Executive Summary:
Top Ten Lessons and Recommendations

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>
> James Fallows
> "The Invisible Poor"
> *New York Times* Magazine
> March 19, 2000

Nonprofit community development corporations pursuing economic development have been successful in capacity building and replication, in part because there are excellent technical assistance and training opportunities for them. But we know less about how to best provide technical assistance and training for capacity building and replication to grassroots nonprofit organizations working in "softer" fields -- like child development, youth development, public school innovation, job training, job placement, advocacy, crime prevention, violence prevention, drug prevention and community-police partnerships.

This report is primarily about the latter groups. The report is based on street level experience by the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation from 1990 to 2000. During that time, the Foundation sought to enhance the capacity of, or host replications in, eighty-one nonprofit organizations in twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. These groups had annual budgets that ranged from $45,000 per year to well over $1M per year. Almost all were African American, Latino or Asian American nonprofit organizations in inner cities. The Eisenhower Foundation financed capacity building, replication, or both, through grants from eleven foundations, four federal departments, eight major corporations and over fifty other national and local matching partners. For some replications, police chiefs in eleven cities supplied officers as in-kind match to work with civilian staff.

Based on this experience, our top ten lessons and recommendations for funders, technical assistors and grassroots, inner city, nonprofit organizations are as follows:

1. A straightforward cause-effect model for technical assistance can work. For capacity building, and replication, the Foundation's cause-effect technical assistance model was:

Cause-Effect Model for Technical Assistance



We began with technical assistance and training by the Foundation in capacity building, technical assistance in replication, funding to sites, or some combination. This we anticipated would result in improvements in skills, knowledge and action by the nonprofit organizations. We then anticipated measurable outcomes that could be attributable to the improved skills, knowledge and action. For example, such outcomes might include more funds raised by the organization or better school performance by youth served by the organization.

In social science terms, Foundation technical assistance, training and funding represented inputs, or "independent variables"; consequent grassroots organization improvements in skills, knowledge and action represented "proximate variables"; and consequent measurable outcomes represented "dependent variables."

The cause-effect relationships we posited did, in fact, operate -- for capacity building as well as for replication -- based on findings from several outcome evaluations documented in the report as well as on a decade of process evaluations.

2. The same technical assistance and training inputs work for capacity building and replication. The primary technical assistance and training inputs the Foundation deployed were needs assessments, workplan development, national group workshops, one-on-one training back home and provision of grants and other resources. This formula was successful, for the most part. To refine the formula, we need more funds -- to increase the number of technical assistance staff making these inputs, lengthen the time staff can spend at any one site, increase resources directly granted to sites and allow for more systematic evaluation. The technical assistance and training, we found, should be done by peers who have both formal training and practical experience. It should be practical, applicable to solving problems, complemented by step-by-step follow up and written instructions, and involve trainees who then become trainers back home.

Our inputs were directed to technical assistance in the following areas of capacity building: board development, fundraising, financial management, organizational management (including evaluation), personnel management, staff development and communications (including leadership development). We learned that technical assistance in all of these areas can create positive change -- including technical assistance in evaluation and in communications, areas not always covered in the field of nonprofit capacity building. The nonprofit organizations we trained felt strongly that every one of these technical assistance areas impacted on every other area. For example, board development facilitates fundraising. Unless programs are well managed financially, they are unlikely to be successful, which makes fundraising and board recruitment more difficult. Skill with media can lead to more visibility and hence income. If the new board members are selected carefully, they will bring in ideas for new programs and can access new funding. The lesson is that a well developed technical assistance workplan must create these linkages for any one organization. Funders need to avoid restrictions on technical assisters and nonprofits making such linkages.

3. The technical assistance and training inputs for capacity building and replication created improvements in skills, knowledge and action -- as well as measurable outcomes. To refer back to the above cause-effect model, we were almost always successful in using Eisenhower Foundation technical assistance inputs to create improvements in skills, knowledge and action by grassroots nonprofit organizations. The degree of success varied considerably, but, for any one organization, we always had an example or two of success -- or more.

In the case of capacity building, there were good examples of measurable outcomes (like more funds actually raised and improved performance of youth served by a program) but they were not as consistently apparent as the examples of improvements in skills, knowledge and action by the nonprofit organization. In other words, for capacity building, we found changes in proximate variables easier to come by than changes in outcome (or dependent) variables. Consequently, we concluded on the need to provide capacity building technical assistance to any one site for periods of twenty-four to thirty-six months, in order to more fully generate measurable outcomes. In the case of replication, there were many improvements in skills, knowledge and action -- as well as many measurable outcomes.

However, we found that too many grassroots organization staff members still seem to believe that "success" is at hand as long as there are demonstrable improvements in their skills, knowledge and action. The continuing disconnect -- the failure to translate organizational improvements into measurable outcomes -- is, perhaps, not surprising. The disconnect is all too apparent in the context of national private and pubic policy in America that seeks inner city solutions. For example, in the case of "welfare reform," "success" has been claimed by some on the basis of reduced welfare roles. But taking people off welfare rolls is an organizational action. "Welfare" originally was designed as an intervention to reduce child poverty. Hence, the outcome measure for "welfare reform" is reduced child poverty. Yet child poverty has not been reduced by much over recent years, and it is difficult to causally link the "reform" to any consequent changes in child poverty. The lesson, here, is that we need more careful technical assistance to better teach grassroots organizers, as well as policy makers, the difference between actions taken and outcomes achieved.

4. Future progress in capacity building will be a function of adequate resources, regional clustering and distance learning. Grassroots nonprofit organizations that best respond to technical assistance and training typically are in the "pre-takeoff" stage (often three-to-five years old) have some solid capacity in place and often operate with budgets in the $150,000 to $600,000 range. Not uncommonly, such groups exhibit an enthusiasm to learn, a commitment to stay with the technical assistance over many months and a desire to pursue multiple technical assistance linkages.

For such groups, the rule of thumb we developed over time is one technical assistance and training director (who also has at least one area of substantive expertise) and two full time equivalent technical assister/trainers for every ten sites, over twenty-four to thirty-six months of assistance. Each grassroots group also should receive a discretionary grant of at least $10,000. Such a grant immediately will establish the seriousness of a commitment to change and will allow local grassroots organization staff greater clout in effecting change. Grants of this kind are a much needed financial boost to many grassroots organizations -- which are being asked to make major investments of time without immediate benefit.

Regional clustering of sites creates economies of scale for technical assistance. Given that thousands of nonprofit groups are in need of capacity building technical assistance in America, any serious effort to provide sufficient assistance requires both national and regional intermediaries. There should be uniform standards -- in terms of quality and quantity of staff and consultants, ratios of assisters/trainers to sites, inputs provided by assisters, areas of assistance covered and length of time assisted.

Capacity building for the thousands of nonprofit organizations currently in need of technical assistance and for new groups would seem a daunting endeavor. However, distance learning could provide a cost-effective breakthrough to allow, over time, assistance to all groups in need. Established funders and new grant makers with endowments from high technology fortunes need to support a series of demonstrations to learn just how far we can proceed and how successful we can be with nonprofit distance learning in capacity building and replication with pre-takeoff groups. Our experience suggests that hands-on in-person training will continue to be necessary, but that committed grassroots organizations can make great progress using clear, well-packaged, peer-based distance learning training that fits their busy schedules.

5. For capacity building, mechanical change is easier than behavioral change. At least two types of change occur within an organization receiving capacity building technical assistance and training: 1) "mechanical" change, like change in processes and systems, such as personnel policies, office procedures and fiscal policy; and 2) "behavioral" change, the more important of the two, that requires the emotional and intellectual commitment of key individuals -- such as the executive director, the chair and other key board members -- before they can take effect.

Mechanical change tends to be rather straightforward. You have policies or you don’t. The policies are effective or they are not. Such change is relatively easy to make -- once the key executives involved realize that the change improves their operations and makes them appear more efficient.

Behavioral change is the more difficult of the two. It tends to focus on people, rather than on systems. Therefore, it often requires altering long-held beliefs and "ways of doing things" that, however time-consuming or inefficient, are nonetheless "comfortable" and highly resistant to alteration. This is the form of change that can underlie resistance to seemingly "easy" mechanical changes and delay or even sabotage them. It also may explain the continual delays, postponements and obfuscations that prevent "getting things done." Such behavior seems to be associated with people who have been with their organizations for a long time and have become accustomed to doing things in a specific way.

It takes time to recognize the need for such behavioral change. When the need for change is recognized, it may require a degree of coddling and nagging, or both, by the technical assister to convince the person to begin to change. It takes more time for these changes to be implemented, and, once begun, tends to require continuous tweaking. Such change requires a tremendous amount of trust between the technical assister and the client grassroots organization staff and trustees, because a great deal of personal power and prestige are involved in these changes. One key element in establishing this level of trust is the clear expertise, professional and interpersonal skills of the technical assister. Senior technical assisters are required.

6. To qualify as a model for replication, a program should be scientifically evaluated. In terms of personal and public health, Americans tend to accept the notion that new drugs to fight, say, cancer or AIDS need to be scientifically evaluated and that, if they work, there then should be widespread use of them among all in need.

For the truly disadvantaged, a few instances can be found of replications that follow such a reasonable course. One example is the Ford Foundation’s Quantum Opportunities Program, based on adult mentors for inner-city high school youth. After Brandeis University released statistically significant findings that showed Quantum Opportunities worked and could be replicated, the *New York Times* published an editorial summarizing the success.

Quantum Opportunities now is being replicated on a broader scale through public and private funding.

Yet the example of Quantum Opportunities is relatively rare. Especially for public sector funding, programs for the truly disadvantaged can be replicated because of the influence of well paid lobbyists, access based on friendships, and fashions of the moment -- not because of positive evaluations.

When it comes to evidence that a model is qualified to be replicated, and that a replication has worked, we believe funders should base decisions on scientific evaluation, not political ideology. By "scientific evaluation," we mean, most importantly, use of a control group or comparison group outcome measure design implemented over sufficient time -- not just in a narrow, academic way but also in the rough-and-tumble of real world street life, funding, pressure, stuff burnout, inadequate salaries and political machinations.

Many successful models provide multiple solutions to multiple problems, and good evaluations must capture this reality.

7. Replication is possible. Some assert it is impossible to replicate successful grassroots nonprofit successes -- in part, we are told, because such successes depend on charismatic individuals who can’t be duplicated. That is not so. Replication is quite possible and depends on:

- Securing adequate funding over sufficient time (ideally a minimum of thirty-six months);
- Evaluating the replication (not just the model being replicated) in a scientific way;
- Creating sound institutional and staff capacity at replication sites;
- Generating professional training manuals and videos;
- Training replication staff systematically and in stages;
- Adhering to strategic workplans and budgets;
- Insuring tenacious quality control;
- Concentrating on underlying principles rather than exact copies; and
- Recognizing that either an entire program or parts of it can be implemented in another location.

8. Beware of conventional wisdoms. As knowledge has accumulated on how to technically assist capacity building and replication, some conventional wisdoms have, wisely, been questioned. This is as it should be, and reflects progress. For example, we have concluded that:

- Technical assistors can push too hard for a corporate model of board-dominated respectability that emasculates a nonprofit organization’s founding mission and blurs its founding vision.
- "Volunteerism," "self-sufficiency" and "empowerment" can be used as smokescreens to hide the very real dollars needed for enduring capacity building and replication success.
- Funders should give more priority than at present to replicating unaffiliated, indigenous grassroots nonprofit organizations and relatively less priority than at present to resourcing large national nonprofits to create more affiliates. The result, we believe, can be more grassroots democracy and better outcomes.
- The key to outcome based success is not so much whether a grassroots nonprofit organization is "faith based" or secular but

whether it has sound institutional capacity.

9. Funders and assisters need to better understand the power of communications in capacity building and replication. A nonprofit organization with a solid communications office can create a great amount of publicity. The publicity can help to generate funds -- useful for management improvements, staff development, further fundraising and replication of the programs favored by the think tank. Yet most grassroots, nonprofit organizations that we have supported and most of their technical assisters are far behind in their media sophistication. As part of a communicating what works movement, inner city grassroots nonprofits and the intermediaries that assist them need to learn strategic communication planning, train to be effective on the electronic media, create local community web sites, and create linked "master" web sites on what works -- all as means to build capacity and replicate more effectively.

10. Plan strategically. Established a new economy information foundations that embrace grassroots nonprofit capacity building and replication to a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem should establish long term strategic plans with local nonprofits and redesigned national nonprofit intermediaries. Established and new high tech foundations that provide the kind of capacity building and replication leadership recommended here -- for child development, youth development, public school innovation, job training and placement, community and economic development, community banking and community equity policing -- should seek to incorporate public sector income streams. Public funding is needed to replicate to scale. It should be modeled, in part, on the way the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development channels public resources through two private nonprofit intermediaries -- the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and the Enterprise Foundation.

At present, knowledge has converged with prosperity. What better time to begin capacity building and replication to scale?

1. Policy Framework

It is striking how much less talk there is about the poor than there was eight years ago, when the country was economically uncertain, or in previous eras, when the country felt flush.

James Fallows
"The Invisible Poor"
New York Times Magazine
March 19, 2000

This report is written for private and public funders who wish to supply technical assistance to grassroots nonprofit organizations on how to build capacity and how to replicate success. It also is written for technical assisters, whether or not they are funders, and for grassroots nonprofit organizations that seek lessons in how to enhance capacity and replicate what works.

The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation does not believe that technical assistance and training can be pursued in a vacuum. Where is the nation heading? Where does the Foundation believe the nation ought to be heading? What role should technical assistance in capacity building and replication play in any vision of the future?

To answer these questions, our point of departure is an uneasiness over how America's economic system controls its political system. For example, consider the failure to legislate campaign finance reform, the resulting continuation of what some call a "one dollar, one vote" democracy, the success of the media lobby to secure from Congress free use of public airwaves, the consequent use of these public resources by the media to gain still more control over the people, the not-unrelated existence of a twenty-three percent poverty rate for children five and under after almost a decade of unprecedented economic expansion, and the not-unrelated enormous income, wage and wealth gaps between the rich and the rest of the population that have grown faster over the last twenty years in America than in any other industrialized democracy.[1]

A symptom of the times has been the well-financed strategic communications plan carried out over recent years by think tanks that promote tax breaks and market solutions for the rich, combined with prison building, boot camps and disinvestment for the poor. In the 1990s, foundations with this ideology made grants totaling over $1B to think tanks with a similar ideology to carry it out.[2] Public attitudes have been influenced. For example, polls often show that, while majorities nationally want progress in the inner city and for the truly disadvantaged, they believe the major obstacle to doing more is "lack of knowledge."[3]

However, based on scientific evaluations over the last thirty years, we have learned a great deal about what doesn't work, and what does, for the inner city and the truly disadvantaged. Many of the interrelated, multiple solutions that work in child development, youth development, public school reform, job training and retention, job generation, economic development, community-based banking and problem oriented, community equity policing are led by grassroots nonprofit organizations -- or they involve such groups in partnership with other local institutions, like school systems and police departments. Accordingly, some believe we need a national policy, based on knowledge and not ideology, that stops doing what doesn't work and uses the money so saved to help invest what works -- but "at a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem," to quote the Kerner Riot Commission of the late nineteen sixties.[4]

To carry out this vision, the Eisenhower Foundation believes that a national communicating what works movement is necessary. Such a movement needs to convince the poor, working income people and middle income people that we do have the knowledge to carry out the education, job training and retraining reforms needed by all of them to compete in the global marketplace. We seek recognition that, for the inner city and the truly disadvantaged, public and private sector resources ought to be devolved to the local and grassroots level, not to the states. And we must enhance the capacities of the grassroots nonprofit organizations responsible for so much of what works, so that they can be replicated on a broader national scale. One model for such capacity building and replication is the process through which nonprofit community development corporations have grown from the original ten associated with Robert Kennedy's Mobilization for Youth in the nineteen sixties to over 2000 in the year 2000.[5]

The present report provides street level lessons for the last component of this knowledge-based vision -- capacity building and replication.

2. Qualities of Success

What are qualities of grassroots nonprofit inner city organizations that make for success? If we can answer this question, we can compare any grassroots, nonprofit organization to the ideal, decide what may be lacking in the organization, and create a technical assistance plan to move the organization closer to the ideal.

Model grassroots, nonprofit organizations are not just based on good program ideas. Our experience has taught that at least as important is the presence of a clear, outcome driven mission associated with strong board and staff leadership; skill in generating multiple income streams; competent financial and organizational management; quality, flexible and tenacious staff members who are given the opportunity for personal development; and ability to use the media to further the organization and promote leadership. Consider each of these qualities:

A Clear Mission and Sound Leadership
Successful grassroots, nonprofit organizations have clearly defined missions based on measurable outcomes. The operating head of the agency and the board of directors work well together and understand the role of evaluation in defining the mission. The operating head is respected by the board and the staff. Typically, the founder of a successful grassroots, nonprofit organization works long hours and has a strong work ethic, intense commitment, cultural sensitivity and considerable fundraising and political skill. Such executive directors are empathic with and well-informed about the people served by the nonprofit and communicates well with fellow staff-members, inspiring staff to work as hard as they do.

Skill in Generating Multiple Income Streams
In part because funders have recognized a clear mission, sound leadership, good ideas, multiple solutions, flexibility and competent management, successful or promising community-based nonprofits are able to secure at least minimal funding year after year. This is "soft money," because grassroots nonprofits rarely are endowed.

Such programs typically have learned to keep a balanced portfolio of public and private funders. They have staff, consultants or trustees who can locate announcements of fund availability and write good proposals. They mix restricted funding with unrestricted funding from private donors, special events and sometimes for-profit income streams.

Successes like Delancey Street in San Francisco create business-like and for-profit ventures linked to nonprofit programs. Delancey Street is able to involve participants in business ventures -- in part because Delancey Street participants are not thirteen year olds who still need to focus on school, but adult ex-offenders who, if they can be turned around, are more ready for steady employment.[1] Other nonprofit organizations involved with human development, like the Mid-Bronx Desperados Community Housing Corporation in New York, have integrated youth programs into economic development initiatives, and have generated income streams from the economic development -- for example, through housing syndication.[2]

Still, even the most successful grassroots nonprofits experience funding as a constant problem and have their bad times. Much of the reason is that such nonprofits are not sufficiently recognized by citizens as cost-effective investors in human capital. In turn, funding from the public and private sectors remain minuscule compared to what is needed nationally.

Competent Management
One stereotype of the inner city grassroots nonprofit organizations responsible for so much of what works is that they are begun by charismatic leaders who cannot manage. There is some truth to this, and many nonprofits, especially in youth development and human services, fail because of poor management. However, successful organizations have competent chief financial officers to manage grants and contracts. Many successes have the resources for executive vice presidents who manage day-to-day, while the leader provides vision, develops new ideas and raises funds with the

board. Good management helps generate good performance, which attracts more funds. More funds increase the resources available for bringing on good managers. It is a two-way relationship.

Effective Staff

In successful grassroots programs, staff are selected for their expertise and typically come from the same background and communities as persons in their program. Senior staff often have been at the organization for many years. These staff members understand that multiple solutions and outcomes cannot be routine or uniform. Variation is needed to fit individual needs of children, young people and adults. Staff feel they are wanted because of a supportive atmosphere. This facilitates participation by staff and the development of their leadership skills.

To deal with more traditional funding bureaucracies, staff need to be dedicated and tenacious. The founders of the Argus Community in the South Bronx and Delancey Street in San Francisco, for example, have been at it for over a quarter century.[3] Staff members often devise innovative plots and schemes to tunnel under or circle around the rules and regulations of more traditional bureaucracies that provide funds. Those bureaucracies tend to be narrow and categorical -- so at times they must be manipulated if the community groups are to come up with funding for the comprehensive interventions and multiple solutions that work best. To do all of this usually requires attention to mundane, day-to-day detail. Staff at successful organizations have considerable patience.

Such staff have opportunities for renewal and development -- although, typically, they would like time for much more. There often are regular, weekly staff development meetings, as is the case at Argus, where staff share their feelings, aspirations, triumphs and frustrations. Staff have access to professional development networks, and they exchange good practices at meetings and workshops with peers outside their organizations.

Mastery of the Media and Communications Technology

The media can be used to publicize a grassroots organization. The result can be education of the public that the program works. Such knowledge can be leveraged into political action, legislation and public funding for the program, and programs like it. It also can make private funders more aware of the success, and increase their support. For example, Delancey Street has been featured on CBS *Sunday Morning with Charles Kuralt*, ABC’s *20/20* and hosts of other national and local elections and print media stories. As a result of Delancey’s program success and media skill, its founder was given the lead by the Mayor of San Francisco in reforming the city’s juvenile justice system. Major banks helped finance construction of the Delancey Street residential and commercial complex on the Embarcadero.[4] Another example is the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, where program youth appear in public service announcements and commercials, frequent talk shows, have produced Blockbuster community service videos and were financed by Hollywood for a limited distribution motion picture, *Squeeze*.[5] Not only can media capacity share the word, but it can develop the leadership skills of nonprofit staff and program participants, as the Boston program has demonstrated.

Conclusion

Based on these qualities of success, how can technical assisters at the national, regional and local levels enhance the capacities of grassroots nonprofit organizations? How can technical assisters then help facilitate replications in other locations? Chapter 3 begins to answer these questions.

3. A Model for Change

Nonprofit community development corporations pursuing economic development have been successful in capacity building and replication (Chapter 1), in part because there are excellent technical assistance and training opportunities for them -- for example, from the Center for Community Change in Washington, DC and the Development Training Institute in Baltimore, Maryland. But we know less about how to best provide technical assistance for capacity building and replication to grassroots nonprofit organizations working in "softer" fields -- like child development, youth development, public school innovation, job training, job placement, advocacy, crime prevention, violence prevention, drug prevention and community-police partnerships.

This report is primarily about the latter groups. The report is based on street level experience by the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation from roughly 1990 to 2000. During that time, the Foundation sought to enhance the capacity of, or replicate, over eighty grassroots nonprofit organizations in twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Figure 1 shows their geographic distribution. Appendix 1 lists the organizations. These groups had annual budgets that ranged from $45,000 per year to well over $1M per year. Almost all were African American, Latino or Asian American groups in inner cities. The Eisenhower Foundation financed capacity building, replication, or both, through grants from eleven major foundations, four federal departments, eight major corporations and over fifty other national and local matching partners. For some of the replications, police chiefs in eleven cities supplied as in-kind match officers to work with civilian staff. (See Acknowledgments.)

Figure 1
Sites Receiving Eisenhower Foundation Capacity Building and Replication Technical Assistance 1990-2000



Each funding source had its own restrictions. Some funds were for capacity building technical assistance only. Sometimes the forms of capacity building were restricted by funders. Other sources provided funds primarily for replication, and allowed some capacity building at the nonprofit organization that hosted the replication.

Figure 2 summarizes the model of change used by the Foundation. As the model shows, we began with technical assistance and training by the Foundation in capacity building, technical assistance in replication, funding to sites, or some combination. This we anticipated would result in improvements in skills, knowledge and action by the nonprofit organizations. Crucially, we then anticipated measurable outcomes that could be attributable to the improved skills, knowledge and action. For example, such outcomes might include more funds raised by the organization or better school performance by youth served by the organization.

Figure 2

A Model for Change



In social science terms, Foundation technical assistance, training and funding represented inputs, or "independent variables"; consequent grassroots organization improvements in skills, knowledge and action represented "proximate variables"; and consequent measurable outcomes represented "dependent variables."

The rest of this report is devoted to summarizing how well the model of Figure 1 worked. Chapter 4 assesses the specific kinds of technical assistance and training inputs used by the Foundation to build capacity. Chapter 5 evaluates the skills, knowledge, and action that did or did not result and identifies measurable outcomes for capacity building assistance and training. Chapter 6 summarizes lessons learned in capacity building. Chapter 7 reviews lessons learned in replication. Chapter 8 asks where we go next with the knowledge that the Foundation has assembled.

4. Technical Assistance Inputs

Over the ten years of trial and error reported here, the Foundation found that cost-effective capacity building technical assistance and training inputs included: careful site selection, team-based intervention, needs assessment and workplan development, group training and technical assistance, on-site and other individualized training and technical assistance, and direct provision of services and resources as needed.[1] Consider each input:

Careful Site Selection
During our decade of capacity building work, we purposely selected a wide range of grassroots nonprofits groups, in terms of their budget size and years in existence. We wanted to experiment.

We found that technical assistance can be most effective at a point in time after an organization has survived birth and early development -- and is at a "pre-takeoff" point, on the cusp of becoming a model if it can enhance its capacity. Such groups typically were three to five years old, had budgets in the $150K and $600K range and had at least four staff members, including an executive director and a support staff person. The staff were able and willing to receive assistance. The groups had low staff turnover, and there was evidence that their services were being utilized by persons in need and other constituents.

Newer organizations with smaller staffs (sometimes just one person) often were overwhelmed by the details of incorporation and fundraising, with little time available for other organizational and staff work. They could not absorb all that was needed and thought they didn't have the time. They felt out of place in sessions with more mature groups. Although we increasingly deferred from engaging such organizations, they did respond to one-on-one coaching by technical assistance mentors and were helped when the Foundation wrote grant proposals for them.

Because so many nonprofit groups around the nation are in need of assistance and because technical assistance resources are so limited, we concluded that groups that have passed a certain threshold usually should not be included in technical assistance initiatives -- simply because they are stronger than other groups. Several groups we worked with were "mature" organizations with large budgets ($1M in some cases). Although many reported that they benefitted from Foundation assistance, they did not need help as much as others. We recommend that post-takeoff agencies with budgets above $600,000 usually not be selected, although flexibility should be maintained when there is a clear area of need and strong desire locally to engage in technical assistance.

Founder organizations (so-called "mom-and-pop" groups) can be difficult technical assistance recipients, we found. These are groups whose founders are the current executive directors or who continue to have final decision-making authority. The agency heads have accomplished a great deal with little to no outside capacity building assistance. Inventive and resourceful, these visionaries have performed numerous roles in their fledgling organizations, and it can be difficult for them to take advice from "outsiders" or implement changes with whom they do not agree. Progress can be stymied when founders fail to confer authority to other staff members within the organization to implement technical assistance recommendations.

Needs Assessment and Workplan Development
Over time, the Foundation developed a standardized needs assessment instrument. It is administered through one-on-one interviews with the staff of each organization receiving technical assistance. (The questions asked in the interview format are found in Appendix 2.) The Foundation assembles the responses and writes an analysis of staff priorities. The local executive director and Foundation technical assisters then make final decisions -- based on the director's priorities, the frequency of assistance requested by others and the Foundation's judgements on the feasibility of meeting the requests within the budget available.

Table 1 illustrates the variety of needs that were articulated during needs assessments for a cohort of sites that received Foundation technical assistance. For each group, technical assistance needs are ranked by order of priority, as perceived by the organization's staff in consultation with the Foundation. The Foundation supplied technical assistance for as many of the priorities as was financially feasible. As Table 1 shows, the number of Foundation staff members and consultants whose areas of expertise we needed at any one site ranged from two to nine.

Table 1: Technical Assistance Priories Ranked
By A Cohort of Sites in Consultation with the Foundation

Site	Technical Assistance Priorities as Ranked by the Site and the Foundation	Number of Foundation Technical Assisters Who Responded to These Needs
Casa del Pueblo Washington, DC	• Financial Management • Board Development • Fundraising • Proposal Writing	4
Iona Whipper Homes Washington, DC	• Communications • Financial Management Review • Board Development • Fundraising	5
Mentors, Inc. Washington, DC	• Communications • Evaluation	2
Metro Teen AIDS Washington, DC	• Fund Development • Board Development • Financial Management • Communications	4
Norris Square Civic Association Washington, DC	• Board Development • Fundraising • Staff Development • Communications	9
North Capital Neighborhood Development	• Board Development • Fundraising • Staff Development	2

Washington, DC	• Communications	
Paradise at Parkside Washington, DC	• Program Administration • Program Development • Fundraising/Proposal Writing	4
Pregnancy Aid Centers, College Park, MD	• Board Development • Fundraising • Communications	2
Village of Arts and Humanities Philadelphia, PA	• Board Development • Fundraising • Communications	7

After the needs assessment, the Foundation facilitated a process in which the staff, board members and community members generated a written workplan. The workplan identifies tasks, time frames and personnel needed to carry out the technical assistance. The Foundation has found that at least eighteen months of assistance usually is needed to show results, and that the optimal time is thirty-six months. The workplan has clear milestones, so the technical assisters can, month by month, make adjustments if work is off course.

In the process of undertaking a needs assessment and formulating a workplan, we concluded that it was not appropriate for the Foundation to simply promise to do what an organization perceived was necessary. Many groups did not know, or entirely know, what was needed. Often, they did not know how to ask the right questions. For example, some executive directors had no sense of time management or of delegation. Diplomatically, we had to point out such blind spots. As a result, we concluded that it was necessary to walk a fine line -- responding to needs as they "bubbled up" from the organization and community, but also providing some top down guidance on how to improve management, based on our experience. These simultaneous bubble up and top down principles of assistance and training were not impossible to achieve. But they did require considerable work and sensitivity.

During workplan development, grassroots organizations often had difficulty distinguishing between Foundation technical assistance inputs; consequent improvements in their skills, knowledge and action; and consequent measurable outcomes -- as summarized in Figure 2 (Chapter 3). For example, if an organization wanted to improve fundraising, the Foundation's technical assistance might be a group workshop followed by one-on-one tutoring on-site by a Foundation expert on the subject. The planned consequent action by the nonprofit organization might have included the submission of a higher quality grant proposal than before the assistance. The planned outcome here would be more funds raised.

At every opportunity, the Foundation tried to impress upon sites that new action taken by the nonprofit organization as a result of Foundation technical assistance was *not* the measure of success. Rather, the measure was a positive outcome as a result of the action. For example, more and higher quality proposals meant nothing if they didn't lead to more money raised. Yet, to many persons who we trained, higher quality proposals were an end in themselves -- not the potential means to the end of more funds actually raised. We concluded on the need for reinforced training by the Foundation that, we hoped, eventually would lead to more nonprofit staff who understood the difference between actions and outcomes.

Once a workplan was developed, a cooperative agreement was signed between the grassroots nonprofit organization and the Foundation to implement the workplan. Although this was not a formal contract, the agreement was an attempt to make groups aware that their actions were critical to a successful technical assistance experience. However, it was not clear that such agreements significantly increased the likelihood that a group would fulfill its end of the bargain.

What problems were encountered? Even with the pre-takeoff groups we found to be our best partners, some did not make a serious enough commitment of time and energy. Some entered into the agreement with the expectation that the new connection would lead to more funding (and this did sometimes occur). But some organizations implied in interviews with evaluators that the Eisenhower Foundation, being a foundation, should have provided more resources. However, upfront, the Foundation stated that it was an operating foundation, not an endowed foundation, and that it was supplying only as much technical assistance as the grant covering any cohort of sites would allow.

In some cases, executive directors did not share cooperative agreements with their staffs. Misconstrued staff expectations often were the result. In other cases, the executive directors simply did not realize the amount of effort that was required from them and their staff members. For these groups, we found that enthusiasm and cooperation could diminish. Unreturned phone calls, low or no attendance at group meetings, and uncompleted assignments all provided evidence that scarce technical assistance resources were not cost-beneficial. In still other cases, groups started out with good intentions, but encountered difficulty raising funds that led to budget and staff cuts. The Foundation provided fundraising technical assistance, but sometimes it was insufficient, during the period of assistance, to insure that the group would return to its commitments in the cooperative agreements and workplans.

What can be done to increase the commitment of some organizations over time? We found that more explicit, step-by-step, follow-up instructions by the Foundation could help a group, burdened with many time demands, to carry out a task it had committed to in a workplan. For example, the workplan for one organization included the goal of evaluation. After several conversations with the executive director, the Foundation developed a jargon-free, simple document that provided a list of indicators, potential data collection instruments, and an explanation of the practical ways in which the evaluation data could be used. In another program, as part of staff development there was a need for a ready-made curriculum for a new after-school program director who would arrive on the first day of school--without the benefit of an orientation or planning period. A Foundation consultant developed detailed lesson plans for the entire first month of the program. Pre-development of these materials helped avoid a chaotic environment during those first crucial days.

In addition, we concluded that some commitment problems can be eliminated with more careful site selection and more communication upfront--with all staff, not just executive directors, clear about what the Foundation was and was not able to do, for how long. Improved and repeated training was necessary on inputs versus outcomes. A more formal, legally binding contract should be tried, we decided.

Team-Based Intervention

Even when we ranked needs in order of priority, addressed only the highest and most manageable priorities and kept to pre-takeoff groups that had some capacity, the demands on Foundation technical assistance staff were great. Many different technical assistance skills were necessary. In addition, technical assisters who worked day-to-day with groups did not necessarily possess the same skills as technical assisters who were workshop trainers. Consequently, the Foundation developed a team approach to technical assistance--selecting staff and consultants who, collectively, covered all assistance needed by any one cohort of sites. Given the constraints on the Foundation's budget based on the resources available from different funders, we usually needed to use part-time staff and limited-time consultants to cover all areas of need. As time passed by, we concluded that the ideal technical assister to site ratio was one full-time director (who administered and also had at least one area of technical assistance expertise) plus a team of other part-time assisters, adding up to two full-time person equivalents, for every ten sites.

Group Workshops

Every six to twelve months, the Foundation held a national cluster workshop for any one cohort of organizations receiving technical assistance in capacity building. The goals were to provide common core information, share experiences, exchange best practices, and learn from one another's successes and failures. After one or two initial cluster workshops, later group sessions concentrated on training trainers -- so that local peer-to-peer expertise could be developed that extended and enhanced ownership in the technical assistance process.

Workshop session ratings of Foundation trainers by participants generally were high.[2] Grassroots nonprofit staff members responded best to experiential training curricula based on adult learning theory. The most helpful workshops gave grassroots staff an opportunity to share their experiences, learn information in non-threatening and non-academic work sessions, apply new skills or knowledge in a peer environment and interact with others in an informal setting. Others in the technical assistance field also have reached this conclusion.[3]

Supplemental group workshops and periodic group conference calls were used, as well. Later, over the decade of Foundation assistance reported on here, each site was requested to secure an e-mail address and each cohort of sites had an e-mail conference page. In the future, we will deploy an enhanced Foundation master web site for electronic conferencing and ongoing information exchange. We also will create a linked community web site for each nonprofit group being assisted.

Individuals who attended workshops, conferences and other off-site training events were required to share their newly-acquired knowledge with their colleagues when they returned. For example, all participants in a self-esteem and management accountability workshop were asked to develop a training-of-trainers follow-up plan that included specific dates for in-service training, expected participants and goals for each day of training. Persons attending other events also were required to write a follow-up memo to the Eisenhower Foundation explaining what they had learned, how the information would help them and when they planned to share the information with other staff.

On Site Technical Assistance

Given the different needs of groups, and the different time spans needed for groups to mature in a specific area of expertise, we found that generic cluster workshops were just the beginning. We concluded that, on-site, individual work was even more important. As Joy Dryfoos observes, "How-to conferences and workshops are very popular but they lack the potency of ‘in your face?instruction and guidance."[4] The need for extended, hands-on assistance has been articulated by others, as well.[5]

In most cases, Eisenhower Foundation staff were the lead technical assistance providers for all long-term, on-site work. Technical assistance by consultants was done under the direction of the Eisenhower Foundation capacity building director for any one cohort of groups. The on-site work of consultants typically was more short term. For example, frontline staff of one organization participated in a two-day training event on case management. A local consultant was engaged to follow up with the group and to determine whether additional help was needed.

Although resources did not always permit, we soon concluded that quarterly on-site visits were essential. Regular contact, we found, was necessary to establish and maintain trust, a key ingredient in success. The first visit should be for the needs assessment and to build rapport. The second visit should restate the now-developed workplan and the timeline. After the visit, technical assisters need to follow up, summarizing ongoing agreements and listing next steps. The third visit should provide hands-on, in-service training for each agency's areas of need. The last visit should review original goals in the workplan, discuss progress, and plan workplan revisions for the next period of technical assistance.

Direct Services and Resources

Through needs assessments, planning group sessions and individual technical assistance, the Eisenhower Foundation tried to give the staff of grassroots nonprofit organizations the skills and guidance needed to accomplish key tasks. However, we also often found a need to provide a direct service to a grantee, or offer a mini-grant so that grantees might acquire the service.

Grassroots organization staff especially appreciated services and resources that they could use immediately. Local staff thanked us for step-by-step instructions on how to use the information.

In terms of services, the Foundation provided written, computer disk, and video materials to sites. Distribution of some materials was initiated by the Foundation. Other materials responded to requests by the sites. Over ten years of capacity building, hundreds of distributions were made. Sites were especially grateful when the Foundation was able to undertake detail work that saved them time -- like ordering copies of requested materials and mailing them to the groups.

For some cohorts of organizations, the Foundation produced a monthly newsletter. The newsletter was developed on the recommendation of an executive director from a participating organization -- who felt there was a need for regular communication among all sites beyond national cluster workshops and technical assistance activities taking place at individual sites. When used with a cohort of groups, newsletters provided information of direct benefit to staff, and multiple copies were mailed to each site for wide distribution.

Examples of grants made to enhance capacity building were Foundation funding to attend workshops by other technical assisters and funds to hire local consultants for a variety of tasks -- like the design, installation and provision of local staff training for a database on client services.

In the future, resources permitting, we believe more direct grants to sites would be helpful -- in establishing trust, covering administration and staff costs associated with training, encouraging overworked staff to stay with the technical assistance process and providing high priority services.

We discuss this need more in Chapter 6, but here illustrate it with grants for technology. Many grassroots nonprofit groups did not have the technology to operate in the information age. To the extent they owned computers, they were likely to be outdated; even when they were not, many nonprofit staffers were not skilled computer users. In the Foundation's ten years of assistance, we usually did not have funding to meet these needs.

Accordingly, we recommend that technical assistance include funds so that every participating agency receives a grant to purchase up-to-date computers (in the full knowledge that they may be obsolete within two years). The technical assistance should include mandatory training for all staff members in use of basic word processing software, spreadsheets and databases. Each agency should receive a one-year paid subscription to an Internet Service Provider. Staff should receive mandatory training on how to access information from government agencies and from other nonprofits. Funds should be provided to create and maintain with program youth a community web site at each nonprofit assisted.

Internet access is critical because community-based organizations and others working in poor neighborhoods often operate in an information vacuum -- about models that have been proven effective, based on data from scientific evaluations, and that are suitable for replication; about programmatic innovations that could help them improve their management practices and direct service provision; about data collection tools and other instruments already in existence that could be adopted by these programs, saving them from having to "reinvent the wheel"; and about best practices in organizations that could be located in other areas of the country or just across town.

The Eisenhower Foundation is enhancing its web site (www.eisenhowerfoundation.org) to provide such models and best practices, and to link them to other sources of information.

Computer technology not only increases the technological proficiency of nonprofit staff, it also can help to make an organization more efficient. Cases can be managed through a computer database rather than through paper files; organizations can computerize their fundraising efforts and increase access to funds; and nonprofits can download information on federal and state grants directly, instead of waiting for announcements through the mail.

In short, the grassroots nonprofit sector needs to possess the same efficiency-producing technology and administrative systems that prevail in the for-profit private sector.

Conclusion

How were these technical inputs directed -- what areas of need received our attention? That is the subject of Chapter 5.

5. Consequent Knowledge, Skills, Action and Outcomes

The technical assistance inputs discussed in Chapter 4 were directed by the Foundation at these areas of local grassroots capacity building need:

- Board development
- Fundraising
- Financial management
- Organizational management and evaluation
- Personnel management
- Staff development
- Communications and leadership development

We designed this menu over time, based on what nonprofit organizations told the Foundation they needed. Reports by other technical assisters have acknowledged the need for most of these areas, although not necessarily for evaluation and especially not for communications.[1]

Based on the model of Figure 2 in Chapter 3, we illustrate in Chapter 5 how improvements in a grassroots organization's knowledge, skills, action, and measurable outcomes are possible, as a result of technical assistance and training. We note problems and lessons along the way.

Across the years of our capacity building technical assistance, the Foundation's funders were not able to set aside significant resources for formal evaluation. However, two modestly funded assessments by outside evaluators were commissioned by the Foundation.[2]In the case of communications capacity building, we also have "before" and "after" videos that show improvements in the communications skills of local organization staff who received training from the Foundation in how to present well on television.[3] In addition, participants in most Foundation group workshops rated sessions.[4] Last, process evaluation observations by Foundation staff and consultants were made on all cohorts that received technical assistance over the ten years covered by this report. The illustrations and discussions of successes and setbacks in Chapter 5 draw on these "triangulated" sources of evaluation evidence, as do the lessons on capacity building found in Chapter 6.

Board Development

Many agencies had similar, and in some cases severe, problems with their boards of directors. There typically was a need for better understanding of the board's roles and responsibilities, improved effectiveness of board committees, and increased board involvement in fundraising.

Foundation technical assisters reviewed materials from nonprofit groups that defined board roles and responsibilities, observed board meetings, and assessed the degree of board involvement of the executive director and of individual board members. For many groups, staff and trustees were equally unclear about board roles and responsibilities. One change often recommended was to increase board diversity, in terms of skills and ethnicity. For example, attorneys formed the majority of the board of one group we assisted. Board votes often were postponed because of concern over legal implications by one trustee or another. The board was ineffective. After revising the by-laws and electing a new executive committee, the agency brought on more nonlawyers, and some of the earlier deadlocks were resolved.

The Foundation provided board members with materials from the National center for Nonprofit Boards that explained fiduciary and policymaking roles and responsibilities of board members. When assistance was given to boards, we appeared successful in changing board understanding of its fiduciary and policymaking roles, encouraging changes in board composition, and impressing on trustees the need for financial support. These were proximate outcomes. However, in most cases, ultimate measurable outcomes remained uncertain at the time we completed assistance, usually after twelve or eighteen months. In many cases, it still was not clear whether board members were merely giving lip service or were prepared to act. For example, one chair had insufficient time for his duties, but would not alter his role. Out of frustration, the executive director threatened to resign. We persuaded her that she would be of more value to the organization if she stayed -- and tried to reshape the board slowly over time.

Fundraising

Over the years, nonprofit organizations requested fundraising technical assistance more than any other kind of assistance. Given this interest by nonprofit groups, it is perhaps not surprising that Foundation technical assistance appeared more effective for fundraising than for any other area of capacity building.

For example, one popular Foundation roleplaying workshop helped nonprofit organizations practice presentations to funders. All participants were nonprofit organization staff, but some played the role of grantmakers. The rest made their cases. The grantmaking role players had $2 in quarters to distribute. The first round of the exercise ended with one presenter getting most of the quarters, two others getting some quarters and the rest getting none. The exercise helped teach participants how difficult funding decisions could be with scarce resources. It also pointed to the importance of developing quality presentations that led to financial support.

Many nonprofit organizations habitually apply to the same funding sources and are unfamiliar with other funding options available to them. Foundation assistance articulated such options. For example, several organizations carried out capital campaigns. One executive director was encouraged to take greater risks in applying for funds. She submitted proposals to several sources and delivered her message effectively enough to secure grants from all of the new funders who received applications. Her boldest move was to develop a collaborative grant request that involved working with an established organization to provide services and training to clients in Russia. The proposal was funded. She attributes her fundraising success to the skill development she garnered from Foundation fundraising workshops.

As a result of Foundation advice, another nonprofit organization hired a professional to help with grant writing. The organization then submitted more proposals than in any previous year. Foundation assisters met with the new hire and the executive director monthly to plan short-term and long-term fundraising strategies. The executive director and development professional were sent to a fund-raising event in Boston to generate ideas about conducting fundraisers. The organization succeeded in raising more money in the year of assistance than in any of the previous five years.

Basic to this success, and to similar success with other nonprofit organizations, was the Foundation’s insistence on a balanced portfolio -- including but not limited to individual donations, corporate grants, foundation grants and public sector grants. Each source has its costs and benefits, and the optimal strategy, we taught local groups, is not to become trapped by an overreliance on any one.

Financial Management

As part of the initial needs assessment, the Foundation reviewed the fiscal management of nonprofit organizations, determining what record-keeping policies and procedures were in place, who was responsible for accounts payable and receivable, who signed checks and under what circumstances, whether state and federal guidelines were being followed, what the budget process entailed and what programs and equipment were in place to facilitate the process.

Because all funders require some demonstration of ability to manage funds, each of the agencies had some procedures in place. Foundation technical assisters helped to make their systems operate more efficiently, and helped the executive directors provide adequate financial reports to boards of directors.

All of the organizations we assisted underwent annual audits. The most common fiscal problem was when the board of directors did not properly exercise its financial oversight responsibilities. Such boards usually had weak committees responsible for financial oversight. The Foundation sought to strengthen those committees. Groups with fiscal management difficulties were especially likely to encounter multiple capacity building problems -- for example, with boards, fundraising and staffing -- and so we sought to work through the problem linkages and common origins with such organizations.

In several cases, the Foundation examined accounting software that was in use by the organization and made recommendations for improving the system. For example, one group had software that could only be used on one computer and was not transferable to other computers on site. In response to the Foundation’s recommendations, this organization hired a part-time accountant who consulted with the Foundation’s chief financial officer to develop a system that worked more efficiently.

Perhaps our clearest financial management success was with an organization in trouble with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for not having paid payroll taxes for several years. The Foundation's chief financial officer secured power-of-attorney and interceded on behalf of the organization in negotiating with the IRS for payment of back taxes. He also convinced the organization to hire a part-time accountant to assist with managing finances. These are proximate outcomes. The ultimate measure of success -- still unrealized -- will be when the organization can, for example, utilize its improved standing with the IRS and its new accountant to attract more grants, improve staff morale, bring on trustees with more confidence in the organization and motivate those trustees to raise new funds.

Organizational Management and Evaluation

The Foundation's greatest success in organizational management over the years may have been in teaching improved accountability. Needs assessments frequently showed that lines of accountability were unclear in many grassroots organizations. The Foundation therefore created an accountability workshop as part of its group training.

The accountability workshop was popular with participants. The reasons for success were that:

- The workshop trainer was a peer of the trainees who had experience with and understood the problems of nonprofit organization staff;

- The trainer had himself undergone accountability training, and understood the difficulties faced by the trainees;

- The training involved practice sessions so that nonprofit staff could immediately apply what they had learned while help was still available; and

- Participants were able to obtain feedback from peers who were in similar positions in their home agencies.

Originally perceived as an abstract concept by many participants, "accountability" was made more concrete by a trainer who was "in the same shoes" as the trainees. The training sessions ended with each agency presenting an "in-service training plan" that gave the dates on which each would conduct training at home agencies. Six months after the training, each organization was asked to forward materials showing whether and to what extent other staff had been trained. Copies of accountability matrices for all staff were submitted.

Other areas of organizational management assistance proved more challenging. For example, as discussed in Chapter 4, grassroots nonprofit executives typically did not understand the distinction among foundation inputs; consequent local organization improvements in knowledge, skills and action (proximate outcomes); and consequent measurable outcomes. This we saw as a problem in organizational management. Many local staff thought the end consisted of improvements in knowledge, skills and action. While such changes are crucial for evaluators to document, evaluators look for consequent measurable outcomes -- like more money actually raised in the case of fundraising. If nonprofit executive staff are implementing programs with different ends in mind than evaluators, the resulting evaluations may disappoint the organizations being evaluated, and their funders. Program staff and evaluators need to be on the same wavelength. Our workshops on input-outcome evaluation thinking and its relation to management by objective usually received high ratings.[5] But we concluded that these lessons should have been repeated, in group and one-on-one settings.

Another illustrative organizational issue we faced was excessive control of organizations by the larger organizations in which they were located. For example, over the years, we experienced at least three instances where youth serving organizations were stymied by the economic development organizations in which they were components. In one case, the smaller, youth serving component had a number of problems, but also many successes and considerable promise. The Foundation provided needed proposal writing assistance, so the organizational component could continue after support by an initial funder ended. However, the overall economic development organization did not support continuation (for reasons that never were shared with us), so the initiative shut down. In the second, somewhat similar case, the highly structured economic development staff of the host organization did not feel comfortable with the unstructured style of the youth development program staff. In the third case, the youth program performed well, but the overall nonprofit economic development organization was poorly managed. In spite of Foundation efforts to improve management, the economic development organization closed down, causing the youth component to close down as well. Technical assistance funds ran out, and the Foundation was unsuccessful in an attempt to help the youth group incorporate separately.

An organizational lesson here, therefore, is caution against selecting organizations that are components of larger organizations, with missions that are not completely in sync and staffs that may possess different styles and skills. In our experience, such dysfunction is especially possible in marriages between economic development and youth development nonprofits. The former often have the financial resources to begin youth development components, which then appeal to youth in unstructured ways that may be inconsistent with the more structured, business-like style possessed by many economic development staff. However, with careful communication and a cooperative overall director, such partnerships are not impossible, as we found in New York in a successful youth and community initiative with the Mid-Bronx Desperados Community Housing Corporation.

A final illustration of the organizational management issues we faced was the almost universal need for more modern computers and associated software, Internet access and training. Good nonprofit managers need information; tools to organize and help time-manage their usually extended, stressful and often chaotic day; improved filing systems to keep track of documents, especially given inadequate numbers of well-trained support staff; and quick ways to communicate with board members. None of the grants used to finance the Foundation's capacity building work had sufficient funds to address these hardware, software and training needs. In Chapter 4, we have proposed that grants for these purposes be included in all future capacity building initiatives.

Personnel Management

Personnel is one of the most volatile areas of management. It is essential for grassroots nonprofit organizations to have policies in place that guide the employer and employee. Personnel and policy procedures manuals help to facilitate resolution of problems that arise. However, our needs assessments found fewer problems than we might have anticipated -- because most funders of the organizations we assisted had strict guidelines on the need for sound personnel manuals. Nonetheless, in some cases, as required, the Foundation provided model personnel manuals and evaluation forms. In the case of one nonprofit, several staff needed to be fired, yet this was not easy because of an incomplete personnel manual. We helped create a new manual -- with policies that provided a process for termination.

Staff Development

Foundation technical assistance embraced both executive staff development and front line staff development.

A good illustration of executive staff development was Foundation assistance with organization founders who recognized the need to delegate more. For example, one group was founded by a person with the talent, courage and tenacity to create an extraordinary oasis in the middle of an inner-city ghetto. As required by the group's by-laws, a majority of the board was composed of community residents. The requirement led to recruitment of trustees who meant well but who were otherwise limited in their contribution to the agency, resulting in the reinforcement of the executive director's already considerable authority. Our technical assistance consisted of series of "coaching" sessions with the executive director, convincing her of the necessity of building a stronger board as the only way to achieve her stated objectives. The executive director eventually embraced this approach. Over many months, improvements in the board gradually were made. New members were added to both the community and non-community components of the board. The board went through a Foundation training session on its roles and responsibilities -- and gradually became more involved in the substantive decisions of the agency.

Over the ten years of capacity building technical assistance reported here, most of our staff development was targeted to front line youth workers, the priority of the major funder that financed these investments.

In the Foundation's youth worker training group workshops, the program director for the cohort of sites selected especially sensitive trainers. The trainers made all the difference in the world and were highly valued by participants. As with training in accountability (discussed under Organizational Management, above) the group sessions for youth worker staff development were led by a professional who not only was knowledgeable about the theory of youth development but also had practical field experience. The trainer was able to provide concrete examples of how to use academic information about youth development in youth work practice. Participants experienced an "'aha?moment" when the information they were exposed to made sense to them and could be applied immediately.

In one of the outside evaluations of the Foundation's technical assistance, two thirds of the youth workers who we trained and who were interviewed reported actual improvements or expansion in their youth services over a two year period. The specific changes that one or more reported were:[6]

- Having staff who were better trained in working with youth;
- Working with youth of different target ages and better understanding their social needs;
- Improving the agency intake process to obtain more comprehensive information about youth served so that their needs were better defined;
- Understanding better the role of volunteers, and how to recruit, train and retain them;
- Working more closely with other community-based, family-related and youth organizations;
- Working more closely with the juvenile court system and schools;
- Providing more afterschool and summer activities;
- Providing adult education, English As A Second Language, General Education Diploma classes and computer training classes;
- Working more effectively with parents;
- Becoming a multiple-site program in order to serve a larger number of youth; and
- Understanding more research-based development models.

Illustrations of measurable outcomes which could be considered at least partially associated with youth worker technical assistance included the following:[7]

- The grade point average of African-American youth in one grantee organization doubled;
- The number of teen fathers declined in one grantee organization;
- All 150 youth in one grantee organization graduated from high school and most of them were pursuing their college education;
- In one organization, the number of youth going to prison decreased; and
- For another organization, the number of youth committing crimes after they left the organization's youth program was thirty-three percent lower than any other youth-serving organization in the county.

Communications and Leadership Development

The literature on the practical experience of capacity building for grassroots nonprofit organizations is small. It is smaller still for communications as capacity building.

Few grassroots nonprofits are skilled in media and communications. This is not surprising -- because few can afford a communications director and communications office. Not many grassroots nonprofit executive directors have had the time to think through this part of their organization's mission. Yet these groups typically undertake advocacy, and it is important to get the word out to organize people. When groups achieve success in their programs, communicating that success can bring recognition, attract new trustees and generate more interest by funders. Increased funding can be used to improve management, financial management and staff development. The funding can finance new computers and a new director for fundraising. Most of these grassroots organizations oppose policies like tax breaks for the rich and prison building for the poor (Chapter 1). They have well thought out alternative policy frameworks that make more sense. Yet they have not been trained to use the media to articulate their frameworks and positions. For the most part, those who support a frame of tax breaks for the rich and prison building for the poor *have* been trained; as a consequence, the latter have increased the likelihood that their ideas will prevail.

In response, over the last ten years, the Foundation has trained several cohorts of inner-city nonprofit organization executive directors and other senior staff at the Foundation's Communications and Television School. The school runs over four days. The first two days cover how to develop a strategic advocacy campaign that identifies the message, the message senders and the target audiences. Also covered are basics like how to hold a press conference, write a press release, develop a press kit, "pitch" a story, write an op ed, write a letter to the editor and create public service advertising.

Over the remaining two days, the Foundation sets up a television camera and television studio. The camera is operated by a savvy, African-American cameraman off duty from the Washington, DC NBC affiliate. Training is led by the Foundation's director of communications. Each participant must first sit in front of the camera and, in a minute or two, present the mission of her or his organization. Then each must undertake an interview with reporters who act in a friendly and receptive manner. Next, each must undertake a hostile interview on what works and doesn't. Training concludes with groups of participants undergoing press conferences -- with our trainers acting as aggressive and sometimes offensive reporters. Each round of this training is videotaped, replayed and critiqued in front of the other participants.

Grassroots nonprofit participants learn electronic media lessons like these:

- Television is most effective when messages are simple;
- Keep in control. Always talk to the television audience, not the reporter or interviewer;
- Come to the presentation or interview with three priority messages -- and make sure you get them in;
- Make short statements that are memorable. "It costs more to go to jail than to Yale." "Prison building has become our national housing policy for the poor." "The states now spend more on prison building than on higher education." "The rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer."
- The most effective TV messages let the viewer create for herself a mental image that represents the message. The speaker can create this image with anecdotes and memorable language;
- You don't always need to answer directly all questions asked of you. Feel comfortable with stating your own message first. Answer within your own frame;
- Always bring a question back to your main message and theme. For example, perhaps your message is that the federal budget will hurt millions of children. Perhaps the interviewer then asks you, cynically, if the sky is green. Your response could be: "No, the sky is blue, which reflects the mood of millions of children who would be hurt";
- Always get briefed ahead of time on who is interviewing you, who else will be interviewed and the perspective of each of these people. Research their positions and writings ahead of time;
- It is okay to interrupt. You can always interrupt with eloquence. It is important not to let your point be overwhelmed and not to let misstatements go unchallenged; and
- The host does not have to totally control the agenda. Feel comfortable correcting and countering the moderator or host, especially when that person appears biased.

An Eisenhower Foundation capacity building media training manual has a more systematic review of such lessons and tips.

Communications and Television School students discuss the media's tendency to create conflict and controversy. Television and radio interviewers often seek conflict and opposition because they perceive controversy in terms of ratings and profits. Advocates for programs that work at the grassroots learn how not to respond to loaded questions -- and to promote their views within a framework in which they feel comfortable. Good television can, we teach, promote consensus building.

Video taped clips are shown at the Communications and Television School for how to deal with naysayers on television. For example, one video clip shows a debate on *The News Hour with Jim Lehrer*, on PBS. The debate centered on the Eisenhower Foundation's thirty year update of the Kerner Riot Commission.[8] The president of the Foundation debated two naysayers. One accused the report of being obsessed by race. The Foundation's president said no, the report was focused on *both* poverty and race. Then he quickly "pivoted," and moved on to reframe the discussion. The Foundation's president reminded viewers that he helped launch the naysayer's organization years ago -- by providing the naysayer with a start-up grant when the Foundation's president was a federal government appointee. The Foundation's president had "exposed" the naysayer on national television for taking federal grants. (The camera caught the naysayer's response.) The Foundation's president suggested that the grant for the fledgling organization of the naysayer was the kind of investment in human capital that we needed in America's inner cities. The naysayer then needed to take time to defend himself. That gave him less time to attack the Foundation's president, who therefore had more time to frame his next statements and keep control of the discussion.

We have found that Communications and Television School lessons on televison also apply to talk radio.

Television training is difficult and stressful for most participants. However, again not surprisingly, most grassroots nonprofit principal staff learn quickly over the course of the brief training. Often, progress is dramatic. The increased media acumen enhances leadership skills. At the end of the sessions, many admit that, prior to training, they had little experience in using media as a tool for capacity building and advocacy.

In terms of proximate outcomes, all training is video taped -- we have accumulated many examples of how specific participants perform before and after training.[9] Appendix 3 has excerpts from a press conference with several organizations, showing how, after training, they fended off and reframed media questions. Appendix 4 contains excerpts from a written evaluation of one television trainee, who followed up a Foundation group workshop with a video taped one-on-one training session. In addition, here is feedback by some of the people who have received television training, from the evaluation forms they submitted after the workshops:

- "I feel that the skills I have gained will make me a better presenter, interviewee and deliverer of my organization's message";
- "The camera allows you to see yourself, your mannerisms and how you deliver your message";
- "I plan to develop a strategic plan with a strong message regarding the agency and its impact on abused, neglected children";
- "I plan to invite the trainers to my agency so we learn issue techniques";
- "I will use the knowledge and skills acquired to become a better spokesperson for my agency. I really learned how to use the media to our advantage";
- "The videotaped review and criticism from fellow conference participants were particularly helpful";
- "This is good information that everyone should learn"; and
- "This is by far one of the most powerful workshops given by the Foundation. Sharing media stories prepares us for the unseen and unknown."

However, funds have not been available to follow up with most nonprofit groups after the training. The need is to fully develop a strategic communications plan for each nonprofit organization, implement it over two or three years and measure for concrete, ultimate outcomes. One such outcome might be more funds received as a result of publicity. Another might be success in changing local television news to include more stories on what works and less stories about violence and demonized minority youth.

At the time of the present report's publication, we have begun such follow-up. Foundation assisters are creating long term strategic communications plans with grassroots groups that received initial Communications and Television School training, performed well and have intense interest in media as capacity building. The strategic communications plans are individualized, but a commonality will be the creation of a web site at each organization that is linked into the Foundation's emerging "master" site, designed as an archive documenting what does and does not work, in terms of substantive programs and capacity building assistance. The three local groups will learn to use the "master" site and apply its information to local communications campaigns. More importantly, each grassroots organization's web site will be used as a local organizing tool to bring together people and institutions in their cities for common causes.

Multiple Areas of Assistance

Chapter 5 has illustrated success in each discrete area of capacity building. But participants in our training consistently felt that each area impacted on each other area, that our needs assessments should embrace the linkages among areas of need, and that the workplans should embrace all areas of need. In terms of need, interest and therefore planning, the most prominent linkages for most groups over the years were among fundraising, fiscal management, organizational management and communications.

The Foundation concurred with trainees. However, some funders limited work to only some technical assistance areas. Others had fewer content limitations, but in all cases funding was limited. Hence, Foundation staff and financial resource limitations were very real. We did the best we could under existing constraints. For over sixty organizations assisted during the end of the ten year period of our report, Table 2 identifies how we sought multiple solutions whenever feasible.

The evaluation of our work consistently found that the co-targeting of resources from different funders to better allow the Foundation to provide assistance in multiple areas was one of the most highly rated features of our work in the minds of trainees. Professor Lisbeth Schorr at the Harvard School of Public Health has concluded that one key to substantive programmatic success of nonprofit organizations is their ability to provide "multiple solutions to multiple problems," overcoming the categorical thinking of many funders.[10] In our ten years of capacity building experience, the need for multiple solutions to multiple capacity building problems proved equally imperative.

Conclusion

While funding proscribed more sophisticated evaluation, then, substantial triangulated evidence does exist on a casual relationship among Foundation technical assistance inputs, improvements in local organization knowledge, skills, action and consequent measured outcomes -- even though there were plenty of shortcomings and setbacks along the way.

One of the two independent evaluations reached this conclusion:[11]

> Based on the information collected as part of the evaluation, the technical assistance program was found to have a positive impact on the grantee organizations and their staff. In general, the grantee organizations found the technical assistance program to be helpful and agreed that, overall, the Eisenhower Foundation met their expectations. However, from the technical assistance program manager and providers?perspective, the program would not be as effective unless the grantee organization fulfilled their part of the technical assistance program agreements, and that is to transfer the knowledge and skills they acquired to the rest of their organizations, and to implement the technical assistance.

Similarly, the other independent evaluation concluded:[12]

> The overall quality of the training and technical assistance provided to the participants was very good and addressed the most significant needs of these organizations. The participants rated both the technical assistance and the workshops as above the norm and very useful in helping them better serve the youths involved in their programs.

Table 2: Eisenhower Foundation Technical Assistance

Sites	Technical Assistance in Board Development, Fund Raising, Financial Management, Organizational Management or Personnel Management[1]	Technical Assistance in Youth Worker and Other Front Line Staff Development[2]	Technical Assistance in Strategic Communications Planning and Television School[3]	Technical Assistance on How to Replicate[4]
African American Male Leadership Academy Lawrence, KS	X		X	
Al Kebulon Youth Right of Passage Baltimore, MD	X			
Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity Atlanta, GA	X	X	X	X
Baltimore American Indian Center Baltimore, MD	X			
Baltimore Jobs In Energy Youth Center Baltimore, MD	X			X
Blue Gargoyle Youth Center Chicago, IL		X		
Boys and Girls Club of Maryland, Flag House Courts Youth Safe Haven-Police				

Ministation Baltimore, MD	x	x		x
Boys Choir of Harlem New York, NY			X	
Boys Club of Memphis Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation Memphis, TN	X	X	X	X
Boys to Men Chicago, IL	X	X	X	
Bridging Bridges Cambridge, MA			X	
Capital Commitment, Inc. Washington, DC	X	X		X
Casa del Ninos Washington, DC	X	X	X	
Center for Youth Services Washington, DC		X		X
Centro Sister Isolina Ferre at Caimito	X		X	X

San Juan, PR		X		
The CLUB Boston, MA			X	
Clymer Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation Kansas City, MO		X		X
DC Barrios Unidos Washington, DC	X			
Dorchester Youth Collaborative Boston, MA		X		X
Ervin's All American Youth Club Clearwater, FL		X		
Friends of Benjamin Banneker Historical Park Baltimore, MD	X			
Gonzalez Gardens Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation KOBAN, Inc.	X	X	X	X

Columbia, SC				
Henley Homes Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation KOBAN, Inc. Columbia, SC	X	X	X	X
Holton Youth Center Milwaukee, WI		X		X
Hyde Park Neighborhood Club Chicago, IL		X		
Institute for Responsible Fatherhood Washington, DC	X	X	X	X
Iona Whipper Homes Washington, DC	X		X	
John R. Grubb Community YMCA Learning For Living Program Des Moines, IA	X	X		X
Latin American Youth Center	X			

Washington, DC				
Latino Youth Development New Haven, CT	X	X		
Lillian Jones Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation Baltimore, MD	X	X		X
Logan Neighborhood Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation Philadelphia, PA	X			X
MAD DADS Omaha, NE			X	
Mentors, Inc. Washington, DC	X		X	
Metro Teen AIDS Washington, DC	X		X	
Mineral and Whittier Parks Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation Dover, NH	X	X		X

National Capital Neighborhood Development Corp. Washington, DC	X		X	
New Beginnings Center St. Paul, MN	X	X		
New Community Corporation Newark, NJ				X
Norris Square Civic Association Philadelphia, PA	X		X	
Omega Boys Club San Francisco, CA			X	
Omega Little Brothers Helena, AR			X	
Our Family Table Atlanta, GA	X		X	
Paradise at Parkside, Youth Safe Haven Police	X	X	X	X

Ministation Washington, DC				
Pathways Dermott, AK			X	
People's Congregational Church Washington, DC	X		X	
Perry School Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation KOBAN, Inc. Columbia, SC	X	X	X	X
Phoenix Youth At Risk Phoenix, AZ		X		
Portland House of Umoja Portland, OR	X	X		
Pregnancy Aid Centers College Park, MD	X		X	
Project Keep Hope Alive Commerce, TX	X		X	

Project LEEO Roxbury, MA	X			
Quality, Education for Minorities Network Washington, DC			X	
Riker McKenzie Human Dev.Corporation Baltimore, MD	X			
St. Francis JOBS Program Charlotte, NC		X		
Saxon Homes Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation KOBAN, Inc. Columbia, SC	X	X	X	X
Teen Choice Center Phoenix, AZ		X		
The Village of Arts and Humanities Philadelphia, PA	X		X	
Tomberlin Community Dev.				

Center Youth Safe Haven Police Ministation Little Rock, AR	X	X	X	X
Urban Dreams Des Moines, IA		X	X	X
Youth Guidance Chicago, IL	X			X
Youth Leadership Academy Milwaukee, WI	X	X	X	X

[1] Funding primarily from the Annie E. Casey Foundation and the W.K. Kellogg Foundation.
[2] Funding primarily from the DeWitt Wallace-Readers Digest Fund and the Stearns Family Foundation.
[3] Funding primarily from the W.K. Kellogg Foundation.
[4] Funding primarily from the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Justice and Labor - as well as the Center for Global Partnership and Keidanren of Japan.

6. Lessons for Capacity Building Technical Assistance

Based on this experience with capacity building technical assistance, we learned the following lessons:

1. The Foundation's technical assistance model worked, and can be improved;
2. Future progress will be a function of adequate resources, regional clustering and distance learning;
3. Resources build more capacity than rhetoric;
4. Mechanical change is easier than behavioral change;
5. Beware of technical assister syndrome;
6. Funders and assisters need to better understand the power of communications as capacity building; and
7. We need to reorganize and better fund national nonprofit groups.

Consider each lesson:

Lesson 1: The Foundation's Technical Assistance Model Worked, And Can Be Improved
The model of Figure 2 in Chapter 3 asserts that inputs by technical assisters can lead to improvements in skills, knowledge and action by grassroots nonprofit organizations that result in measurable outcomes. Input (or independent) variables impact proximate variables, which impact outcome (or dependent) variables.

The primary technical assistance inputs the Foundation deployed were needs assessments, workplan development, national group workshops, one-on-one training back home and provision of grants and other resources. This formula was successful, for the most part. In terms of refinements, more funds are needed -- to increase the number of technical assistance staff making these inputs, lengthen the time they can spend with any one site, increase the resources directly granted to sites and allow for more systematic evaluation. The technical assistance and training, we found, should be done by peers who have both formal training and practical experience. It should be practical, immediately applicable to solving problems and complemented by step-by-step follow-up and written instructions. Trainees then should become trainers back home.

Our inputs were directed to technical assistance in the following areas: board development, fundraising, financial management, organizational management (including evaluation), personnel management, staff development and communications (including leadership development). We learned that technical assistance in all of these areas can create positive change -- including technical assistance in evaluation and in communications, areas not always covered in the field of nonprofit capacity building. Our nonprofit organizations strongly felt that every one of these technical assistance areas impacts on every other area. For example, board development facilitates fundraising. Unless programs are well managed financially, they are unlikely to be successful, which makes fundraising and board recruitment more difficult. Skill with media can lead to more visibility and hence income. The income can be used to hire more and better trained staff. Better prepared staff can increase the likelihood of positive program outcomes, which a savvy communications office can publicize in ways that attract new board members. If the new board members are selected carefully, they will bring in ideas for new programs and will access new funding. The lesson is that a well developed technical assistance workplan must make these linkages. Funders need to avoid restrictions on technical assisters and nonprofit organizations making such linkages.

We were almost always successful in using our technical assistance inputs to create improvements in skills, knowledge and action by grassroots nonprofit organizations. The degree of success varied considerably, but, for any one organization, we always had an example or two of success -- or more.

There were good examples of measurable outcomes (like more funds actually raised and improved performance of youth served by a program) but they were not as consistently apparent as the examples of improvements in skills, knowledge and action by the nonprofit organization. In other words, we found changes in proximate variables easier to come by than changes in outcome (or dependent) variables.

We concluded that more time with each organization -- twenty-four to thirty-six months -- and more resources invested probably would have resulted in significantly more measurable outcomes. We also believe that the Foundation needs to extend its training sessions on evaluation. Our evaluation training sessions received high ratings from participants.[1] Foundation staff thought the trainer was highly creative. The lesson was not to improve the workshop, but to repeat its message more often, in individual and group settings. Too many grassroots organization staff members still seem to believe that "success" is at hand if there are demonstrable improvements in their skills, knowledge and action. The continuing disconnect -- the failure to translate organizational improvements into measurable outcomes -- is, perhaps, not surprising. The disconnect is all too apparent in the context of national private and public policy in America that seeks inner city solutions. For example, in the case of "welfare reform," "success" has been claimed by some on the basis of reduced welfare roles. But taking people off welfare rolls is an organizational action. "Welfare" originally was designed as an intervention to reduce child poverty. Hence, the outcome measure for "welfare reform" is reduced child poverty. Yet child poverty has not been reduced by much over recent years, and it is difficult to causally link the "reform" to any consequent changes in child poverty. The child poverty rate in America for youngsters aged five years and under is about 23 percent.[2]

Whether or not one agrees with the Foundation's specific methods and precise conclusions, there can be little disagreement on the need for this type of capacity building and on the benefits that can accrue.

Lesson 2: Future Progress Will Be A Function of Adequate Resources, Regional Clustering And Distance Learning

Over the ten years of technical assistance reported here, the Foundation carried out technical assistance with grassroots organizations at different levels of maturity. Capacity building grants were made to some sites. We undertook technical assistance over different lengths of time for different cohorts of organizations. Different technical assister/site ratios were tried. Some of these differences reflected varying levels of support from funders for different cohorts of organizations. We tried to do the best with the resources available. Other variations were based on conscious experiments to test alternative formulas.

In terms of optimal cost/benefit ratios, we concluded the Foundation could create more change with a given level of resources if we selected pre-takeoff organizations in the three-to-five-year-old range that had some solid capacity in place and operated with budgets roughly between in the $150,000 and $600,000. With such groups, there often was an enthusiasm to learn, a commitment to stay with the technical assistance over many months and a desire to pursue multiple technical assistance linkages.

Especially when we found multiple areas of interrelated need, periods of assistance shorter than eighteen months did not necessarily prove to be cost-effective. We concluded that at least twenty-four months and, ideally, thirty-six months, were appropriate goals for capacity building technical assistance.

We needed technical assisters with specialities in board development, fundraising, financial management, organizational management, evaluation, personnel management, staff development, communications and leadership development. Sometimes a technical assister or trainer was competent in more than one of these areas -- for example, organizational management as well as board development. More likely, different areas of specialty meant different specialists. Funds always were scarce. Hence, we needed many consultants and persons on staff who could work part time on a specialty. We needed, as well, an overall program director to administer a specific cohort of sites and the grants that were financing it. Through trail and error, the rule of thumb that evolved was one project director (who also had at least one area of substantive expertise) and two full time equivalent technical assisters/trainers for every ten sites.

In the future, we recommend that each grassroots organization receive a discretionary grant of $10,000 or more upon entrance into a capacity building technical assistance program. Such a grant will immediately establish the seriousness of a commitment to change and will allow local grassroots organization staff greater clout in effecting change. Grants of this kind are a much needed financial boost to many grassroots organizations -- which are being asked to make major investments of time without immediate benefit.

For a given amount of funding and a given number of sites, we found that, unsurprisingly, clustering sites together in a region created economies of scale. It was easier to share a given level of technical assistance and training than when we spread sites across the nation. For a single technical assistance organization to cover the entire nation, we suggest at least four regional clusters (Northeast, South, Midwest and West) -- with the full time equivalent of two assisters/trainers living in a region for every ten groups that are trained in the region. To coordinate such a regional effort at the national level, we estimate that one coordinator/administrator, along with one support staffer, might work best for every forty groups (that is, for every cohort of ten groups in each of four regions). Each region could, in turn, create more decentralized assistance in concentrations of greatest need, like offices in major cities.

Alternatively, grantmakers can fund nonprofit technical assistance intermediary organizations to concentrate in specific regions -- with the same ratio of assisters/trainers to sites that we have suggested. Given that thousands of nonprofit groups are in need of capacity building technical assistance, any serious effort to provide sufficient assistance requires both national and regional intermediaries. But there should be uniform standards -- in terms of quality and quantity of staff and consultants, ratios of assisters/trainers to sites, inputs provided by assisters, areas of assistance covered and length of time assisted.

So stated, capacity building for all nonprofit groups around the country that could benefit would seem a daunting endeavor. Far more resources would be necessary than the private and public sectors presently are prepared to provide. However, we believe that there is a potential breakthrough that might facilitate a feasible long run strategic plan by a consortium of funders to provide quality capacity building technical assistance and training to all nonprofit groups that could benefit from it.

The potential breakthrough is distance learning. There is a wave of hyperactivity at present to create for-profit distance learning. Web sites are being created by entities like Global Education Network, Kapan College.com and Unext.com. The Dean of Harvard Business School has predicted, "This technology allows someone who is used to teaching 100 students to teach a million students." Unext.com is investing $100M to develop a full range of academic courses over the Internet. The company has signed deals with Columbia, Stanford, Carnegie- Mellon University, and the University of Chicago -- promising them revenue from the course materials they develop and granting them Unext shares. Unext envisions a world where anyone can begin a course in, say, basic finance, at any time of the year, from any location. To make a profit, the company will need thousands of people engaged in a particular course at any one time. Unext believes that the opportunity to take courses designed by elite schools will attract such numbers. Company projections suggest that, if Unext is correct, the University of Chicago could earn $20 million in royalties alone from the venture over the next five years.[3]

But why make elite universities richer? Why think in terms of for-profit models? To create greater equality of opportunity, more promising is the recent donation of $100 million by high tech billionaire Michael Saylor as down payment toward creating an online university that he says will offer an "Ivy league-quality" education to anyone in the world -- free.[4]

Traditional funders and especially new grant makers with endowments from high technology fortunes need to support a series of demonstrations to learn just how far we can go and how successful we can be with nonprofit distance learning in capacity building and replication with pre-takeoff groups. Our experience suggests that hands-on, in-person training will continue to be necessary, at least in the short run, but that committed grassroots organizations can make great progress using clear, well-packaged, peer-based distance learning training that fits their busy schedules. The W. K. Kellogg Foundation's initiative, Building Bridges Between Practice and Knowledge in Nonprofit Management Education, plans on-line courses in nonprofit management. It is a step in the right direction. So is the on-line course being designed by the Development Training Institute for community development corporations.[5] An ambitious distance learning initiative for capacity building to scale also can be packaged as one venue to help bridge the digital divide -- because state-of-the-art computers will be needed by all participating grassroots organizations.

Lesson 3: Resources Build More Capacity Than Rhetoric
We cannot allow misleading rhetoric to camouflage the need for much more adequate resourcing of capacity building for hundreds of thousands of grassroots organizations across the nation.

Specifically, we have concluded that while the notions of "volunteerism," "self-sufficiency" and "empowerment" can be useful as tools in or descriptors of capacity building, they also can be used as smoke screens to hide the need for more resources.

For example, a highly publicized 1997 national summit on volunteerism was viewed with skepticism by many observers. The summit was held in Philadelphia. At the time of the summit, the *New York Times* interviewed residents in the impoverished Logan neighborhood of North Philadelphia (where the Foundation had financed a successful capacity building replication). One resident thought the summit was a bit "naive" because "you need a certain expertise among the volunteers, and in communities like Logan, people don't have the expertise." The director of a nonprofit community program in the neighborhood observed, "Volunteering is really good, but people need a program to volunteer for, and in order to do that, you have to have dollars." Pablo Eisenberg, former Executive Director of the Center for Community Change and now a Senior Fellow at the Georgetown University Public Policy Institute, concluded that "no matter whether you attract lots of volunteers, money is still the most important ingredient in reducing poverty and helping poor people. You need money even to organize volunteers." An article in *Youth Today* on the national organization created at the Philadelphia summit to promote volunteerism, among other goals, asked whether the organization was "delivering for youth or fatally flawed." The executive director of one Midwest non-profit community group concluded that, after two years, the new organization was "long on talk and hoopla and short on doing." Although the organization promotes a vision of change in the inner city with people working for free, as volunteers, the *New York Times* reported that thepresident and CEO of the group was being paid $250,000 per year.[6]

Or take an international comparison. In the early 1990s, America won the war in the Persian Gulf because of large numbers of well trained professional staff, large numbers of well trained support staff and a huge amount of expensive, high quality equipment. The American force had built a strong capacity to fulfill its mission. Yet, when it comes to investments in the inner city and the truly disadvantaged, we often are told that there is not enough money for adequate and adequately paid professional staff, adequate and adequately paid support staff, and good equipment -- like computers and facilities in pubic schools and at the headquarters of the inner-city, grassroots community-based non-profit organizations that are responsible for a great deal of what works. Instead, we are told that, for example, a grassroots community group ought to get initial grants from the public and private sectors. Then it ought to convert into "self-sufficient" operations, in part with the help of (often poorly trained) volunteers. Volunteers should be combined with "partnerships" and "coalition building" among other financially competing and often penurious groups in the inner city. This, we are told, will lead to the "empowerment" of our neighborhoods and our schools, less injustice and more domestic tranquility. But it hasn't usually worked that way -- as anyone who has labored in the trenches knows.

The lesson is that capacity building needs to invest in human and physical capital to create enduring outcomes.

Lesson 4: Mechanical Change Is Easier Than Behavioral Change

Based on our experience, we have identified two types of change that occur within an organization receiving technical assistance: 1) "mechanical" change, like change in processes and systems, such as personnel policies, office procedures and fiscal policy; and 2) "behavioral" change, the more important of the two, that requires the emotional and intellectual commitment of key individuals -- such as the executive director, the chair and other key board members -- before they can take effect.

Mechanical change tends to be rather straightforward. You have policies or you don't. The policies are effective or they’re not. Such change is relatively easy to make -- once the key executives involved realize that the change improves their operations and makes them appear more efficient.

Behavioral change tends to focus on people, rather than on systems. Therefore, it often requires altering long-held beliefs and "ways of doing things" that, however time-consuming or inefficient, are nonetheless "comfortable? and highly resistant to alteration. This is the form of change that can underlie resistance to seemingly "easy" mechanical changes and delay or even sabotage them. It also may explain the continual delays, postponements and obfuscations that prevent "getting things done." Such behavior seems to be associated with people who have been with their organizations for a long time and have become accustomed to doing things in a specific way.

Facilitating mechanical change can be as simple as providing an organization with a prototype of personnel policies or board procedures developed by such organizations as the National Center for Nonprofit Boards. The grassroots nonprofit organizations that we assisted were able to recognize fairly quickly how making these changes would benefit them and be in their own best interests.

Behavioral change takes time. It takes time to recognize the need for such change, leadership or decision-making style. When the need for change is recognized, it may require a degree of coddling and nagging, or both, by the technical assister to get the person to begin the change. It takes more time for these changes to be implemented, and, once begun, tends to require continuous tweaking. Such change requires a tremendous amount of trust between the technical assister and the client grassroots organization staff and trustee, because a great deal of personal power and prestige are involved in these changes. One key element in establishing this level of trust is the clear expertise, professional and interpersonal skills of the technical assister. Senior technical assisters clearly are required.

The following are two examples of what we mean by mechanical and behavioral change and how they are brought about:

Agency 1
The chair of the board of directors of one the of the organizations we assisted had been associated with the organization for nearly fifteen years, always as a member of the board. Some of our most important recommendations for this agency addressed the functioning of the board. After observing his interaction with the board for about six months, we concluded that it was the chair's own attitudes and behaviors that contributed significantly to the problems we identified. For example, he did not assign duties to board committees or other officers, except the treasurer. He "tailored" information to the board, delayed appointments and otherwise limited the board's ability to do its work, preferring instead to undertake the bulk of the work himself, in part because "the board doesn't do anything." Because of a small staff, the chair volunteered to "help" the executive director with fundraising and public relations. In both cases, he overstepped his bounds and became more of a nuisance than a help.

It took nearly eighteen months, several one-on-one conversations between Foundation staff and the chair, and two meetings among Foundation staff, the chair and the executive director to make the necessary changes in the chair's behavior -- that then allowed for changes in other areas.

Agency 2
We worked with one agency about a year and helped update its personnel policies as well as some financial and administrative procedures. Yet certain personnel problems persisted. One was a very serious problem with a financial manager. An equally serious legal problem was associated with another staff person. Although the revised personnel policies clearly dealt with such issues, it took two months and a steady deterioration of the problems for the executive director, in highly personal discussions with Eisenhower Foundation staff, to recognize that the problems were not being solved because of what the executive director described as her style of management. That style was to turn the troubled employee into a social service "client" of the agency, rather than to face a disciplinary problem to be solved. When the problems caused by these employees simply could not be ignored any further, the consultant and the executive director were able to develop scenarios that helped find solutions.

The lesson is that sufficient technical resources over sufficient time are needed to facilitate the more time consuming behavioral change.

Lesson 5: Beware Of Technical Assister Syndrome
The conventional wisdom of nonprofit management assisters and trainers is that the operating head of a nonprofit organization needs to delegate to staff and share power with trustees, in order for the organization to run well and to grow. Our experience over the last ten years agrees on the need for the CEO to delegate extensively to a few senior staff within the span of the CEO's control. The Foundation's experience has been, as well, that a diverse board is essential to raise funds and generate ideas.

However, we know of and have worked with successful nonprofit organizations, national and local, where the operating head, often the founder, has a powerful vision, and where that CEO is careful not to blur the vision by losing control to staff or by acquiescing to a board on which trustees set all the priorities -- priorities that can be based on financial security rather than on the cutting edge perspective that originally framed the mission. In such organizations, trustees typically join out of respect for the operating head and the founding vision -- often working one-on-one with the CEO on fundraising and idea generation, rather than forming a rigid structure of permanent committees. Such organizations typically have concern over succession of leadership after the CEO retires or otherwise departs, and may put into motion a strategic plan for passing the baton. But they are aware that successors to founding visionaries can be less passionate with the founding vision and less skilled in carrying it out. They are aware that, when the founder leaves, the organization can lose its cutting edge and can become a board-led and corporate-leaning enterprise. Given these possibilities, such organizations do not discount the option of simply closing down. We had a good run, they argue, and we made an impact. Perhaps we can get the right visionary to carry on, but, if not, it may be better to declare victory, terminate operations and support other, newly emerging visionaries with fires in their bellies -- rather than for the organization to continue to "do good" but as a shadow of its former self.

For example, in one nonprofit organization we examined, a group of trustees tried to reduce control by the CEO. The plan was to relocate the nonprofit within a larger nonprofit, lower the visibility of the organization and increase the power of a wealthy trustee with strong corporate ties. The plan was defeated by other trustees, who argued for higher visibility and a continuation of the founding vision, as articulated by the CEO. The organization went on to impact policy in ways not envisioned by the corporate trustees who wanted lower visibility and encapsulation of the organization within a larger entity.

During the ten years of our capacity building assistance, a related experience was a visit from a consultant of a major foundation -- who wanted to know our opinion of a major national nonprofit organization. We thought that the nonprofit had lost its cutting edge, in part because success in corporate fund raising had made it more reluctant to speak out. The visiting foundation representative said that concern over lost vision was precisely the reason that person was making the inquiry.

What are the lessons here for capacity building technical assistance? As they diagnose an organization, capacity building technical assisters should not, we believe, necessarily push a for-profit corporate model of board-dominated respectability that emasculates the mission and blurs the vision. Even with imperfections, some visionary-led enterprises might better be left alone. Or capacity building assistance might be directed at strengthening such organizations, but without the accompanying dogma that CEO control must be relinquished or at least modified in for-profit, corporate-resonating ways.

Another implication is not to short change technical assistance to very young groups that are several years from pre-takeoff -- especially when such groups are run by passionate, powerful, intelligent new visionaries who also have some potential skill in management, or a sense that they need to hire persons who do have that skill. If we do not disapprove of some groups having a good run and then going out of business, rather than diluting their essence, then we must better promote a constant supply of new visionary organizations to take their place, engage the struggle and proceed beyond. The Foundation's experience has been that one-on-one coaching with founding visionaries of very small organizations often is the most effective venue for such initial technical assistance.

As for the other end of the spectrum -- very mature organizations that have taken off -- funders and assisters need to ask whether some are worth financial support, or worth the training in those areas of capacity building where they still need development. For example, we have worked with one very large national nonprofit youth organization that has, in our view, stagnated and done relatively little, given its considerable potential to engage the inner city and the truly disadvantaged.

Lesson 6: Funders And Assisters Need To Better Understand The Power of Communications As Capacity Building
When it comes to communications as an essential component of capacity building for grassroots nonprofits, funders who accept our conclusion that we know what works and how to replicate it are, in our view, decades behind funders who support policies like tax breaks for the rich and prison building for the poor.[7]

Grassroots nonprofit leaders learn very quickly and, as natural advocates, show great skill, for example on the electronic media. Many have never thought of enhancing communications capacity as a means to improve fundraising, through greater public visibility.

The need for media savvy by grassroots nonprofits also is immense because they are responsible for so many child development, youth development, public school reform, job training and placement, economic development, community-based banking and problem-oriented, community equity (not zero tolerance) policing programs that work. Yet most Americans are not aware of what works -- because it is poorly communicated.

To begin to balance the media playing field at the same time that we develop institutional capacity, thousands of grassroots groups need the kind of Televison School and strategic communications training discussed in Chapter 5. Public service and related announcements on what works can be part of such a grassroots media capacity building strategy. We have seen little scientific evidence that public service announcements by well-heeled national nonprofit organizations have had much of an impact. Instead, we propose funding and evaluating alliances of local nonprofit organizations -- to tailor local what works messages that are delivered by local youth. To employ the previously demonized as the message senders conveys a powerful message in and of itself. Here the model is the youth media enterprise of the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, which already has been evaluated as successful, as part of a more comprehensive strategy. The Collaborative's positive messages, by and about youth, have been seen and heard locally in Boston and distributed nationally through Blockbuster Video. The Collaborative has the capacity, through its youth, to build on the peer training it already undertakes with nonprofit organizations that receive Foundation assistance.[8] One potential source for funding a grassroots based organization strategy is the Office of National Drug Control Policy, with its substantial media budget.

An interrelated lesson is that considerable potential exists to enhance the communications capacity of grassroots organizations through community web sites. When he resigned from CBS, Bill Moyers called for a return to Tom Paine-like pamphleteering.[9] Community web sites are perhaps the most cost-effective information age ways to achieve this end. Such sites can link up local nonprofit organizations with local citizens -- who can help to communicate what works to local public and private leaders. The outcomes of town meetings can be summarized on community web sites. Plans for upcoming town meetings can be communicated. Each community web site can serve as an ongoing town meeting -- continuing to debate reform, discuss budget priorities, organize campaigns for more televison news on what works, and generate new, proactive communication strategies. There already is evidence that many people want to convene with their geographic neighbors, both online and in person, and community-based web sites linked to town meetings can do just that. Partial existing models include community web sites in locations as diverse as San Francisco, California; Blacksburg, Virginia; and London, England. For example, in London, Microsoft supplied computers, Internet access and a way for persons in specific communities to communicate with one another online.[10] Much more is possible, we believe, and it can help reduce the digital divide -- as it builds grassroots capacity and advocates for what works.

Nationally, nonprofit capacity building technical assistance organizations need to construct much more sophisticated web sites than at present. The national sites should summarize what works, and doesn't work, based on scientific evaluation. (The Foundation's web site, www.eisenhowerfoundation.org, is beginning to do this.) They should tailor much of their information to local, grassroots inner city nonprofit groups. The groups, and especially the inner city youth they serve, should be taught how to access what works information and how to use it for building their capacities and advocating for what works. The national sites should provide a network of distance learning.

Lesson 7: We Need To Reorganize and Better Fund National Nonprofit Groups

To enhance the capacities of local nonprofit organizations to a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem, we need more and better resourcednational and regional technical assistance and training capacities.

One way is for major private and public funders to expand their in-house technical assistance staffs. An advantage is that well-endowed foundations and government agencies have, relatively speaking, more financial security than nonendowed nonprofit assistance providers. The implication is that at least the potential exists, under wise leadership, to upgrade and then maintain the level of in-house assistance and training in major foundations and government agencies.

Perhaps more feasibly, foundations and governments can simply increase contract funding to for-hire consulting organizations, nonprofit and for-profit. The strength and weakness of such contractors is that, relatively speaking, they have a technical mission -- to deliver contract deliverables as specified in the procurement, professionally and on time -- without, necessarily, a vision of what America can be that engages untidy issues of democracy.

There is a third way -- to reorganize national nonprofit groups that agree with the positions set forth in this report. Figure 3 suggests a model organizational plan for national nonprofits that share our views.[11] To address all that we have proposed, national nonprofit organizations should, we believe, retain more traditional capacities -- including policy research and development, fundraising and technical assistance. But, especially when it comes to technical assistance on communicating what works, such national nonprofits should create sophisticated offices for marketing and communications, for leveraging change at state and local levels (with an eye to devolution), and for mobilizing grassroots constituencies which can push for more of what works. There are some national nonprofits with our view that already are organized in this way -- but far too few.

For their part, funders who agree with the positions of such national nonprofits should, we believe, provide sustained and general support for all of the activities shown in Figure 3, not intermittent and categorical support. Such funding will make it much easier than at present for national nonprofits with our perspective to carry out a broad, democratizing what works vision, while linking specific policy and program initiatives to it. Such funding to national nonprofits modeled after Figure 3 also will make it easier than at present to pursue structural reforms which have the potential to change the substance of policy and the rules of the game far into the future.

Figure 3
A Model Organizational Plan for National Nonprofit Groups
That Share the Eisenhower Foundation's Position



Such a plan will not only enhance the capacities of local nonprofits but also strengthen the capacities of allies to public and private funders -- entities that help define new, democratizing movements.

Conclusion

Enhanced capacity increases the likelihood that a grassroots organization can and should be replicated. How are lessons on capacity building complemented by lessons on replication? Chapter 7 provides some answers.

7. Lessons for Replication

By replication, we mean identifying a program, program component or program principle that works in one location and implementing it in another location. Over the ten year period covered in this report, the Foundation pursued thirty replications, so defined, in nineteen cities (Table 3). Three were implementation failures. Of the remaining twenty-seven, twenty-three completed their work with the Eisenhower Foundation, over a period of thirty to thirty-six months. They received process and outcome evaluations. Four are in midstream at present, and are receiving process and impact evaluations. (Fifteen new replications were beginning at the time of publication and are not covered in Chapter 7.)

Three of the twenty-seven completed or midstream replications focused on employment training and placement. The rest primarily focused on youth development, improvement of youth performance in school, crime prevention, drug prevention and problem-oriented, community equity policing innovations -- or combinations of these elements.

It is not our intent to provide detailed accounts of the substantive, programmatic findings from the evaluations of these replications. This has been done elsewhere.[1] However, the footnotes summarize the evaluation findings,[2] and we reference these findings at times in Chapter 7.

Table 3: Foundation Replications by City and Lead Funders

City	U.S. Department of Labor and W.T. Grant Foundation	Ford Foundation	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services	U.S. Department of Justice and the Keidanren of Japan	U.S. Department of Justice, Second Round	U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Center for Global Partnership	Total[2] Replications
Baltimore, MD		_	_		_	_	4
Boston, MA		_		_			2
Bronx, NY		_					1
Brooklyn, NY		_		_			1
Chicago, IL		_					1

Cleveland, OH					_	_	1
Columbia, SC					_		2
Des Moines, IA	_				_		1
Dover, NH						_	1
Kansas City, MO				_		_	1
Little Rock, AK							1
Los Angeles, CA		_				X	1
Memphis, TN		_				_	1
Miami, FL		_		_		_	1
Minneapolis, MN		_		_			1
Newark, NJ		_					2
Philadelphia, PA							2
San Juan, PR	_		_				2
Washington, DC							4
Total Cities = 19							**Total Replications = 30**

[1]There were many other matching partners.

[2]<u>There were four groups -- in Boston, Columbia, San Juan and Washington, DC -- which first replicated with funds from one major source and then further replicated, with new components, with funds from another major source.</u>

Our purpose here is to distill lessons on how to replicate, and how not to, based on this experience. Our lessons are as follows:

1. The same model works for capacity building and replication.
2. The same inputs work for capacity building and replication.
3. To qualify as a model for replication, a program should be scientifically evaluated.
4. Good candidates for replication have multiple solutions.
5. Replication is possible.

6. Communications should be part of a replication strategy.
7. Replication policy should pay more attention to unaffiliated grassroots nonprofit organizations.
8. "Faith-based" rhetoric should be kept in perspective.
9. What works can be cheaper than what doesn't; and
10. Beware of too much "volunteerism," "self-sufficiency," and "empowerment" in replication, as in capacity building.

Lesson 1: The Same Model Works for Capacity Building and Replication
The cause-effect model of Figure 2 (in Chapter 3) applies both to capacity building and to replication.

The Foundation provided technical assistance and training inputs (the dependent variables) to grassroots nonprofit organizations that hosted replications. The host sites utilized the inputs to replicate the complete model of a successful organization, or to replicate model program components and model program principles (proximate outcomes). The evaluations measured for ultimate outcomes -- like increased employment of out-of-school youth, higher earnings, improved school performance, less crime and drug involvement of cohorts of targeted youth, more (non-zero tolerance) sensitivity by police to the minority community and more perceptions of community-wide security by residents in inner-city locations.[3]

Lesson 2: The Same Inputs Work for Capacity Building and Replication
As with improved capacity, successful replication, we found, is based on a careful needs assessment, development of a workplan that then becomes the basis for a cooperative agreement, group workshops, one-on-one assistance and training on-site, and provision of resources and services.

However, some of these inputs take on greater importance in replication than in capacity building. Compared to capacity building assistance, more significant resources obviously are needed to assist, staff-out and operate a replication in another location. For example, funding for our employment training and placement replication was about $170,000 per year per replication site for each of three years. The resources were for staffing substantive program components -- like "tough love" pre-employment training, remedial education, training for a job in demand, job placement and job retention. Consequently, replication workplans were more complicated than workplans that concentrated on capacity building alone. With replication workplans and associated budgets specifying how subcontracts from the Foundation to the sites would be allocated, the cooperative agreements we co-signed with nonprofit organizations were legally binding in ways not possible with capacity building cooperative agreements in which no, or very few, dollars actually were subgranted.

Lesson 3: To Qualify As a Model for Replication, A Program Should Be Scientifically Evaluated In terms of personal and public health, Americans tend to accept the notion that new drugs to fight, say, cancer or AIDS need to be scientifically evaluated and that, if they work, there then should be widespread use of them among all in need.

For the truly disadvantaged, a few instances can be found of replications that follow such a reasonable course. One example is the Ford Foundation-initiated Quantum Opportunities Program, based on adult mentors for inner-city high school youth. After Brandeis University released statistically significant findings that showed Quantum Opportunities worked and could be replicated, the *New York Times* published an editorial summarizing the success. Quantum Opportunities now is being replicated on a broader scale through public and private funding.[4]

Yet the example of Quantum Opportunities is relatively rare. Especially for public sector funding, programs for the truly disadvantaged can be replicated because of the influence of well paid lobbyists, access based on friendships, and fashions of the moment -- not because of positive evaluations. For example, one well-known anti-drug program has been awarded five percent of federal Drug Free Schools grants passed through states to localities. It has been replicated in over 8,000 schools. Yet a series of evaluations have shown that the model and the replications do not reduce substance abuse. The program continues to expand because the national organization has created a powerful lobbying arm for what amounts to an almost billion dollar per year industry. An article by Stephen Glass concludes in *The New Republic*:[5]

> [The organization] has used tactics ranging from bullying journalists to manipulating the facts to mounting campaigns in order to intimidate government officials and stop news organizations, researchers and parents from criticizing the program.

The need for solid, unequivocal scientific evidence is all the more crucial to counter the influential ideology of naysayers. For example, a book published in the 1990s that talked of the "moral poverty" of "feral" "superpredators" was influential in encouraging the boom in prison building, according to some observers, as well as the proliferation of bootcamps (which later were discredited, based on scientific evaluation).[6]

When it comes to evidence that a model is qualified to be replicated, as well as to decisions on how to assess whether replications have worked, we believe funders should follow scientific evaluation, not political ideology.

What do we mean by "scientific evaluation"? The National Research Council has concluded that the vast majority of programs for the truly disadvantaged and the inner city are not evaluated, or receive superficial evaluations that do not allow conclusions to be drawn on whether the program actually worked.[7] By contrast, the Eisenhower Foundation's standards for scientific evaluation are as follows:[8]

- **Scientific Research Design:** The program was evaluated using a "quasi-experimental" design with comparison groups or an even more rigorous design with random assignment of subjects to program and control groups. Pre-post (before and after) outcome measures were undertaken.

- **Targets Populations Most At Risk:** All or most of the persons receiving the interventions were truly disadvantaged in urban areas and were "at-risk" in terms of a combination of factors, including income, dependency, education, employment, earnings, teen pregnancy, delinquency, crime and substance abuse.

- **A Focus On Core Problems:** The program addressed at least one of the problems or issues facing truly disadvantaged populations -- like poverty, inadequate education, unemployment, crime, drugs, teen pregnancy, dependency or substandard housing.

- **Specific, Measurable Outcomes:** The outcome findings were not equivocal, but clear cut -- with all or most of the key outcome variables showing improvements for the treatment groups that were statistically significant vis-a-vis control or comparison groups.

- **Implementation, Modification And Replication:** The program was not an isolated, narrow academic experiment, but it started with, or built up to, broader scale implementation, possibly at multiple sites which later may have been replicated still further. The evaluation included considerable practical information on the day-to-day management of implementation and on how organizational and staff issues impacted on final outcomes.

- **Specification Of Program Elements:** The program intervention was articulated in sufficient detail. The demographic, social and risk characteristics of the population served by the program were specified.

These standards for scientific evaluation are comparable to reviews of programs in the *American Journal of Preventive Medicine* and by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.[9] However, the Eisenhower Foundation gives more emphasis than such reviews to initiatives, beyond academic research, that have adequate technical designs but that also have been operating for some time in the rough-and-tumble of real world street life, funding pressure, staff burnout, inadequate salaries and political machinations at the local and federal levels. Academic experiments are limited, in our experience, unless the ideas can be carried out and replicated on the streets.

Lesson 4: Good Candidates for Replication Have Multiple Solutions

The Quantum Opportunities Program (above) has to do with learning life skills, getting good grades, staying in high school, undertaking service for the community, learning to do a job for pay, earning income for the family and working out a way to go to college. As with most successful models and replications of them that we have observed, Quantum Opportunities is not a categorical, "one shot" venture. Rather it has a kind of comprehensive interdependence -- multiple solutions to multiple problems.

What common program elements tend to appear in grassroots organization models and replications that work in the inner city and for the truly disadvantaged? Our review suggests that the multiple elements often include preschool; safe haven sanctuaries off the street after elementary and middle school hours, where youth receive sustained social support and discipline from near peers or adults; public school innovations like parent-teacher school management, smaller and more holistic schools, full service community schools and computer-based remedial education that motivate youth to stay in school and obtain a high school degree; "tough love" job training carefully linked to the creation and retention of real jobs that are in demand; incentives for continuing on to college; employment linked to needed economic development (like housing rehabilitation or telecommunications repair) and operated by community development corporations; community-based banking to finance that development to help create the jobs for high-risk youth; and problem oriented, community equity policing (not zero tolerance) to mentor youth and secure the neighborhood for the banking and development.[10]

Of course, not all model programs and replications illustrate all of these program elements. *But the elements, or variations of them, often appear in multiple combinations.*

Similarly, successful programs and replications tend to have multiple good outcomes. Not uncommonly, in successfully evaluated models and replications, these outcomes include some combination of less crime, less gang-related behavior, less drug abuse, less welfare dependency, fewer adolescent pregnancies, fewer school dropouts, more youth development, more school grades completed, more successful school-to-work transitions, more employability, better parenting among targeted high-risk youth, and more stable families. Quantum Opportunities has most of these outcomes. In addition, the communities where young people live can experience less fear, fewer drug dealers, better schools and more business, job, and economic development. Again, all model programs and replications achieve all of these good outcomes. *But the point is that multiple outcomes are the rule, not the exception.*[11]

In the same vein, enough models and replications that work have been identified to orchestrate them together into a comprehensive, complementary, interdependent national policy for the truly disadvantaged. For example, problem oriented, community-equity policing with minority officers as role models can be deployed to help secure and stabilize inner city neighborhoods. The public safety can encourage community banking and community economic development. Particularly when pursued by nonprofit community development corporations, such inner city economic development purposely can be designed to generate jobs for high-risk young people. Often they can better qualify for such jobs if they have participated in some of the education, remedial education, life skills training, job training and job retention models that have been scientifically evaluated as successful and replicated -- like Quantum Opportunities nationally, the Argus Learning for Living Center in the South Bronx and other locations, Project Prepare in different locations in Chicago and the Comer School Development Plan nationally and internationally. Young people can get as far as these kinds of education and employment innovations if they stay out of trouble with the help of counselors, advocates and near peers in safe havens after school during their pre-teen years. They can get as far as the safe havens if they have participated in adequately funded and managed Head Start-type preschool when they are three-to-five years old.[12]

Lesson 5: Replication Is Possible

Up to this point, we have been talking about what makes a program a model, ready for replication. Now we move to lessons on *how* to replicate -- once a program has been recognized as an appropriately mature model.

Some assert it is impossible to replicate successful grassroots nonprofit successes -- because they depend on charismatic individuals who can't be duplicated. But the experience of the Eisenhower Foundation has been that replication is quite possible and depends in no small part on:

- Securing adequate funding over sufficient time (ideally a minimum of thirty-six months);
- Evaluating the replication (not just the model) in a scientific way;
- Creating sound institutional and staff capacity at replication sites;
- Generating professional training manuals and videos;
- Training replication staff systematically and in stages;
- Adhering to strategic workplans and budgets;
- Insuring tenacious quality control;
- Concentrating on underlying principles rather than exact copies; and
- Recognizing that either an entire program or parts of it can be implemented in another location.

Consider each of these points:

Securing Adequate Funding Over Sufficient Time

Like the original model, a replication needs adequate funds for planning, operations and technical assistance. One cohort of Eisenhower Foundation replications provided particularly compelling evidence that well-conceived, private nonprofit programs succeed when they are adequately funded. These replications were fully funded by the public sector during their first two years. Over the two years, serious crime dropped by an average of eighteen percent in target neighborhoods in four cities. However, in the third year, federal funding to this initiative (as well as to other initiatives like it) was cut in half -- not because of poor performance (indeed, we were praised by public and private sector authorities) but because federal priorities that year required shifting resources to other areas. As a result, in the third year, serious crime dropped by an average of only three percent in the four sites.[13]

In terms of the length of time needed for a professionally run replication, the Eisenhower Foundation has been able to facilitate statistically significant outcome success in as little as eighteen months. On balance, we feel much more comfortable with thirty-six months as a standard length of time to plan a replication, train staff, run the replication for a while to work out problems before evaluation even begins, conduct the evaluation, retain quality control, refine programming after mid-course corrections, complete a process and impact evaluation report, and communicate outcomes in the print and electronic media.

Evaluating the Replication in a Scientific Way

The same scientific method and pre-post control or comparison design needed to establish the *original* program as a model is necessary for the *replication*. Otherwise, how will we know that the replication works? Through trial-and-error, we found that staff from the replication site should be involved and have a stake in the evaluation. It helps morale, assists evaluators and can be done in an objective way. Evaluations of replications need to be especially sensitive to "implementation failure." That is, we can already assume to some extent that the program idea is sound -- at least in the location where the initiative originally demonstrated success and hence became a model. But the replication still may fail (as it did in some of our experiences) because of inadequacies in the unglamourous, day-to-day process of implementation.

How much longer should evaluations continue after an initial round of replication is assessed as successful? There is as yet no established answer. Thus, for example, the Eisenhower Foundation's youth safe haven-police ministation model program in inner cities, public housing and public schools now is undergoing its third round of replication evaluations, with evaluations of the first two cohorts showing substantial success. In order to generate continuing illustrations of what works at a time when those who advocate prison building and boot camps remain highly influential, in spite of scientific evidence to the contrary, the Eisenhower Foundation has continued encouraging evaluations for the safe haven-ministation model. But how long does -- and should -- it take before a consensus builds that a program is worthwhile and needs to be replicated to scale, without still more expensive evaluations?

It has been our experience that the organization that provides technical assistance to replication sites also can undertake the evaluation. Such a dual role has been played by a number of national nonprofit intermediary organizations. The advantage is that the technical assistance team and the evaluation team can coordinate closely -- insuring, for example, that all partners are focused on the same dependent, proximate and independent variables. Through cluster group workshops, we have found that joint assister-evaluator-site director sessions can engender trust more often than with an outside evaluator. Such trust is critical if the evaluator is to work with the nonprofit organization in collecting data -- a partnership the Eisenhower Foundation encourages but that outside evaluators often do not. The potential disadvantage is that objectivity is lost when the same entity undertakes both technical assistance and evaluation. However, our experience differs. The Eisenhower Foundation has been able to name evaluation oversight boards of outside experts who have insured objectivity.

In addition, while we have had positive experience with outside evaluators, there also have been horror stories. For example, after data collection by one academic evaluator, who sent white women in heels knocking on doors in an inner-city neighborhood, program youth later told Eisenhower Foundation staff they had lied in the interviews. In another instance, the outside evaluation organization's fees were considerably higher than the cost would have been with an Eisenhower Foundation evaluation, because our past evaluation experience has created many economies of scale. The outside evaluation began almost one year late. The complete, written evaluation design was withheld from the Eisenhower Foundation and the local sites -- creating much distrust, violating the Foundation's principles for replication, and disregarding our procedures for how to treat and work with grassroots nonprofit organizations. In spite of protests to the contrary, the evaluator contemplated measures the Eisenhower Foundation had found in the past to be inappropriate. The net result was that the evaluator changed the process to such a degree that we no longer were replicating the original Eisenhower Foundation model. The replication had become defined as what the evaluator thought the model should be.

Creating Sound Institutional and Staff Capacity at Replication Sites

If we insist that a model must demonstrate substantial institutional capacity before it is replicated, we need to similarly assure that an organization hosting a replication has sound institutional capacity. This means an outcome-driven mission associated with strong leadership by the board and chief executive officer; an ability to undertake strategic planning; quality, flexible and tenacious staff members who are given the opportunity for development; competent time, personnel and organizational management; clear-cut accountability; financial management skill; an ability to generate multiple income streams; skill with the media; receptivity to evaluation; and understanding of the distinction among technical assistance inputs, consequent changes in nonprofit organization skills, knowledge and action, and consequent measurable outcomes. As it begins replication operations, an organization needs these components of capacity in place -- or needs to enhance them in the course of replication with technical assisters and trainers. No replication host site will be strong in all the areas of needed capacity, and, in our experience, there can be institutional resistance to change. Quality technical assistance and training must strengthen the weak points.

Contrary to the ideology of those who assert that replication is difficult or impossible, capable leaders can be identified for replications, we have found, as long as they are given adequate time, funding, coaching, training and technical assistance.

Generating Professional Training Manuals and Videos

We have found that a clearly written replication program manual and a brief, focused replication video are desirable for teaching and reinforcing the model. They should be distributed well in advance of training of staff at replication sites.

For example, for the Foundation's employment training, placement and retention replications based on the Argus Learning for Living model in the South Bronx, the training manual is a well written, step-by-step training guide to how Argus works and what scientific evidence is available to prove its success. Produced by Argus itself, the training video that accompanies the manual follows the main points of the manual, using visuals and personalities to draw trainees into the experience and make it come to life. Appendix 5 has transcript excerpts from the training video.

Another example is the Foundation's youth safe haven-police ministation model. The model is not a single program in a single location (as Argus) but a hybrid of several principles or concepts. The two leading concepts are the American notion of an extended family sanctuary for youth off the streets after school, as popularized in the Carnegie Corporation report, *A Matter of Time*,[14] and the Japanese notion of a neighborhood police ministation.[15] When we first began working in this field, in the late 1980's, our training manual consisted of descriptions of safe havens and Japanese ministations. Then we undertook two round of replications, in ten cities. The present training manual reports on the replications -- different ways of blending safe havens and ministations in ten cities. The manual is designed for organizations undertaking our later generation of replications of these hybrids in public housing, other low income neighborhoods and schools. The idea is to let the later generation groups read the ten different case studies, and then come up with their own hybrids -- while at the same time operating within the framework of unifying principles and concepts found in the manual. We have several training videos for this model. One was made by the Foundation. The others were based on television network stories on the model. For example, Appendix 6 has the transcript of a story on the Foundation and the model that appeared on *ABC World News Tonight* with Peter Jennings. Because of the prestige of such national coverage, we have found that it has a lasting effect on replication site trainees, and complements well the more nuts-and-bolts training videos that the Foundation produces itself.

Training Replication Staff Systematically And In Stages

Before replication begins, local staff should be hired and thoroughly trained in the programmatic content set out in such materials. Up-front training of all replication staff should take place *at the model site*. Training needs to be provided well in advance of actual recruitment of youth program participants. Early training of staff helps to reduce some of the confusion that arises from trying to implement a program while simultaneously learning about it. Key staff members of the institution undertaking the replication (like the executive director, project director, counselors and education staff) should be brought on board early in order to take advantage of the initial training. The length and substance of training at the model site should be the same for all youth development staff.

After initial training, running about three days, we found a second training at the model site was critical between months six and nine for addressing implementation questions and for training staff who were not on board when the first training was conducted. After that, we found that at least one additional training workshop per year during the length of a replication grant was necessary. Such later workshops bring together all staff from all replication sites -- to exchange notes, refine understanding of the replication, keep in touch with the evaluation and focus on specific issues that sites agree ahead of time are of common interest for group discussion. There always will be staff turnover, and these workshops help new staff to understand the replication. The workshops also can be structured as staff development sessions where exposure is given to other models, multiple solutions and the state-of-the-art in youth development.

Throughout all workshops, we keep bringing up the distinctions among inputs (dependent variables); consequent skills, knowledge and actions (proximate variables) and consequent measurable outcomes (independent variables). By making such distinctions, we encourage staff to manage by objective -- and seek to insure that staff are thinking in the same cause-and-effect manner as the evaluators. For example, in one such workshop, a Foundation trainer began by engaging participants in a hands-on exercise. The objective was to introduce sites to the idea that actions produce outcomes. Each site was asked to use food coloring to change a jar of water into the "ideal" jar of navy blue water. Each team was given jars of colored water (red, yellow, green and clear), food coloring, and measuring implements. Participants were asked to use the food coloring to change the four small jars of colored water so that they all had a navy blue color. Participants had ten minutes to complete the exercise before being asked to show their results.

The trainer then explained the exercise:

- The young people in their programs were like jars of water with different "colors" -- problems and experiences. The problems and experiences might include poor family relationships, learning problems, parents with substance abuse problems, lack of skills, lack of money, drug dealers on the corner trying to get them to sell drugs, peer pressure to have sex and low self-esteem.

- The participants?programs (the food coloring) were trying to change these different colors of water into a jar of navy blue water -- they were trying to turn these kids into productive members of society who had a chance at a decent life.

- The participants?programs don't have a lot of time per week to work with kids (the reason for having only ten minutes in the exercise). So whatever activities, programs and interventions the sites offered had to be very focused, effective, intense and systematic. The sites had to offer high-quality programs that could make an impact.

Sites then were taken through the steps of specifying what it meant to become a "productive member of society with a decent life." Participants listed what, in their view, helped a child become a responsible adult. For example, participants thought a child should:

- Stay in school;
- Have positive adult role models;
- Have a stable family;
- Not use drugs;
- Not engage in unprotected sex, or refrain altogether; and
- Be involved in social and religious activities.

The trainer explained that the participants had developed a regression equation for youth development. Sites were asked to define program components that would increase all of the above factors (variables). All sites were provided a list of program outcomes that would be measured during the evaluation. Participants workplans were reviewed to determine whether they adequately reflected inputs, actions and outcomes. Some sites were provided technical assistance to better articulate this goal.

Adhering to Strategic Workplans and Budgets

Implementation should not begin and funds to replication sites should not be released until a strategic workplan and budget are completed, in our experience. Strategic workplans need to include itemization of tasks to be accomplished, identification of who is responsible for each, and specification of timelines for completing the tasks. Proposed budgets need to be reviewed for feasibility and to assure that staffing patterns meet program requirements. The extent to which the strategic workplan and the budget are clear and concise determine the ease with which conflicts during implementation can be resolved.

Insuring Tenacious Quality Control

The Foundation's experience has been that replications will fail unless there is close and detailed monitoring and careful quality control. The best way to insure quality control is by employing a full time national replication director who is assisted by staff and consultants; creating a workplan up-front; making frequent hands-on, in-person site visits; anticipating midcourse corrections as inevitable problems arise when workplans are compared to actual implementation; and requiring quarterly program and financial reports in writing. When problems do arise, it is imperative that a face-to-face meeting be held to address the concerns and work toward mutual resolution of the problem.

Unless there has been significant staff turnover, in the second year of a replication more time should be given to site visits to provide technical assistance on refining the replication. Accurate and timely documentation of participant activity is imperative. Staff time must be regularly available for this purpose, we have found.

Flexibility -- but also tenacity and attention to detail -- are important qualities in a replication director. To illustrate, staff at one Eisenhower Foundation replication site were furious over insistence by the Eisenhower replication director that key parts of the workplan be implemented. Staff at the replication site did not return Eisenhower-Foundation calls for a week. Consequently, quarterly drawdown checks were withheld by the Foundation. Eventually peace was made.

It is not yet entirely clear when and where it is best to have replication directors located at the model program and when and where it is best for them to be part of an intermediary organization which collaborates with staff from the original model. We have seen both variations work. If the replication director works at the model organization, "founder's syndrome" (Chapter 4) sometimes can get in the way of the replication. For example, the founder of the model can insist on too exact a duplication of the original program and may not sufficiently delegate the complex replication process to others. The founder sometimes can try to manage both the "mother" program and all the replication sites -- which can lead to implementation failure.

These problems sometimes can be overcome by an intermediary organization, which manages the replication process. But the intermediary must know the model well and have the trust of the staff of the founding organization (as has been the case, for example, with the Foundation and Argus). Such trust is not always easy to achieve. When it is achieved, the intermediary can be helpful in leveraging funds, providing technical assistance, insuring objective quality control, leading the evaluation and communicating the outcomes through the print and electronic media in ways that also help the site raise ongoing financial support. It often is difficult for the model program to undertake all these tasks by itself.

Concentrating on Underlying Principles Rather Than Exact Copies

It is possible to be successful with replications that are as close to duplications as possible. Many funders, especially public bureaucracies, can insist on duplication as the goal. In spite of achieving positive outcomes with such duplications (for example, with the Argus replication), the Eisenhower Foundation prefers instead to replicate the *principles* underlying the model program. The essence of the model is replicated. But variations on the theme are allowed so that local implementors can have more ownership in the process of replication and the strength of the outcomes. With this definition of replication, it also is easier than with exact duplications to adapt to local circumstances. The Eisenhower youth safe haven-police ministation programs illustrate well replication of underlying principles.

Recognizing that Either a Entire Program Or Parts of It Can Be Replicated in Another Location

A model program can be replicated entirely at another location. It also can be replicated at a host organization that already is working the field and has some of the model's components in place. The Eisenhower Foundation has had positive experience with each variation.

When the model is replicated in its entirety at a new location, sometimes there can be a rather slow replication start-up period and considerable staff turnover, as new ideas are put into practice and some personnel do not meet expectations. The advantage to replicating the entire model can be local enthusiasm for those exciting new ideas and little resistance to implementing them.

When the host organization already has some of the components of the model in place and is integrating in other components that it does not have, there can be institutional resistance. In some cases, the host organization can act like it "just wants the money" for replication operations, knows better and really is not interested in the model. When all goes well, the advantage to integrating in just some components can be the creation of a new hybrid that is a synthesis of the best of the model and the best of the host.

Lesson 6: Communications Should Be Part of A Replication Strategy

After the 1992 Los Angeles riots a national *CBS/New York Times* poll found a majority of Americans willing to do more about resolving the problems of the inner city, but concluded the major obstacle to doing more was "lack of knowledge." [16]

Why is the dominant view in America that we don't know what works and don't know how to replicate?

The Eisenhower Foundation has concluded that much of the answer has to do with money, communications and the media. Some well-funded think tanks have been extremely effective in communicating an ideology that little works except failed programs like prison building, boot camps, tax breaks for the rich and enterprise zones.

Media have responded to and reinforced the communications effectiveness of such think tanks. A good illustration is local television evening news. More Americans get their news from this source than from any other. Typically, a local half hour news program includes perhaps nine to ten minutes of real news -- as well as sports, the weather and many commercials. Commercials are extremely important for local television news. Local news commercials usually are the prime source of revenue for local television stations. In spite of polls which show that Americans are against violence and against negative images on television, the producers of local news producers often have decided that stories with crime, violence, bad news and negative stereotyping will maximize the possibility that viewers will stay tuned. That maximizes revenues, the producers reason. The result of this violent and negative programming can be the "mean world syndrome." Day in and day out, the average, middle class, suburban American viewer is left with the feeling that nothing works.[17] This may increase the likelihood that the middle class viewer will conclude that policies like prison building and boot camps are the answer, not replication of programs that do work.

To help combat the mean world syndrome, we believe that the kind of communications strategies recommended in Chapters 5 and 6, including television schools and community-based web sites, should not just be part of capacity building that leads to a model, but should be reinforced during replication of the model.

Lesson 7: Replication Policy Should Pay More Attention To Unaffiliated Grassroots Nonprofit Organizations

Lisbeth Schorr has concluded that not a single example of success that she could identify "was the product of normal functioning of a large system -- public or private."[18] We have found that some large public systems, like Head Start, can undertake replications, but also must improve, especially in terms of more funding for management and other institutional capacity. Other replication successes, which are public-private mixes, like the School Development Plan of James Comer at the Yale University Child Study Center, have taken a large system -- here the public school system -- and modified parts of it, through management changes, nonprofit organization leadership and an infusion of private sector match money. There also have been evaluated successes associated with large national nonprofit organizations -- like Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America and Boys and Girls Clubs of America. They implement their programs through local affiliates.[19]

Yet at least as successful, we have found, are local, indigenous, *unaffiliated* nonprofit organizations -- which are *not* the products of large systems. Argus in the South Bronx, Delancey Street in San Francisco, Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in Puerto Rico, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, Koban, Inc. in Columbia, South Carolina and Youth Guidance in Chicago are just a few examples.[20]

We acknowledge the "top down" success of some national nonprofit organizations. But large systems do often pose problems, as Lisbeth Schorr has recognized. Local affiliates of some large national nonprofits sometimes complain that the national organization is not in touch with local circumstances and that the technical assistance provided by the national office is not always as helpful as it might be. Such local affiliates, which the Eisenhower Foundation has worked with, sometimes say in private that they have, on balance, decided to remain affiliated because the national logo and imprimatur are useful in raising money.

Money and influence are key. Large organizations are more likely than small indigenous organizations to have the money to lobby for legislative earmarks, secure executive branch sole source contracts and write sophisticated proposals for replication grants and contracts. They are more likely to have communications offices that can effectively send their messages through the media -- to foundations, corporations, public sector executives and legislators at the federal, national and state levels. These big systems also can become allied with nationally known evaluators which, to sustain themselves financially, need the kind of substantial evaluation grants and contracts that large, national nonprofit institutions can attract from major funders. *All of this has generated a kind of large system network, when it comes to replicating grassroots nonprofit organizations.* Given the power and personal associations in the network, the result presently may be a bias toward replicating what works for the truly disadvantaged through large institutions.

Compared to the large public and private institutions, the small, indigenous nonprofit groups that we have found to be at least as effective at replication can be more in touch with the people they serve in inner cities. This was especially evident when one of our groups broke away from the local affiliate of a large national organization and, as a result, undertook more creative and successful work. It also has been our experience that, after Foundation-facilitated funding ends, a national affiliate can have the financial wherewithal to continue the work, but may blur the original vision in order to encompass the national organization's mission. The local community base of an unaffiliated organization can allow neighborhood residents, including high-risk youth, to acquire a stake in planning and implementing programs and to tailor solutions to local needs. A national policy based on these creative, energetic, unaffiliated local nonprofits, in our view, will draw more stakeholders onto the playing field and so may enhance a more inclusive, democratic, bubble up national process with increased local ownership.

Accordingly, we propose that funders give more priority than at present to replications of these grassroots, bubble up institutions, and less priority than at present to the top down large system network. We believe that there is a need for a national strategy that facilitates a flowering of unaffiliated groups and their replication locally as they become models, all in ways that expand ownership at the grassroots level.

Lesson 8: "Faith Based" Rhetoric Should Be Kept In Perspective

Grants to "faith based" organizations presently are in fashion. Over the years, the Foundation has replicated with both secular and faith-based grassroots nonprofit organizations. One of our present replication organizations is secular, but its vision, energy and creativity come from the values of the local chief of police, who is an ordained minister. Yet success by this group also is greatly based on sound management and the hard work of secular civilians and police. Another organization that hosted a replication was secular, but the executive director was an ordained minister. The evaluation of this replication showed mixed results, particularly because management and relations with the community were not as sound as they might have been. A third group with which we replicated was faith based. Importantly to us, the nun who ran it for most of the time also was a very effective manager and received the cooperation of the police. A final illustration was a group led by another member of the clergy. This replication was an implementation failure, not because of any "faith based" status, but because a new police chief would not necessarily agree to assign officers to the program as local match. This all is anecdotal information -- not information based on scientific evaluation. But it suggests that the key to success is not necessarily whether a nonprofit group is secular or "faith based." More likely, the key is whether it has sound institutional capacity -- for example, in terms of board leadership, staff management and good relationships with the community.

Lesson 9: What Works Can Be Cheaper Than What Doesn't

It is difficult to generalize about the cost of replications that work. So much depends on the content of the intervention, the number of persons served and the geographic area served. For example, Eisenhower Foundation youth safe haven-police ministation replications based on counseling at least 100 youth aged about six to seventeen in a neighborhood smaller than a police precinct worked well on budgets of $80,000 to $100,000 per year -- mostly for civilian staff and not counting matches of two to three police. In terms of cost per youth of replicated successes, Centro Sister Isolina Ferre in San Juan costs less than $1,000 per year per participant, the Quantum Opportunities Program costs about $2,600, and the nonresidential version of Argus costs in the neighborhood of $6,000 per participant.[21]

Perhaps what is most important at this stage of imperfect knowledge is that many examples can be given of how programs that work, based on scientific evaluations, are cheaper than programs that don't work. The annual cost to incarcerate one person can be over $30,000 in New York state prisons. Yet recidivism rates after prison are extremely high, and prison doesn't provide multiple solutions to multiple problems. An excellent example is the state of Arizona, which has begun directing nonviolent offenders from prison to community programs; an evaluation sponsored by the Supreme Court of Arizona found both recidivism rates and costs to taxpayers had dropped. Similarly, boot camps, which don't work, are considerably more expensive than Argus, which does work. In terms of cost/benefit ratios, for every dollar invested in the supply-side targeted tax credit program from 1978 to 1995 there were $.37 in benefits. For every dollar invested in Job Corps, there are $1.50 in benefits.[22]

Although there are plenty of illustrations to make our point that replication success can cost less than failure, the nation needs a much more systematic, independent annual audit than we presently have that compares the costs and benefits of what does not work and what does for the truly disadvantaged -- in terms of models and their replications. For programs where we are unsure of success, the cost-benefit ratios will help clarify what works. Such a tool, perhaps funded by major foundations, might be distributed in attractive, readable formats so that local grassroots organizations, national nonprofit change agents and the media can understand them.

Lesson 10: Beware Of Too Much Volunteerism," "Self Sufficiency" and "Empowerment" In Replication, As In Capacity Building
The Foundation's concern with concepts like volunteerism, self sufficiency and empowerment in the context of capacity building (Chapter 6) was reinforced during the process of replication, where concepts like coalition, and devolution also needed clarification. Consider each of these words:

<u>Volunteerism</u>
The limitations of replicating programs through extensive use of volunteers are especially apparent in the inner city. The fact that inner city residents are resource-poor to begin with is part of the reason why they are faced with the problems of drop-outs, unemployment, crime, drugs and deterioration of community life. In our West Philadelphia nonprofit community replication, staff noted special difficulty in recruiting volunteers because of the high proportion of female-headed households in the neighborhood. Many women in the community already had their hands more than full coping with both family and work. Similarly, an Eisenhower replication in the East Brooklyn section of New York City planned a volunteer subway station watch. Despite considerable efforts, there was little success in finding volunteers. The project director attributed the lack of response to residents?need for paid work, as opposed to volunteer work, and the possible danger involved.[23]

Even when sufficient volunteers can be found for replications, programs do not necessarily show positive outcomes. For example, volunteer citizen block watches do *not* reduce crime in inner-city neighborhoods, based on most evaluations. Sometimes they reduce *fear* while crime remains high or even increases.[24]

Some of the clearest quantitative evidence on the limits of volunteerism comes from the Foundation's first generation of youth safe haven-police ministation replications in four cities. As we have seen, during the first two years, the programs were funded at levels about as originally planned. During the last year, there were sharp budget cuts. During the initial years, paid staff ran the programs, with volunteers in a supportive role -- and crime declined an average of eighteen percent in the target neighborhoods in the four cities. During the last year, paid staff were cut to the bone, much more reliance had to be given to volunteers -- and crime declined by an average of only three percent in the four target neighborhoods.[25]

Just as we have found that good, reliable volunteers are not easy to find in inner city neighborhoods, so others have warned about reliance on middle class or wealthy volunteers who live in the suburbs. Andrew Kohut, who headed an extensive study of "citizen engagement" for the Pew Charitable Trusts, concluded, "It's a truism that people volunteer in their own social strata in areas where they feel comfortable." Julian Walpole, at Princeton, has observed that volunteers overwhelmingly prefer to work in their own communities. "As a rule, volunteers don't commute."[26] The problem was illustrated in one Eisenhower Foundation replication, where the affiliate of a national organization promised adult middle class volunteer mentors, but then did not deliver.[27]

A related issue is that good volunteerism is not free. Abe Wandersman at the University of South Carolina, who specializes in volunteerism, has said, "Effective volunteerism requires understanding the costs and benefits to the volunteers." For a volunteer to benefit and to be productive, the volunteer must be screened, oriented, trained and supervised. One-to-One/The National Mentoring Partnership, which links mentors to children, has concluded that the cost for one mentor for one year in New York City is $192.[28] However, in its evaluation of volunteers in the Big Brothers/Big Sisters Program, Public/Private Ventures estimated the cost for one mentor for one year to be $1,0000. This evaluation also estimated that perhaps five to fifteen million youth need such volunteer mentors. Hence the cost might be $5B to 15B per year if such volunteerism were replicated to a scale equal to the dimensions of the problem.[29]

<u>Self-Sufficiency</u>
There are some examples of replications that can become "self-sufficient." For example, the original Delancey Street in San Francisco and its replications around the nation are replication is run entirely by adult ex-offenders, who net millions per year from their businesses.[30]

However, Delancey Street has been an anomaly when it comes to self-sufficiency -- especially for high-risk children and youth who are too young to work. Early Eisenhower Foundation replications found that such programs were frustrated, hampered, and sometimes stillborn because of insufficient funds for paid staff, insufficient funds for staff development, an absence of qualified, trained people to hire even had the funds been available, lack of space for program activities, lack of money to pay for the most basic, essential supplies and lack of internally generated income streams. For example, in the Foundation-funded replication in East Brooklyn, despite help from several VISTA volunteers, the project was "overwhelmed by the work." One staff member said: "There are too many things to do at one time -- block organizing, clean-ups, meetings, fundraisers, the after-school program and cleaning the office." We found such programs had trouble hiring, and even more trouble retaining, project directors -- in part, as one evaluation notes, because of the "low salaries offered." In West Philadelphia, the replication had only one staff member for the first ten months of operations. The first project director received a better job offer and resigned after a few months' work, as did the coordinator of a program for senior citizens. The program's executive director commented, "With non-profits, it's terrible. The pay is low, especially for professional people. They'll do it when they don't have other opportunities, but when something better comes up you can't blame them for taking it."[31]

Such salary and related resource limitations had a fundamental impact on the character of many early Eisenhower Foundation replications. In West Philadelphia, the constant turnover of staff made it more difficult to maintain the momentum of the program and to establish a coherent framework within which program activities could be developed. In some instances, the program seemed to develop more in response to external conditions than to the internal mission of the organization. In the program in the Mid-Bronx, a well-planned employment information and referral service folded after a few months of operation, because there were not enough staff members to run it, and the economic-development specialist who served as its director left after a few months, with no one hired to take her place. Similarly, an after-school program in Washington, DC never got off the ground because no one had "sufficient time for the many tasks involved in implementing a new program." Low levels of categorical, short term funding also mean that many inner city programs must cope with a lack of basic materials -- vans, cars, recreation equipment and office space.[32]

As a result, in later Foundation replications, for a grant of a given size, we increased the amount of funding per site and reduced the number of sites.

Empowerment

As a fashionable term, "empowerment" came into its own in the 1980s -- for example, in the context of tenant management and tenant ownership in low income housing. One tenant management demonstration, in Washington, D.C., became a showcase for visitors. Even the Queen of England came to see it. Yet no national strategy was created and funded to replicate tenant management and ownership to scale in low income housing across the nation. Funding would have been necessary to train tenants in management. And job opportunities would have been necessary to assure that those who owned their homes could pay their mortgages. In the absence of such a policy, tenants in only a relatively few demonstrations around the nation were "empowered." There never was much attention given to how "empowerment" would be a practical, day-to-day mechanism through which a model was replicated to scale. That seemingly required money, and money, at least public sector funding, was never part of the concept. However, after public sector executives who articulated this kind of empowerment left government, money came into play -- in that they received large fees for talking about empowerment to audiences that were well off and could afford the fees.[33]

Coalitions

Grassroots coalition building was another popular catch phrase in the 1980s and 1990s. There was, and still is, a lack of clarity in some grassroots initiatives as to why coalitions might help solve the problems of poor communities. Part of the rationale seems to be that resources presumably already are available in the communities, but are poorly managed and need coordination via a coalition.

However proof for this assumption is not entirely clear. An example is the work of federal Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP). CSAP has made hundreds of grants -- to both community-based coalitions and to individual youth development organizations. There is little evidence that the coalitions have produced better outcomes than the individual agencies.[34] The coalitions required a lot of meetings. The individual agencies gave priority to direct service provision, building partnerships with others only if and when they appeared productive. It has been the experience of the Eisenhower Foundation that resource-poor organizations will resist collaborations and their many meetings unless there is a reasonably clear promise that the organizations will secure more funds for their work.

However, if the partners of a coalition are adequately funded, and if there also is additional funding for joint work, then the partners can make site visits to learn one another, create evaluations which might not be feasible on a single agency basis, and perhaps share a common media director who communicates their successes.

Devolution

Today, devolution usually is defined as shifting funds and control from federal government to state government. There is some basis for saying that some states have been "creative laboratories for change," to use language that frequently is used today. An illustration is the success of southern states in reducing infant mortality. Yet there is great variability among states. For example, when the federal government makes block grants to states that affect high-risk children and youth, governors do not always distribute the block grants proportionately to the populations in need. For example, there have been years when California did not grant Los Angeles nearly its proportionate share of drug block-grant money. The same has been true for Wisconsin and its distribution to Milwaukee.[35]

In the case of the most fashionable current social experiment with devolution, "welfare reform," evidence is accumulating that many states are not creating a fair deal to the working poor. For example, one study has found that many states are creating cumbersome, bureaucratic rules for how the working poor can secure the benefits promised them by law and are misinforming the working poor about the benefits legally due them. As one result, millions of families are losing Medicaid and food stamps, often in clear violation of federal law. Meanwhile, many states are sitting on surplus federal funds that accumulate as caseloads decline. At least six states are using these funds to pay for tax cuts or general fund programs. Hardly any of the surplus is finding its way into childcare, training or education, or into transportation subsidies that might make low-wage work more manageable for poor families.[36]

But the key issue for replication is why we should devolve to the state public sector *at all*, when there is considerable evidence that devolution directly to the local, private, grassroots, nonprofit sector would yield better results.

Conclusions

Not only, then, can we enhance the capacities of grassroots nonprofit organizations, but we can replicate them, and we have developed much of the technology for how to replicate. What happens next? Chapter 8 asks funders to help answer this question.

8. Where Are We Going?

We return to the policy framework of Chapter 1. Considerable evidence has been presented on these pages that the technology exists for how to build capacity and replicate what works. But where are we going with that knowledge?

Our ultimate lesson is that the foundations most likely to accept many of our recommendations do not yet have a shared, coordinated, long run strategic plan for capacity building and replication.

One model for what is needed is the community development movement over the last forty years. As Pablo Eisenberg has concluded:[1]

> If the community development movement is to profit from its mistakes and tensions, it will require a tough ongoing analysis that reports objectively, that takes into account issues of responsibility, accountability and integrity. That assessment will have to deal with the challenges of organizing and advocacy, alliances with other community based groups, the question of production versus the management of production, the role of the large intermediaries, matters of leadership, the extent of community accountability and the limitations of CDCs themselves. The Community Development Corporations deserve better treatment from their funders and boosters. They need the truth about the movement, their potential and their options.
>
> If the enormous accomplishments of community development are to be perpetuated, we will need a body of observers, evaluators and critics who will put the lie to the good old public relations myth that only good news, even if untrue, is the sure path to success.

As a corollary to the honest assessment that Eisenberg seeks, foundations need to work through how other nonprofit groups fit into a coordinated path of holistic success -- groups that need capacity building and replication in child development, youth development, public school innovation, job training and retention, community and economic development, community banking and community equity policing.

The established foundations with these interests and any new economy information technology philanthropies that may be evolving in sympathetic directions need to hold a summit on long term complementary commitments and funding -- to grassroots replicators and technical assistance intermediaries.

If capacity building and replication are to be *to scale*, surely such private foundations need to match resources with the public sector. This will not be easy. Public sector funding tends to be narrow, categorical and committed to "demonstrations," without line-item commitments to building the capacities of grassroots implementors and replicating them. But there are some exceptions -- like the funding over time by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to the Center for Community Change and the Development Training Institute to enhance the capacities of community development corporations. Or like the channeling of public resources by HUD through the private, nonprofit Local Initiatives Support Corporation and the Enterprise Foundation. The latter match private resources, all targeted to economic development, capacity building and replication by community development corporations.

In the best scenario, a group of established and new foundations would create core principles, backed with money, for systematic, long term capacity building and replication to scale -- multiple solution principles that could operate without public monies -- but that would incorporate public income streams at local, state and federal levels whenever the appropriate public sector power holders at the time share the vision. Simultaneously, a communicating what works movement would seek to increase the longrun likelihood that voters and public sector institutions would support capacity building and replicate to scale.

At present, knowledge has converged with prosperity. What better time to start?

Chapter Notes

Chapter 1

1. Fred R. Harris and Lynn A. Curtis, Editors, *Locked in the Poorhouse* (New York and Lanham: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
2. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *To Establish Justice, To Ensure Domestic Tranquility: A Thirty Year Update of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence* (Washington, DC: The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 1999).
3. David Callahan, *$1 Billion for Ideas: Conservative Think Tanks in the 1990s* (Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 1999).
4. *Final Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing House, 1968).
5. Ford Foundation, *Perspectives on Partnerships,* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1996).

Chapter 2

1. Vince Stehle, "Visas of Endless Possibility," *The Chronicle of Philanthropy*, November 2, 1995, p. 59.
2. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 1990).
3. Lynn A. Curtis and Fred R. Harris, *The Millennium Breach: A Thirty Year Update of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, DC: The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 1998).
4. Ibid.
5. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring,* Second Edition (Washington, DC: The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 2000).

Chapter 3

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Chapter 4

1. Others also have found these inputs to be important. See, for example, Fund for the City of New York, *Groundwork: Building Support for Excellence* (New York: Fund for the City of New York, 1994) and Diane Baillargeon Inc., *The DeWitt Wallace-Reader's Digest Management Initiative for New York City Organizations that Serve Youth: Program Overview and Summary of Evaluation Findings* (New York: DeWitt Wallace-Reader's Digest Fund, February, 1998).
2. See Chapter 5, note 4.
3. Fund for the City of New York and Diane Baillargeon, Inc., op.cit.
4. Joy G. Dryfoos, *Safe Passage: Making It Through Adolescence in a Risky Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

5. Fund for the City of New York and Diane Baillargeon Inc., op.cit.

Chapter 5

1. Fund for the City of New York and Diane Baillargeon, Inc., op.cit.
2. The two evaluations were:
    - Kien Lee, *Evaluation of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation's Technical Assistance Program for the DeWitt Wallace-Readers?Digest Fund* (Gaithersburg, Maryland: Association for the Study and Development of Community, 1998).
    - John G. Hayes and Mary DeLorey with Helen Kim, *An Evaluation of the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation's Management Program for Institutional Capacity Building for the Annie E. Casey Foundation* (Bethesda, Maryland: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, 1997).

The full evaluations are available from the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation on request.

3. Tapes are available from the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation on request.
4. Here are illustrative ratings from some of our workshops:
    A. Overall Ratings for Various Workshop Sessions, September, 1995

    (Rating Scale 1-4; 4 is highest)

    Fundraising 4.0

    Organizational Management/Strategic Planning 3.5

    Organizational Management/Seven Habits 3.4

    Staff Development 3.8

    B. Workshop Session on Fundraising, September, 1996

    (Rating Scale 1-5; 1 is highest)

    Organization of Presentation 1.8

    Knowledge of Subject 1.4

    Relevance of Material 1.5

    Tailored to Audience 2.3

    Presentation of Material 1.8

    Facilitating Discussion 1.7

Overall average rating 1.8

C. Workshop Session on Organizational Management, September, 1996

(Rating Scale 1-5; 1 is highest)

Organization of Presentation 1.6

Knowledge of Subject 1.4

Relevance of Material 1.8

Tailored to Audience 1.9

Presentation of Material 1.6

Facilitating Discussion 1.7

Overall average rating 1.7

D. Workshop Session on Staff Development, September, 1996

(Rating Scale 1-5; 5 is highest)

Workshop helped me understand the roles and responsibilities of mentors 4.5

I am able to identify the 4 tasks of mentoring 4.5

Workshop helped me understand stages of mentor/mentee relationships. 4.5

I understand the process of recruiting, training and retaining mentors 4.5

The amount of time allotted for this workshop 4.5

The handouts and other written materials 4.8

The techniques used for presenting information (Lecture, discussion, group activities, tests, etc.) 4.8

The clarity of the information presented 4.8

The workshop instructor's knowledge of the subject 4.9

The relevance of the information presented to your work. 5.0

Overall, how satisfied were you with this workshop. 4.8

Average overall rating for effectiveness in imparting knowledge 4.5

Average overall rating for level of satisfaction with workshop 4.7

E. Workshop Session on Evaluation, Inputs, Proximate Outcomes and Outcomes, January, 1997

(Rating Scale 1-5; 5 is highest)

Discussion of tasks and outcomes as they relate to workplan 4.5

Logic Models: Sites charted their activities on individual presentation boards 4.6

Sites gave feedback to each other's presentations 4.6

Session gave participants a clear understanding of what activities (my) site needs to complete in order to be successful with this project 4.3

5. See for example, the ratings in note 4, Ibid.
6. Kien Lee, op.cit.
7. Ibid.
8. Lynn A. Curtis and Fred R. Harris, *The Millennium Breach* op.cit.
9. Tapes are available from the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation on request.
10. Lisbeth B. Schorr with Daniel Schorr, *Within Our Reach: Breaking the Cycle of Disadvantage* (New York: Doubleday, 1988).
11. Kien Lee, op.cit.
12. John G. Hayes, et al., op.cit.

Chapter 6

1. See the workshop ratings summarized in Chapter 5, note 4.
2. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility*, op.cit.
3. Jacques Steinberg with Edward Wyatt, "Boola, Boola: E-Commerce Comes to the Quad," News of the Week in Review, *The New York Times*, February 13, 2000.
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5. Development Training Institute, *FYI: A Quarterly Publication from the Development Training Institute*, Issue 1, Winter 2000.
6. Bill Alexander, "On and Off the Wagon, America's Promise at Two," *YouthToday*, July/August, 1999; Reid Abelson, "Charity Led by General Powell Comes Under Heavy Fire, Accused of Inflating Results," *The New York Times*, October 8, 1999.
7. James Ridgeway, "Heritage on the Hill," *Nation*, September 2, 1997.
8. Fred R. Harris and Lynn A. Curtis, *Locked in the Poorhouse*, op.cit.
9. Ibid.
10. Andrew L. Shapiro, "The Net That Binds: Using Cyberspace To Create Real Communities," *Nation*, June 21, 1999, pp. 11-15; *The Washington Post*, "A Wider Net," *The Washington Post*, July 13, 1999, p. A18.

11. Figure 3 is based mostly on David Callahan, op.cit.

Chapter 7

1. See The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 1990); The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Final Report on a Multi-Site Replication of the South Bronx Argus Learning for Living Center* (Washington, DC: The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 1998); and The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring,* Second Edition (Washington, DC: The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 2000*)*.
2. The Argus job training and placement replications for out-of-school youth are reported in: The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Final Report of A Multi-Site Replication of the South Bronx Argus Learning for Living Center* (Washington, DC: The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation 1998). Argus was replicated in two new locations -- Des Moines, IA and Washington, DC. In each city, three cohorts of participants were compared to cohorts of similar youth not in the program. For cohort 1, the program participants in both sites were more likely to be employed and earned higher wages than the comparison youth. For cohorts 2 and 3, the program youth in Washington, DC were less likely to use drugs over time than their counterparts. In Des Moines, the program youth from cohorts 2 and 3 were less likely to use drugs, get arrested, or to rely on public assistance over time. Taken together, these findings supported the Argus program model.

   The first and second generations of programs that sought to replicate the notion of youth safe havens that share the same space with police ministations are reported in the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring,* Second Edition (Washington, DC: The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, 2000). The first generation replication sites were San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago and Baltimore. In San Juan, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago, a quasi-experimental evaluation design showed that serious "Index" crime reported by the F.B.I. declined by at least twenty-two percent and at most twenty-seven percent over a minimum of three years. Across the four cities, the decline in the four target neighborhoods was significantly greater statistically than for either the surrounding precincts or their cities as a whole. In Baltimore, a quasi-experimental design showed that program youth had less high risk behavior, less alcohol use, less drug use, less self-reported delinquency and better coping skills than comparison youth over eighteen months. The differences were statistically significant.

   The second generation replication sites were San Juan, Columbia, (SC), Memphis, Baltimore, Little Rock and Washington, DC. A process and outcome evaluation demonstrated the three year replications were successful in implementing the basic principles of the program, developing youth, improving grades, reducing drug involvement, reducing serious crime community-wide in tough neighborhoods and improving the quality of life. The degree of successful implementation and the number and degree of positive outcomes varied by site. Serious crime reported to the police declined in all six target neighborhoods. The three sites where we were able to complete youth surveys (Columbia, Memphis and Baltimore) showed a number of statistically significant findings -- like less use of drugs and alcohol by program youth versus comparison youth in Memphis and Baltimore. The findings reinforced the conclusion in a recent best practices guide to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development that safe haven-ministations should be considered a national model. See Center for Visionary Leadership, *A Guide to Best Practices* (Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1998).

3. See the evaluation findings summarized in note 2.
4. Andrew Hahn, *Quantum Opportunities Program: A Brief on the QOP Pilot Program* (Waltham, MA: Center for Human Resources, Heller Graduate School, Brandeis University, 1995).
5. Steven Glass, "Don't You D.A.R.E., *The New Republic*, March 3, 1997, p. 19.
6. For a critique of such ideology, see Herbert J. Gans, *The War Against the Poor* (New York: Basic Books, 1995). Also see Fred R. Harris and Lynn A. Curtis, *Locked in the Poorhouse*, op.cit.
7. National Research Council, *Losing Generations: Adolescents in High-Risk Settings,* Panel on High Risk Youth, Committee on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993).
8. The Eisenhower Foundation draws on the guidelines of National Research Council, Ibid, but proceeds beyond, based on lessons learned from street-level experience.

9. Kenneth Powell and Darnell F. Hawkins, Editors, "Youth Violence Prevention: Descriptions and Baseline Data from 13 Evaluation Projects," *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*, Supplement to Volume 12, Number 5, September/October 1996; James C. Howell, Editor, *Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1995).
10. Lynn A. Curtis and Fred R. Harris, *The Millennium Breach*, op.cit.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. See Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring*, op.cit.
14. Carnegie Corporation of New York, *A Matter of Time: Risk and Opportunity in the Non School Hours* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1992).
15. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring*, op.cit.
16. Fred R. Harris and Lynn A. Curtis, *Locked in the Poorhouse*, op.cit., c. 8.
17. George Gerbner, "Reclaiming Our Cultural Methodology," *In Context*, Number 38, 1994, pp. 40-42.
18. Lisbeth B. Schorr with Daniel Schorr, *Within Our Reach: Breaking the Cycle of Disadvantaged* (New York: Double Day, 1988).
19. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility*, op.cit.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction*, op.cit.
24. Ibid.
25. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring*, op.cit.
26. Lynn A. Curtis and Fred R. Harris, *The Millennium Breach*, op.cit.
27. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Police Mentoring*, op.cit.
28. Lynn A. Curtis and Fred R. Harris, *The Millennium Breach*, op.cit.
29. Ibid.
30. Vince Stehle, op.cit.
31. The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, *Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction*, op.cit.
32. Ibid.
33. Lynn A. Curtis and Fred R. Harris, *The Millennium Breach*, op.cit.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Fair Deal for the Poor," *The Washington Post*, May 9, 2000, p. A31; Francis Fox Piven, "Welfare Movement Rises," *Nation*, May 8, 2000, p. 4.

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Appendix 1:
Nonprofit Grassroots Organizations That Received Foundation Technical Assistance and Training 1990-2000

Around the Corner to the World, Washington, DC

African American Male Leadership Academy, Lawrence, KS

Al Kebulon Youth Right of Passage, Baltimore, MD

Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, Atlanta, GA

Baltimore American Indian Center, Baltimore, MD

Baltimore JOBS and Energy, Baltimore, MD

Blue Gargoyle Youth Center, Chicago, IL

Boys and Girls Club of Maryland, Flag House Courts Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Baltimore, MD

Boys Choir of Harlem, New York, NY

Boys Club of Memphis Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Memphis, TN

Boys to Men, Chicago, IL

Bridging Bridges, Cambridge, MA

Campus Boulevard Logan Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Philadelphia, PA

Capital Commitment, Inc., Washington, DC

Casa Del Pueblo, Washington, DC

Center for Youth Services, Washington, DC

Centro Sister Isolina Ferre at Caimito, San Juan, PR

Challengers Boys Club, Los Angeles, CA

Clinch-Powell Education Cooperative, Tazewell, TN

The CLUB (Action for Boston Community Development), Boston, MA

Clymer Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Kansas City, MO

DC Barrios Unidos, Washington, DC

Dorchester Youth Collaborative, Dorchester, MA

Ervin’s All American Youth Club, Inc., Clearwater, FL

Friends of Benjamin Banneker Historical Park, Baltimore, MD

Gonzalez Gardens Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Columbia, SC

Hendley Homes Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Columbia, SC

Holton Youth Center, Milwaukee, WI

House of Umoja, Philadelphia, PA

Hyde Park Neighborhood Club, Chicago, IL

Institute for Responsible Fatherhood and Family Revitalization, Washington, DC

Iona Whipper Home, Inc., Washington, DC

John R. Grubb Community YMCA, Des Moines, IA

Jubilee Housing, Inc., Washington, DC
Juvenile Awareness Education Program, New Castle, DE
La Casa de Don Pedro, Newark, NJ
Latin American Youth Center, Washington, DC
Latino Youth Development, New Haven, CT
Lillian Jones Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Baltimore, MD
Local Development Corporation of East New York, Brooklyn, NY
MAD DADS, Omaha, NE
Mentors, Inc., Washington, DC
Metro Teen AIDS, Washington, DC
Mid-Bronx Desperados Community Housing Corporation, Bronx, NY
Mineral & Whittier Parks Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Dover, NH
National Capital Neighborhood Development Corporation, Washington, DC
National Foundation for Teaching Entrepreneurship, New York, NY
New Beginnings Center, St. Paul, MN
New Community Corporation, Newark, NJ
Norris Square Civic Association, Philadelphia, PA
Office of Women's Services, Teen Parent Center, Baton Rouge, LA
Omega Boys Club, San Francisco, CA
Omega Little Brothers (Behavioral Health Service of Arkansas), Helena, AR
Our Family Table Foundation, Atlanta, GA
Paradise at Parkside Youth Safe-Haven Police Ministation, Washington, DC
Pathways Community Development Commission, DeMott, AR
Patterson Park Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc., Baltimore, MD
People's Congregational United Church of Christ, Washington, DC
W. Perry School Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Columbia, SC
Phoenix Youth-At-Risk, Phoenix, AZ
Portland House of Umoja, Portland, OR
Pregnancy Aid Centers, College Park, MD
Project Keep Hope Alive, Commerce, TX
Project LEEO (Leadership, Education and Employment Opportunities), Roxbury, MA
Quality Education for Minorities Network, Washington, DC
River McKenzie Human Development Center, Inc., Baltimore, MD
Rural Opportunities, Rochester, NY
St. Clair-Superior Coalition, Cleveland, OH
St. Francis JOBS Program, Charlotte, NC
Saxon Homes Youth Safe Haven-Police Ministation, Columbia, SC
James E. Scott Community Association, Miami, FL
Teen Choice Center, Phoenix, AZ
The Village of Arts & Humanities, Philadelphia, PA
Youth Leadership Academy, Milwaukee, WI

Tomberlin Community Development Center Youth Safe Haven Police-Ministation, Little Rock, AR

Urban Dreams, Des Moines, IA

Walnut Hill Community Development Corporation, Philadelphia, PA

Whittier Alliance, Minneapolis, MN

Youth and Family Alternatives, Inc., New Port Richey, FL

Youth Development, Albuquerque, NM

Youth Guidance, Chicago, IL

Appendix 2:
Questions Asked As Part of the Foundation's Needs Assessment

A. Background

1. 1. Has your organization received technical assistance before? If yes, in what areas and from whom?
2. 2. Was the technical assistance helpful? If yes, why? If no, why?

B. Organizational Development

1. Does your organization have a clear, written mission statement of purpose, goals, values, programs, services, and priorities -- that is understood, supported and practiced by all staff? If yes, please rate the clarity of the mission statement on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being most unclear and least supported and 10 being the most clear, understood and supported. Add any comments below.
2. Is your organization incorporated? Does it have articles of incorporation on file with appropriate government agencies and on file within the organization? Add comments below.
3. Does your organization have a board with a clearly defined role? If yes, on a scale of 1 to 10, please rate how clearly defined the role is -- 1 being not at all clear and 10 being as clear as it can be. Please describe the role of your board (for example, in fundraising, policymaking, budgeting, and hiring and supervision of executive staff).
4. Does the board consist of a diverse group of members who help bring resources to your organization? On a scale of 0 to 10, please rate the effectiveness of your board in directing the development of your organization. Please describe the strengths and weaknesses of your board below.
5. What are some of the resources the board has helped bring to your organization? (For example, computers, office equipment and funds.)
6. Please describe the challenges you face in working with the board.
7. Does your board hold periodic meetings or retreats to revisit its mission and vision, assess progress toward goals and develop new initiatives to respond to client needs? If yes, on a scale of 1 to 10, please rate how helpful those meetings are in directing the development of your organization. Add any comments below.
8. Does your organization have an organizational chart that delineates lines of accountability? If yes, please rate on a scale of 1 to 10, the helpfulness of the chart. What are the strengths of having this chart?
9. What are the challenges to implementing the chart?
10. Does your organization have a process to involve everyone, including board members, staff, volunteers and funders in developing the organization's strategic plan? If yes, please rate on a scale of 1 to 10 the effectiveness of the process.
11. What are the advantages of this process? What are the challenges?
12. Are there any other individuals who should be involved but are not?
13. Does your organization have a manual that contains explicit statements about policies on organizational structure, accountability, hours of operation, opening and closing procedures, emergency and security procedures, code of conduct for staff and other general operating rules? If yes, please rate the helpfulness of the manual on a scale of 1 to 10. What are the advantages of having the manual?
14. What are the challenges to developing such a manual?
15. Does your organization have liability insurance to protect officers and directors? Add any comments below.
16. Does your organization have a process for addressing lawsuits and legal matters? If yes, please rate the strength of the process on a scale of 1 to 10. Please describe the process, its strengths and challenges.
17. Is there any other technical assistance that you may require that has not been addressed?

C. <u>Fiscal Management</u>

1. Does your organization have a federal tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code? If not, what are the challenges to having one?
2. Has your organization registered with the appropriate state and federal agencies for purpose of withholding employee income taxes? If not, what are the challenges to registration?
3. Does your organization contribute to state and locality unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation programs? Are notices on claims for workmen's compensation posted in readily seen areas? If not, what are the challenges to doing so?
4. Does your organization have a payroll system that provides for timely payment of state and local income taxes, of unemployment taxes, social security and Medicare contributions? If not, what are the challenges to developing one?
5. Does your organization have an accounting system in place with clear procedures for financial transactions, financial reporting and fund disbursement? If not, what are the challenges to developing one?
6. Does your organization develop an operating budget that is utilized as a planning and operating tool? If not, what are the challenges to developing one? If yes, please rate the effectiveness of the budget as a tool on a scale of 1 to 10. What are the strengths of using it as a planning and operating tool?
7. Does your organization have a Chief Financial Officer or other staffer who is primarily responsible for managing the financial activity of the organization? If yes, how would you rate the person's skills and knowledge on a scale of 1 to 10? Add any comments below.
8. Does your organization have a system in place to maintain the fiscal integrity and protection of the organization's assets, including annual and independent audits? If not, what are the challenges to having a system in place? If yes, please rate the effectiveness of the system on a scale of 1 to 10. What are some of the challenges of the system?
9. Is there any other technical assistance you may require in this area that have not been addressed?

D. <u>Fundraising and Proposal Writing</u>

1. Does your organization have staff who are responsible for fundraising ? If yes, who are they? (For example, board members, the executive director, fundraisers and consultants.) How would you rate their skills and knowledge in fundraising on a scale of 1 to 10? Add any comments below.
2. Do fundraising staff receive compensation consistent with that of other professionals in similar organizations in your region? Add any comments below.
3. Has your organization submitted any proposals or grant applications to foundations, federal agencies or other funders in the past year? If yes, how would you rate the strength of the proposals or grant applications that your organization submits, on a scale of 1 to 10? Add any comments below.
4. Is there other technical assistance that you may require that have not been addressed?

E. <u>Program Administration</u>

1. Does your organization provide health benefits, including disability insurance and availability of tax sheltered annuity (403(b)) plans for staff? If not, what are the challenges to providing benefits?
2. Does your organization have a personal manual which defines employment, benefits, termination, sexual harassment, staff codes of conduct, grievance procedures and liability issues that are available to all staff? If yes, on a scale of 1 to 10, please rate the helpfulness of the manual. If no, what are the challenges to developing a manual?
3. Do the physical characteristics of your organization's location (like the building, office space and the surrounding area) maximize the implementation of your program activities? Please rate on a scale of 1 to 10 the efficiency of the physical characteristics. Add any comments below.
4. Is your organization in compliance with local zoning and fire codes? Add any comments below.
5. Is there any other technical assistance that you may require that has not been addressed?

F. <u>Program Development</u>

1. Does your organization have clear program objectives, guidelines and curricula? If yes, please rate their clarity on a scale of 1 to 10. What are the challenges you face in defining program objectives, guidelines and curricula?
2. Does your organization have outreach activities to increase its visibility and recruit program participants? If no, why not? If yes, please rate the effectiveness of the outreach activities on a scale of 1 to 10. Please describe the activities and their challenges.
3. Does your program have relationships with other organizations (nonprofit, private and public)? If no, why not? If yes, please rate the strength of those relationships on a scale of 1 to 10. Please describe the relationships and their challenges.
4. Is there any other technical assistance that you may require that have not been addressed?

G. <u>Staff Development</u>

1. Does your organization have adequate staff to meet the program's objectives and client needs? If yes, on a scale of 1 to 10 please rate their knowledge and skills in meeting the program's objectives and client needs. What are the challenges?
2. Does your organization have a process in place for recruiting, training and supervising volunteers? If yes, please rate on a scale of 1 to 10 the effectiveness of the process. What are the challenges?
3. Does your organization have a process for the continuing education and development of staff members (through, for example, training, certification, conferences and courses)? If no, what are the challenges to having such a process? If yes, please rate the strength of the process on a scale of 1 to 10. Please describe briefly the process.
4. Does your organization have a process for addressing issues such as staff burnout and time management? Please rate the strength of the process on scale of 1 to 10. Please describe briefly the process. What are the challenges?
5. Does your organization provide specific staff training to address the needs of the target population (for example, case management training, group facilitation, conflict resolution and mentoring)? If yes, please rate the effectiveness of the training on a scale of 1 to 10. Please describe briefly the training. What are the challenges?
6. Is there other technical assistance that you feel you may require that have not been addressed?

H. <u>Communication</u>

1. Does your organization have sufficient technology (for example, computers, modems, fax machines, copiers, Internet access and electronic mail) to communicate effectively? If yes, please rate the effectiveness of the technology. What are the challenges?
2. Does your organization have staff who are trained to use the technology? If yes, please rate the skills and knowledge of the staff that use the technology, on a scale of 1 to 10. What are the challenges?
3. Does your organization have a press or media kit that includes logos, annual reports, brochures, photos and newspaper articles? If yes, please rate the strength of the kit on a scale of 1 to 10. Please describe briefly the kit. What are the challenges?
4. Does your organization have staff who are responsible for communicating with the media? If yes, please rate the knowledge and skills of the staff on a scale of 1 to 10. What are the challenges?
5. Does your organization have established relationships with members of print and electronic media? If yes, please rate the strength of the relationships on a scale of 1 to 10. Please describe how the relationships have been used in the past and their benefits. If no, what are the challenges to developing such relationships?
6. Is there any other technical assistance that you feel you may require that have not been addressed?

I. <u>Evaluation</u>

1. Does your organization have a system in place to monitor the progress of your activities? If yes, please rate the effectiveness of the system on a scale of 1 to 10. Please describe briefly the system. Does it distinguish among inputs, proximate outcomes and outcomes? What are the challenges?
2. Does the staff understand what outcome evaluations mean? If no, why not? If yes, please rate the average level of understanding on a scale of 1 to 10.
3. Are there any areas that you feel require technical assistance that have not been addressed?

Appendix 3:
Excerpts from a Practice News Conference at the Foundation's Television School

Note: *This training session involved a national coalition of organizations. All coalition members first received a review of programs that do and do not work, based on scientific evaluation. Then they received strategic communications planning and television school training. Toward the end of the training, two members were asked to lead a press conference. The Foundation's trainers were the reporters. The assignment to the coalition members was to keep the focus of their message, despite attempts by reporters to make them lose focus. Only segments of the training are included here.*

Spokesperson A: Ladies and Gentlemen of the press -- We thank you very much for coming today. As you know, our purpose today is to announce the formation of a new coalition of inner city organizations which are scattered across the country. These organizations which have come together for purposes of networking, building capacity, sharing experiences and addressing the problems of African American males. We are now ready to answer your questions?

Reporter: Congress and the President has already outlawed or gotten rid of welfare. How is that going to affect your program?

Spokesperson A: It will deplete it a great deal. What it will mean is that in order to stop that gap, there is going to need to be additional money -- both out of the private sector and out of the public sector -- to address problems of the constituencies about which we have most concerns.

Reporter: Is this move on the part of the federal government some indication that the American public is no longer willing to underwrite welfare?

Spokesperson A: Certainly the polls do not show that. The polls show that America is most compassionate in this regard. How the Congress got off on this bent, I do not know. Except that it is mean spirited and, therefore, they have not followed the desires of the American people and have not been compassionate in approaching these issues.

Reporter: What is going to come out of this coalition that is going to be so different than what we have seen in the past that hasn't worked in the sixties?

Spokesperson B: It is our hope that, as a coalition and as individual programs within the collaboration, we will see a marked reduction in some of the statistics as they relate to homicide and incarceration. We want out streets to be safe. We want to see increases in the number of young graduating from high school and going to college, the number of jobs created and the number of businesses started by people in our communities. Those are some of our indicators of successes.

Reporter: So are you supporting things like enterprise zones and mandatory sentencing and prisons?

Spokesperson B: No, we’re not advocating that at all.

Reporter: Why not?

Spokesperson B: We want to look at the problems and not just focus on the symptoms.

Reporter: What is wrong with enterprise zones?

Spokesperson B: In some cases, they work and some cases, they don't work. And we are not dismissing any kind of solution. I think that, as I have said many times before, multiple solutions are necessary.

Reporter: Was this group a part of the Million Man March?

Spokesperson B: No, we were not part of the Million Man March. There were individuals who were part of the coalition who participated, including myself.

Reporter: And what is your view on Minister Farrakhan?

Spokesperson B: We are really not here to discuss Mr. Farrakhan. We want to reiterate our message.

Reporter: Mr. Farrakhan is a very, very influential popular man in the eye of the American public. You should say something about him. Are you for him or against him?

Spokesperson A: We are not for or against Mr. Farrakhan. There were individual members of our organization who participated in the Million Man March. What is significant about the Million Man March is that it gave evidence of enthusiasm on the part of Black men to address aggressively the problems of the African-American community in the larger American community.

Reporter: But can't you condemn Farrakhan and then move on?

Spokesperson A: We are not willing to condemn anybody. Even those who are his greatest distractors, we do not condemn. That is not our purpose. And, therefore, we remain focused on what we are suppose to be doing.

Reporter: Thank you.

Spokesperson A: Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen of the press.

Appendix 4:
Excerpts from One-on-One Television School Follow-Up Training

***Note*:** *One person who attended the group television school illustrated in Appendix 3 received one-on-one, on-camera training at a later time. What follows are excerpts from an analysis of the person's television performance, written by the trainers.*

Post Media Training Review
Our media professional didn't think that there was a lot to be improved on but was pleasantly surprised by your growth from our earlier session. The reviewer felt that the makeup added greatly to an attractive and positive appearance. She stated that your smile, literally, lit up the screen and the colors in your tunic really brought out your skin tone.

Our reviewer agreed with our "practice makes perfect" axiom. She noted that the message segment got better as you become more relaxed at delivering it. However, she said that the message loses its effectiveness when it comes across as memorized. She suggested that you write down key words on a 4x5 card that will trigger certain thought processes. Our reviewer stated that you know this subject better than anyone -- so when you speak from the heart, it has a powerful effect.

The eye contact in your taped session was much better than in your television segment which was reviewed prior to your training. Your tone was stronger following the training and more confident and your message was interesting and compelling.

Summary You are a natural star. Your warmth, sincerity and enthusiasm radiates when you speak. It is important to keep that quality which is inspiring and effective with audiences. Now the hard stuff. The most important task for you is to keep on your message and learn how to get in all of the information in the short period of time allotted. To help ease anxiety over media appearances, embrace each one as an opportunity to tell your very impressive story. It will greatly help for you to memorize your message and practice it.

You will also need to negotiate with the television program and/or sponsors for greater support, including scholarships, sponsorships, as well as concessions -- assuring that your organization's phone number is on the screen, that you have adequate time to talk about your program and that you are paid AFTRA rates for some of your appearances.

The Message
The opening message that we worked on contains the information you most want people to remember about your organization. That same information should be expanded upon and repeated wherever possible throughout the program. Your vehicle is perfect. Everyone understands the concept of cooking food. When you relate what people already are familiar with, your concept of teaching academic subjects through the cooking, you’ve captured their attention. (Say why it's necessary to read, write, divide, multiply, add, subtract and do fractions, understand some basic principles of science, geography and history to be a good chef.)

Tips To Remember
Following are some important items to memorize to include in your key points:

- Program was started by you and your husband.

- Program gives kids a new lease on life, helps steer them through the troubled waters of today.
- Develops marketable skills while learning math, reading, speech, social studies, geography and confidence.
- Your organization is part of a coalition of grassroots groups giving our youth a fair chance at life. After all, it does take the whole community police, schools, doctors, families to raise a child -- a village.
- Always include anecdotes -- success stories -- in your presentation. (This will open the door for the interviewer to ask about the young men who failed to stick with the program (if there are any) . . . so be prepared with a positive response. Please don't allow any discussion of failure to take much of the time and be careful not to let this kind of focus be the last word. Remember, people often will remember most what they hear last about such a program.)
- During an interview, remember that because you may be finished with what you have to say, the camera may not have finished with you! Please don't look away from the camera or your interviewer. Continue to hold your beautiful smile or make small talk with the interviewer . . . additional information about the program, perhaps . . . until the interviewer indicates the segment is finished.
- Open your show with your message.
- Remember to find out pertinent information before you do your show including:
    - Who is going to interview me?
    - What is the exact format?
    - When will I be on? How much time I have? How often will I be on? Will there be other guests? Who?
    - If there is a taped piece or is the film about our program being shown? Where is the film being played immediately before my interview or after or during a longer segment prior to my appearance? Is the film being excerpted or shown in its entirety?
    - Please put my phone number on the screen as well so that people can contact me.
    - What information can I leave with the station for calls for viewers for recruitment?
    - Can you send a car to pick me up?

What To Wear

Tunic styled blouses with graceful sleeves narrowed and/or buttoned at the wrist would work really well on camera with you. Round neckline or small mock turtleneck look in the style of the blouse you wore on Sunday are also flattering. As stated during the session, you should stay away from open jackets.

Colors should be earth tones or compliments of earth tones -- including russets and blue-greens, muted or bright.

A smock could be a standard option. Actually, a smock with a seamless front (panel covering the zipper of buttons) will free you from the concern of having to wear something of a complimentary color to the apron. A smock styled in the same fashion as described for the tunic styled blouses will work extremely well. The color of the smock will be in the color ranges as described for the clothing. The teal smock with lettering in a strong contrasting color that will not be washed out by the lighting will be very interesting.

Appendix 5:
Excerpts from the Argus Replication Training Video

Female: See, I have a real serious attitude problem and I blamed everybody else for my problems because I wasn't attending school. I was a single mother of two.

Mary Taylor: (Vice President, Clinical Services). The problem is a lot of these kids are from deprived families. A lot of these kids are second and third generation substance abusers, alcohol abusers. Argus provides socialization skills, education, and job training. It also provides bonding an extended family, nurturing and adults who really care and see the positive potential in our participants.

Richard Weiss: (Director of Training and Treatment Services). The Learning for Living for Living Center is a program for 140 high-risk youth from the ages of 14 to 21. High risk means that they are experimenting with drugs and/or have parents and siblings who are a little more involved in drugs.

Steve Chesterson: (Teacher, Computer Services). I think Argus is successful with their approach because it is all encompassing. It is academics, which the Board of Education offers. It's a counseling support, job placement support, health support. They have a health educator here. Every phase of the students?development is addressed here at Argus.

Staff Development

Mary Taylor: (Vice President, Clinical Services). Staff development which I oversee and participate in, is one of our most important projects here. Many of our staff people are from the same environment, the same background that the kids come from.

Richard Weiss: (Director of Training and Treatment Services). I was an intravenous heroine user for 20 years.

Al Strother: (Vice President of Operations). I was an ex-addict. I graduated from Phoenix House in 1969.

Nadine Jackson: (Primary Counselor, Job Horizon Counselor). My parents were alcoholics so I grew up in an alcoholic home.

David Sousa: (Staff). I am from the South Bronx, myself. I grew up in New York City. I graduated from high school, barely making it.

Gary DeVoe: (Job Developer). I come from a broken home, and someone helped me.

Richard Weiss: (Director of Training and Treatment Services). One of the most important parts of my job is staff development. What that means is not only training, but encouraging staff to take the chance and grow personally, as well as professionally. We have weekly staff development groups and basically what that is are personal issues groups for the staff.

Family

Charmaine Swearing: (Director of Learning for Living Job Horizon Program). If I had to

describe what makes Argus work, it would be family. The enrollees come in and they sense that they belong. They feel that we genuinely care about them.

Roselyn Martinez: (Program Participant). From the minute I got here, everybody just made me feel really comfortable -- everybody was like a family.

Steve Chesterton: (Teacher, Computer Services). It is truly a family. Many of our students have been through the comprehensive New York City high schools that have 3,000 students and they have literally gotten lost . Every aspect of their lives, someone here is interested in it. Many of our students have children and that's dealt with -- problems in day care, how can they get their kids taken care of; health issues. It's all dealt with.

Student Life

Rita Puddell: (Teacher/Administrator, Board of Education). The classes are small. There are nearly 15 to 20 students a class. The teachers get to know every student. We talk about the students at lunch or in meetings. They become friends.

Steve Chesterton: (Teacher, Computer Services). We found that the computer itself is a motivator. It is an intrinsic motivator. Students will do work on a computer that they may have difficulty doing with a pencil and paper so I use the computer to increase their reading skills, to increase their comprehension skills and through all of that they are learning computer literacy, which certainly is going to help them with whatever job they get.

Jobs

Gary DeVoe: (Job Developer). It is not easy convincing employers to hire our young people. They are very reluctant at first. But once they see our young people's behavior -- that they are responsible and capable of doing the job -- I get calls back for more.

Charmaine Swearing: (Director of Learning for Living Job Horizon Program). After they do get the job, then we stay with them. We make sure that we call them in the morning. Are you going to work? Do you have money for lunch?

Al Strother: (Vice President of Operations). We teach them how to retain the job and, if they lose it, how to get another one.

Carol Alston: (Program Participant). Right now I am not on public assistance and I was before. I am earning $10.45 an hour. Everything is great. I couldn't ask for anything more.

Charmaine Swearing: (Director of Learning for Living Job Horizon Program). The last person went on the job interview this morning and he got a job, so right now we stand at 100% -- we have placed 27 out of 27 for this training cycle.

Success

Carol Alston: (Program Participant). They tell me to open up. Before I came here, I was very shy, I was very closed in. I couldn't communicate well with other people and they showed me how to be able to do that and not to be afraid -- to go out there and try new and different things. **Roselyn Martinez:** (Program Participant). Argus has prepared me for what I am today. I am a better person -- better attitude, definitely. I learned to calm down my temper and how to get along with people.

Carol Alston: (Program Participant). So they have given me everything that I know now. Without them I wouldn't be where I'm at now.

"It Works?"

Mary Taylor: (Vice President, Clinical Services). It would be helpful to replicate this program in other places, simply because it works. We're seen kids come in here really acting out behavior, coming from courts, and we see them graduate with jobs and hope for the future.

Closing Screen: "Learning for Living is a youth development program that works." U. S. Department of Labor

Appendix 6
Transcript of A Replication Training Video Based On

ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings
February 18, 1998

PETER JENNINGS: Tomorrow, the Milton Eisenhower Foundation is going to release a report on a program that is reducing the crime rates in a number of American cities with remarkable success. It is a simple, but very effective idea called the koban. And it comes from Japan. Here's ABC's Deborah Amos.

DEBORAH AMOS, ABC News (Voice Over): This is a Japanese koban, a neighborhood center where police are also neighborhood helpers. With thousands of kobans in Japan, the country is one of the safest in the world. This is a koban in Columbia, South Carolina, and a model for community policing borrowed from Japan. Home base is Gonzales Gardens, a housing project once plagued by drugs and nightly gunfire.

PROGRAM DIRECTOR, Koban, Inc.: The reason why the koban is located in this building is because that corner was a drug-infested corner. Now the corner is drug free.

DEBORAH AMOS (On Camera): In fact, serious crime has dropped by about a third with the koban program. The crime rate in the rest of Columbia stayed the same. But there's more to this new kind of community policing. Borrowing another idea from Japan, officers are all-purpose neighborhood helpers.

DEBORAH AMOS (Voice-Over) With the koban right in the neighborhood, police come when there's family trouble.

Officer ALBERTUS COCKLIN, Columbia, South Carolina Police: If they have a problem, the first place they run is to me, you know? If their parents are not home, they run and get Officer Cocklin.

Officer MARGARET YARBOROUGH, Columbia South Carolina Police: Part of the koban program is being there all the time. They see us as human beings. We take off the uniform sometimes and go out and play a basketball game.

DEBORAH AMOS (Voice-Over): Or toss a football with teenagers, encouraging long-term relationships that expand the koban program well beyond American standards of community policing -- with a mentoring program, coordination with community groups, and cooperation with local schools. Police officers even check on schoolwork.

MARGARET YARBOROUGH: Have you done your homework today?

CHILD: Yeah.

MARGARET YARBOROUGH: Who checked it for you?

DEBORAH AMOS (Voice-Over): They provide a safe haven to go after school, when crime is most likely to happen. Here, they meet role models and learn paths to success. The best measure of success is in these faces here. Deborah Amos, ABC News, Columbia, South Carolina.