, and across all categories of

offenses. Violent crimes--the assaults, rapes, robberies and killings that concern people most--generally declined the most. The trend has continued.

There has been a scramble to take credit, and to discover why. Some cited the crack cocaine epidemic that had ravaged the inner cities in the 1980s, but seemed to have run its course by the last decade of the millennium. Others credited the strong economy, on the plausible theory that people with jobs don't need to steal. Judges and courts, from the Supreme Court down, had generally become tougher on criminal defendants, and some said that had discouraged crime. Meanwhile, many big-city police forces were concentrating on seizing guns from young men, and lower murder rates followed. Easily the most thought-provoking theory was one produced by two university professors who theorized that the advent of legalized abortions in the 1970's prevented the births of a large number of unwanted children who would have been high-risk to become criminals, but were not around to commit crimes in the 1990's.

But the two measures that seemed to have the best claim for credit for the crime decline are the huge build-up in imprisonment and aggressive new tactics by the police. Law enforcement officials say a relatively few criminals commit a vast number of crimes--so it is no coincidence, they argue, that crime rates have gone down as more and more convicted criminals have been shut away in prison. Likewise, the cities--most notably, New York--that have used "zero tolerance" police methods to seize weapons and squelch even minor disorderly behavior, have achieved some of the steepest declines in crime.

But the very fact that these two anti-crime methods appear to work seems to carry the seeds of political and social conflict. Both methods generate friction with blacks, because both touch upon the unhappy relation between crime and race in America.

When the first Violence Commission report was issued, the subject of race was considered so touchy that the report handled it with cautious indirection. "Violent crime in the cities" it noted, "stems disproportionately from the ghetto slum where most Negroes live." Fifteen years later, the updated report did not flinch to say that "Black Americans, as a group, are more violent than white Americans." In this book, the chapter on "The Extent and Character of Violent Crime in America" notes matter-of-factly that "although blacks have constituted a modest percentage of the overall population, they have accumulated a disproportionately large share of the arrests for violent index crimes."

What this means in practice is that the anti-crime devices that produce results also tend to create tensions with the black population. Jerome Skolnick, in his chapter in this book on police policy, deals adroitly with both sides of this unfortunate conflict. The police, using Willie Sutton-like logic, go where crime is most likely to be found--in minority ghetto neighborhoods. The many law-abiding citizens there feel hassled, and resentment and lawsuits result.

This complicates things, because these contentious anti-crime devices are politically very popular. New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani rode the popularity of his aggressive crime campaign to a landslide re-election, telling minority voters that but for the steep cutback in the murder rate, several thousand of them would be dead and unable to vote for anyone. Other mayors are copying Giuliani, and many governors are building prisons--where a high percentage of the prisoners are always black.

And so it goes. Political pressures call for measures that effectively reduce violent crime. These measures often fall heaviest on blacks. So, what works causes racial problems. Regrettably, the solution to this is not found in this book, or, to our knowledge, anywhere else.

These problems are compounded by the failure of the government's prohibitionist strategy against drug use. It is no coincidence that the last time the nation's murder rate was as high as it reached in recent years was in the 1930s, when the government tried prohibition against alcohol. By almost any measure, the "War on Drugs" has been a vastly expensive failure that has promoted violence between those in the illegal drug trade. A new approach is needed, one that will benefit from the lessons of the blessedly-departed Prohibition Era.

A final irony is that despite recent successes in combating violence, this nation is still an extremely violent place. As Elliott Currie puts it in a chapter in this book on comparative violence, "American rates of serious violent crime are not only higher than they were thirty years ago, but far higher than those in comparable industrial nations around the world." What has happened is that crime had soared so high by the end of the 1980's that the recent declines, while a pleasant relief, only obscured the reality that this is a very violent land.

Guns and Violence

The most depressing consistency in the thirty years since the Violence Commission report has been the culpability of guns in facilitating violence, and the failure of the political system to deal with it. The Violence Commission approached this gingerly, declaring that "firearms generally facilitate, rather than cause, violence." But it did observe that there were then an estimated ninety million firearms in the United States, which it described as a "domestic arms buildup." It recommended the "restrictive licensing of the handgun," designed to greatly reduce the number of handguns in the United States.

Comparing the innocence of these recommendations to the chapter on "Firearms and Violence" in this book is to read and weep. There are now almost 200 million firearms in this country. They are no longer mostly designed for hunting and target-shooting. Today, most are high-powered, rapid-firing, easily-concealed weapons that have no other logical function than to kill humans.

The impact of a flood of such weapons into an urban society is bizarre. Any confused teenager feeling disparaged by fellow students can blow a number of them away. A worker who has problems on the job can put an end to it with a massacre at the office. A litigant who feels wronged by the justice system can set it right by shooting up the courthouse. Most people resolve things in a more reasonable way--but in a nation of 230 million people and 200 million firearms, the law of averages is producing a growing number of massacres.

If ever there was a metaphor for a failure of democracy, this has to be it. Whether it is due to the political muscle of the gun lobby, or the fear of the average citizen of the intruder in the night, or the apathy of everybody else, the political system has spectacularly failed to produce a solution. A symptom of that failure is the intervention of the trial lawyers--who, with millions in potential legal fees as an incentive, have sued to force the gun manufacturers to do their business in less socially-destructive ways. Perhaps the best that can be said is that, when the political system finally rouses itself to achieve a reasonable control of weapons, it will be both a victory against violence and for democracy.

Violence in the Media

Even during the relative innocence of television thirty years ago, the Violence Commission had reason to believe that the violence of those days may have been aggravated by the omnipresent violence on TV. More so than other topics looked into by the Commission, this inquiry was driven by widespread public complaints; many Americans suspected that pervasive TV violence was desensitizing children to the destructive effects of violent behavior, and the public called upon the Commission to come up with answers.

The Commission conducted studies, held hearings, and concluded that "Violence on television encourages violent forms of behavior, and fosters moral and social values about violence in daily life which are unacceptable in a civilized society." But the Commission did not suggest "that television is a principal source of violence in our society. We do suggest that it is a contributing factor."

This equivocal response was driven by two realities of the "television issue:" First, there was no conclusive proof that TV violence causes people to commit crimes, and second, the only certain way to reduce violence in the media was government censorship, and very few people had a stomach for that.

Now, thirty years later, the TV issue persists, and so do the two stumbling blocks in the path of a resolution. In the chapter on "Television Violence" in this book, George Gerbner declares that "the debate has remained at a virtual standstill." There is still no conclusive empirical evidence that television is guilty (and now, movies, video games, music videos and the Internet have been added to the list of suspects), and efforts to curb media violence have been blunted by the public's aversion to government censorship, and the constitutional strictures against it.

"Solutions cause problems," Eric Sevareid used to say, and American society seems to have been sensitive to this in confronting media violence. People sense that there is a connection between the increase in the violence their children see in the media and the violence some of them inflict on others--but people also understand that the entertainment industry gives them violence and sex because that's what they like to watch, and they are reluctant to give government the power to control that. The result has been a series of measures that give a soothing appearance of action, but with little unsettling bite. The Television Violence Act (encouraging television to clean up its own act), the V-chip, voluntary industry TV ratings and special programming for children have nudged the media to exercise restraint, and the public seems comfortable with the process. In fact, the amount

of raw violence in the media seems to have declined. Considering the alternatives, muddling through appears to have been the best policy.

Looking back, it is clear that the Violence Commission's mandate to determine the "Causes and Prevention" of violence was a tall order. It may be more than this nation will ever accomplish. But in the process of trying, it is helpful that the Eisenhower Foundation has conducted these reviews of the status of violence in America every fifteen years. Let the process continue.

ENDNOTES TO GRAHAM AND GRAHAM

1. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1969), 1. The commission and its report were referred to as the Kerner Commission and the Kerner Report after its chairman, Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois.
2. Fred Graham covered the activities of the Violence Commission for the New York Times, and wrote "A Contemporary History of American Crime," Chapter 13 of Violence in America: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 371-86. Hugh Graham was co-director of the Commission's Task Force on Historical and Comparative Perspectives. Fred Graham and Hugh Graham are brothers.
3. William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears (New York: Vintage, 1996); Roger D. Waldinger, Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Postindustrial New York (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
4. Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach and James F. short, Jr., "Collective Violence: The Redress of Grievance and Public Policy," in Lynn A. Curtis, ed., American Violence and Public Policy (New York: Yale University Press, 1985), 168-71.
5. Jack Miles, "Blacks versus Browns: The Struggle for the Bottom," Atlantic Monthly (October 1992): 41-68; Lou Cannon, Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD (New York: Times Books, 1997). See also the chapter on Hispanics by Dora Nuevas-Muniz in this volume.
6. American Violence and Public Policy, 171.
7. Charles Murray, "The Underclass Revisited," American Enterprise Institute research report, 1999.]

Appendix 5
Statistical Trends on Fear and Violence

Appendix 5 contains statistical tables that document many statements in the text.

There have been declines in fear and violence since about 1993 in the United States.

However, Table 1 shows responses to one of the primary questions on fear that has been asked in national surveys from the late 1960s to the late 1990s. By this measure, fear has increased when we compare the late 1960s to the late 1990s.

Tables 2 and 3 show violent crime rates per 100,000 as measured by reports to the police that then are reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In the text, we refer in particular to the FBI "violent crime Index" -- the rate per 100,000 population of murder, forcible, robbery and aggravated assault combined. From the late 1960s to the late 1990s, this rate has gone up. As discussed in Chapter 2, part, but not all, of the explanation of the rise is due with changes in the procedures for how these crimes were reported.

When just murder is broken out in these FBI tables, the rate per 100,000 has gone down slightly from the late 1960s to the late 1990s. But this is so despite enormous increases in the prison population, and despite the very significant medical improvements in our ability to keep people from dying if they are badly hurt in an assault. The picture is considerably more troubling, moreover, if we look at murder trends among different age groups. For though murder deaths have fallen at all ages from the 1990s peak, they remain much higher for the young than they were in the era of the Violence Commission. Among 14-17 year olds, the risk of death by murder was almost half again as high in 1998 as in 1970, despite a sharp fall since 1993. For those aged 18-24, the situation is worse: their homicide death rate remained nearly twice as high in 1998 as it was in 1970. Long-term reductions in murder have come entirely among people over 25. In addition, in 1999, murder increased by about 10% in New York City, which has received so much attention over recent years of decline. See Chapter 2.

Table 4 shows trends in violent crime based not on police and FBI reports, but on the National Victimization Survey (NVS). In this alternative way of measuring crime, people in a national sample of households are interviewed about their victimization, and crime rates then are calculated. The Table 4 NVS statistics show an increase over time in forcible rape and a decline over time for robbery and aggravated assault. The NVS only began in the 1970s, so we do not have the late 1960 base years we have with the FBI measures.

Principal Findings

The 1969 National Violence Commission understood that pervasive and deep-rooted violence in a highly fragmented and unequal society cannot be reliably contained by criminal justice policies -- even extreme ones. The experience of the past 30 years has proven the Commission right, indeed more dramatically than anyone could then have expected. The Commission has been proven correct in its vision of a "City of the Future" with rampant suburbanization as a response to central city decline. But it did not foresee how unsuccessful and self-defeating the strategy would turn out to be. Crime and violent acts in the suburbs, such as the Littleton massacre, and the deterioration of the older "inner-ring" suburbs show that, in the long run, one can't simply abandon the nation's social problems. The Commission foresaw that a city based on the principle of flight to safety would only deepen social divisions.

In spite of welcome reductions of fear and violence since about 1993 that have been coterminous with the economic boom and less unemployment in the inner city, fear and the FBI Index of violent crime have *increased* when the late 1960s are compared to the late 1990s. Specifically, in a national poll in 1967, Americans were asked, "Is there any area right around here -- that is within a mile -- where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?" In 1967, 31% answered yes. In 1998, 41% answered yes. Similarly, the FBI Index of violent crime (murder, rape, robbery and assault combined) has increased from a big city offense rate per 100,000 of 860 in 1969 to 1218 in 1998. (Appendix 5.) America's rates of violence remain *much higher* than most other industrialized nations, as in the 1960s. Today the rate of homicide death for a young man is 23 times higher in the U.S. than in England. In 1995, handguns were used to kill 2 people in New Zealand, 15 in Japan, 30 in Great Britain, 106 in Canada, 213 in Germany and 9,390 in the United States. In addition, official "crime" statistics in the U.S. do not measure the rate at which our nation produces criminality. Official statistics understate and hide the endemic problem.

America's failure to reduce endemic fear and violence over the long run is paralleled by its failure to establish justice. Nearly 1 quarter of all young children live in poverty. America is the most unequal country in the industrialized world in terms of income, wages and wealth. As a result of the racial bias in our mandatory sentencing system, especially for drugs, 1 of every 3 young African-American males is in the prison-industrial complex, on probation or on parole in America at any one time. In big cities, it is about 1 of every 2.

There is a new "triumphalism" about crime that is misleading. The triumphalism exaggerates the role of tough sentencing and "zero tolerance" policing and underestimates the role of explanations that may be more important, like the economic boom and the related waning of the crack epidemic.

Prisons have become our nation's substitute for effective public policies on crime, drugs, mental illness, housing, poverty and employment of the hardest to employ. In a reasonable culture we would not say we had won the war against disease just because we had moved a lot of sick people from their homes to hospital wards. And in a reasonable culture we would not say we have won the war against crime just because we have moved a lot of criminals from the community into prison cells.

The good news is that we are at a point in our history when we actually have the wherewithal -- both the knowledge and the material resources -- to launch an honest and effective attack on the violent crime that still afflicts us, in ways that are both enduring and community-wise. Since the late 1960s and based on scientific evaluations, we have learned a great deal about what doesn't work and about what does work to insure domestic tranquility *at the same time* that we establish justice. America has the scientific information and the money to replicate what works at a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem.

Much of what *doesn't* work also is immoral -- like tax breaks for the rich while young child poverty is almost 25% and more spending by the states on prison building than on higher education.

Local television news too often emphasizes violence and too seldom produces thoughtful stories on what works. This helps create a "mean world syndrome" in the minds of viewers, who then often conclude that nothing works. In terms of network television entertainment violence, not every child who watches a lot of violence or plays a lot of violent games will grow up to be violent. Other forces must converge, as they did recently in

Colorado. But just as every cigarette increases the chance that someday you will get lung cancer, every exposure to violence increases the chances that some day a child will behave more violently than they would otherwise.

If there ever were a metaphor for a failure of democracy, lack of firearms control may be it. The firearms death rate in America is 8 times greater than those of the 25 other wealthy nations combined. In the late 1960s, there were 90 million firearms in the U.S. Today, there are almost 200 million firearms in this country. They are no longer mostly designed for hunting and target-shooting. Today, most are high-powered, rapid-firing, easily-concealed weapons that have no other logical function than to kill humans. The impact of a flood of such weapons into an urban society is profound. Any confused teenager feeling disparaged by fellow students can blow a number of them away. A worker who has problems on the job can put an end to it with a massacre at the office. A litigant who feels wronged by the justice system can set it right by shooting up the courthouse. Most people resolve things in a more reasonable way -- but in a nation of 230 million people and 200 million firearms, the law of averages is producing a growing number of massacres. In the 1960s, the dialogue on firearm violence was dominated by political assassinations and the shock of losing some of our nation's most promising leaders. In the 1990s, the dialogue has shifted to our children, and to public shootings in schools, places of worship and day care centers.

Dominated by the economic system, America's leaders presently lack the will to act, to replicate to scale what we already know to work based on scientific evidence -- in spite of considerable public opinion to the contrary and unprecedented prosperity.

Principal Policy Recommendations

1. A new "grassroots federalism" is needed in which the federal government identifies sufficient resources to replicate what works to a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem -- but then targets most funds directly to local governments, and to the local, private, nonprofit organizations responsible for so much of what works. With the economic boom, we can find the money now to replicate to scale. The federal government also should require revenue sharing alliances among central cities, inner ring suburbs and, if possible, suburbs further out. The model experience of Minnesota should be replicated widely.
2. Funding priority needs to be given to replicating to scale investments that have proven through scientific evaluations to reduce crime *at the same time* they improve educational performance and help develop children, youth and young adults in positive directions. Most of these successes *also* reduce drug involvement and increase employability. Leading examples include Head Start preschool; safe havens after school -- like the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, Koban, Inc. in South Carolina, and Centro Isolina Ferre in San Juan; the public School Development Plan of Professor James Comer at Yale University; full service community schools, like the El Puente Academy in Brooklyn, where nonprofit organizations partner with individual inner-city schools; the Ford Foundation's Quantum Opportunities Program to keep inner-city youth in high school; the South Bronx Argus Community's "training first" (not "work first") job preparation investments in out-of-school youth; YouthBuild USA in which drop outs rehab houses; problem-oriented, community-equity policing in which minority officers are trained by local, private, nonprofit organizations to mentor at-risk youth; and the San Francisco Delancey Street model for self-sufficient reintegration of ex-offenders. To better measure the successes of replicating what works to scale, we need new measures of endemic criminality.
3. To help finance what works to scale, we need to cut back on programs that don't work -- including the "war on drugs," prison building, boot camps, supply side tax breaks to the rich, Enterprise Zones, and the Job Training Partnership Act for high risk youth. We need to reduce by a fraction affirmative action for the rich, corporate welfare and the military budget. We need to use a fraction of any future budget surpluses.
4. To support what works, we need a macroeconomic policy that gives first priority to eliminating child poverty and generating full employment for the hardest to employ in the inner city and in pockets of rural poverty. In spite of official and media reports, the present "jobs gap" for the hard-to-employ is perhaps 4 million -- not counting the almost 2 million in prison. To generate jobs, we need to invest in more local, private, nonprofit community development corporations, as pioneered by the Ford Foundation and modeled after Robert Kennedy's Mobilization for Youth, and invest in local, private, community-based banking, like Chicago's South Shore Bank, on a much broader scale. The for-profit private sector should be encouraged to close as much of the "jobs gap" for the hardest to employ as it is willing and able. But public sector jobs are needed. Public urban infrastructure regeneration is in great demand, as is public service employment -- especially for child care, work in schools, and work with local inner city nonprofit organizations.
5. Federal and local policy should significantly shift away from prison building and toward cheaper, more effective treatment alternatives in the community, following the model of the state of Arizona. Interrelated models of success like Delancey Street for the reintegration of ex-offenders, drug courts and community courts should be replicated much more widely. A National Sentencing and Drug Treatment Commission should be formed to review federal and state sentencing practices, the impact of recent sentencing trends on the fiscal health and public responsibilities of state and federal governments, the impact on serious crime, and the feasibility of a broad range of alternatives. The Commission should gather evidence on promising alternatives, including innovations in other nations that have kept their levels of incarceration relatively low by American standards. The Commission should propose a new policy to eliminate the disparity in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine, by reducing excessively long sentences for crack-related offenses.
6. Established progressive foundations and new foundations generated by information technology fortunes should fund a major new communicating what works movement that lets citizens know we do have the answers. "Television Schools" need to be funded to train perhaps a thousand nonprofit leaders each year in how to perform effectively on television, how to advocate for reduced violence on television news and how to organize to persuade media to increase news on what works. The clergy need to be organized to communicate that we know what works and that what doesn't work often is immoral. Building on ideas by Bill Moyers, "high tech pamphleteering" needs to be funded to create a new generation of advocacy-

based, community web sites, run by grassroots, private, nonprofit organizations and the youth they serve. The sites should function as ongoing town meetings, debate reform, reformulate budget priorities, organize against local television news that leads with violence and fails to report on what works, and support candidates who have a what works agenda.

At the same time, the federal government should reduce the power of big media conglomerates so we can reduce entertainment and commercial violence on television, reinvigorate public television, and establish a national media literacy policy as a core component of the K-12 education curriculum. National nonprofit organizations should advocate that the television industry needs to pay for use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Presently it doesn't. This amounts to taxpayer subsidies of billions per year -- almost enough to fully fund Head Start.

7. Established progressive foundations and new foundations generated by information technology fortunes should increase funding to private, nonprofit organizations, like Public Campaign, to educate the public and fight for lasting campaign finance reform to overturn our present "one dollar one vote democracy." We need to level the political playing field -- so that more persons can be elected who are not beholden to an America economic system that presently runs our political system. In many ways, real campaign finance reform is the reform that makes possible the replication to scale of education and jobs programs that work in the inner city and for the truly disadvantaged.

8. Just as the President and Surgeon General successfully framed smoking as a public health issue and changed the tobacco industry, so they need to frame network television entertainment and commercial violence, local television news violence and firearms violence as public health issues requiring changes in industry behavior. Campaign finance reform will reinforce such a campaign by the President and Surgeon General, better controlling the power of media conglomerates and big monied special interest groups that presently protect television and firearms violence.

9. Established progressive foundations and new foundations generated by information technology fortunes should increase funding to national and local nonprofit organizations and other citizens groups to educate the citizenry on the need for more state-based and local-based initiatives against firearms; local alliances between city residents and more conservative "soccer mom" suburbanites in the wake of the killings of youth in our schools; litigation against firearms manufacturers; a national handgun licensing system; a federal ban on Saturday night specials; and federal regulation of firearms as consumer products.

10. Private national and local nonprofit advocacy organizations should refocus their education and organizing efforts on the creation of a new voting majority, a new political alliance in America. The alliance should bring together middle income Americans (who often need 2 or 3 jobs in the family to make ends meet) wage earners (who need to be reminded that their CEO's earn on the average 419 times as much as they do) and the poor (who suffered in the 1980s and hardly improved in the 1990s). The alliance should unite around an unfair economic deal, resentment over economic rewards to the rich that are disconnected from the efforts that go into securing them, and the education and training needed by the poor, working income people and middle income people to compete in the global marketplace.